

TOP SECRET

CABINET OFFICE

(This File must not go outside the Office.)

CAB 163/33

Registration

28 MAY 1954

C 1969.

File Number

82/142/8 Pt 2

Previous Reference

82/142/8 Pt. 1.

For Cross References see inside of Cover

Joint Intelligence Committee

FAR EAST

INDONESIA.

Capableness & Military Threat to Malaysia.

Referred to

Date

Referred to

Date

Referred to

Date

E
406

K

2

TOP SECRET

Other Files containing Matter Bearing on this Subject.

File No.

Subject

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First Review

This file has now passed out of active use. Under the Public Records Act 1958, it must be reviewed within five years to determine whether it should be destroyed or retained for departmental use.

This file should accordingly be -

- a. ~~destroyed on 31.12.49... or~~
- b. retained for administrative purposes for 25 years.

Signature.....

H. W. J. Smith

Date 25 May 1972

Notes

1. Where the file has only short-term usefulness (ie extending to at most five years) it should be marked at (a) for destruction at a pre-determined time when it is judged likely to have ceased to be of any further use to the Department.
2. Where it cannot be so treated (b) will apply. Each file so retained will be subject to a second review at 25 years by the Departmental Record Officer who, in conjunction with the Public Records Office Liaison Officer, will decide whether it should be transferred to the Public Records Office for permanent preservation. Material destined for the Public Records Office will be withheld for so long as security considerations require.

C18.1.71

SECRET




MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1
Telephone: WHITEhall 7022, ext.

168

Our reference: D/DIS/6/1
Your reference:

16th August, 1965

SECRETARY, J.I.C.



142/8.

Java Sea Passage

When the last Java Sea passage was being considered a few weeks ago there was some not unnatural divergence of service views on the threat which the Indonesian Air Force would have posed to the two escorts concerned.

2. A threat under such circumstances is never easy to define in precise terms and of course there are always considerations both of 'capability' and 'effectiveness' to be taken into account.

3. There is the further point that since the matter was last under review BADGERS have carried out successful - if set piece - ASM firings.

4. This subject will come to the fore again in late September/October when the next passage is being considered.

5. Under the circumstances it is therefore proposed that J.I.C.F.E. be asked by the J.I.C. to provide an assessment and a draft telegram is annexed.

Rekt

D. of D.I.C.

Copy to: DNI
DMI
ACAS(I)

*Amendment agreed
with D of Dic
17/8*

SECRET



SECRET

Draft Telegram to J.I.C.F.E. from J.I.C.

Re COSSEA 64. As it seems likely that question
of Java Sea passage will ^{now have to} be reconsidered ^{in the course of the} ~~at some date~~
^{next few months} ~~in the future~~ an up-to-date assessment taking into
account recent developments especially the Badger ASM
trial firing of the threat posed to two escorts using

(a) Sunda

(b) Lombok

is requested.

2. Such an assessment should cover the alternative
assumptions of

(a) 12 hours notification

(b) 48 hours notification

SECRET

7
168

Originating Authority GCHQ

Reference and Date 1/2 15th July 65

See 'C' File 142/B/C

Folio No. 49:

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166

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1. Category 'A' Cypher telegram. Paraphrase NOT required.
2. A telegram which contains a reference to any classified telegram or correspondence must itself be classified.
3. The Cabinet Office Communications Centre (Tel. No. WHI 5422 Ext. 196/197) must be consulted if it is desired to distribute or release this telegram, or any part of it, to a person or nation who would not normally be authorized to receive it.

FROM: J.I.C. LONDON

D.T.G. 16.45 (GMT) 15.7.65.

TO: C-IN-C FAR EAST

TEL NO: JIC 703

DATED: 15TH JULY 1965.

ROUTINE

CONFIDENTIAL

142/8.

FOR SECRETARY JICCFD

¹⁶²
FROM SECRETARY JIC

REFERENCE MY SIGNAL JIC 679 D.T.G. 131245Z.

ANNEX 'A' OF JICCFD 83 WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY SIGNAL
MIS-READ HERE AS BEING THAT OF JICCFD 82.

FULL COPY OF JICCFD 82 RECEIVED BY BAG TODAY.

DISTRIBUTION: SEC JIC (5)

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165

SECURITY WARNINGS

1. Category 'A' Cypher telegram. Paraphrase NOT required.
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FROM: C-IN-C FAR EAST

DTG 05.07 (GMT) 14/7/65

TO: J.I.C. LONDON

TOR 09.57 (GMT) 14/7/65

TEL NO: RTT/JICFE 86

DATED: 14TH JULY, 1965.

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL.

142/8.

FOR SECRETARY JIC FROM SECRETARY JIC(FE).

REFERENCE YOUR JIC 679 DATED 13TH JULY. 162.

1. PARA 6 OF JICFE 82 CONSISTS OF EIGHT PAGES WHICH ARE ATTACHED TO JICFE 82 ITSELF. AS PARA 20 TO ANNEX A COMES HALF-WAY DOWN PAGE A-4 CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY YOUR COPY SHOULD END THERE.

2. THE COMMENT AT PARA 6 IS RELATED TO PRESS STATEMENTS. PARA 24 OF ANNEX A TO JICFE 82 READS

QUOTE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR OPENING FIRE ON NAVAL CRAFT AND AIRCRAFT (UNCLS).

24. IN A STATEMENT MADE TO THE PRESS ON 22ND JUNE, AFTER A CEREMONY

IN MEDAN COMMEMORATING THE 14TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BUKIT BARISAN

(KODAM 2) MILITARY AREA, GENERAL YANI CALLED ON ALL SERVICEMEN TO

SHOOT AT ANY ENEMY VIOLATOR OF INDONESIAN AIRSPACE, WATERS OR LAND,

IN LINE WITH AN ORDER GIVEN BY PRESIDENT SUKARNO TO A RECENT

CONFERENCE OF NAVAL LEADERS, TO FIRE AT NAVAL CRAFT. THIS ORDER BY

YANI HAS BEEN BACKED UP BY A SIMILAR ONE BY THE FLEET COMMANDER.

COMMENT. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL INSTANCES OF THE ENEMY

FIRING AT OUR AIRCRAFT, THE INSTRUCTIONS FOR FIRING AT OUR NAVAL

CRAFT IS A NEW POLICY AND INDICATES THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INCREASED

RISK OF FIRE BEING DIRECTED AGAINST OUR SEA PATROLS. UNQUOTE.

DISTRIBUTION:- J.I.C. NORMAL

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Originating Authority J.I.C.

Reference and Date Jic 678 13* June 1965

See 'O' File 142/8/c

Folio No. 48

EXTRACT from C.O.S. 36¹² MEETING/64 held on 13 July 65.

(164)

2. PASSAGE OF HM SHIPS THROUGH THE JAVA SEA 142/8.

Recorded as a Confidential Annex.

TOP SECRET
(Use only in the Ministry of Defence)

163.

Instructions on completing this form are in Office Instructions—MOD Manual 2

Category AC: no unclassified reply or reference

PRECEDENCE—ACTION PRIORITY	PRECEDENCE DEFERRED	131515 Z	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS EXCLUSIVE
FOR COMM. CENTRE USE	FROM MOD UK	PREFIX	
	To (Each address to start on a new line)	*SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (Messages referring to a classified message must be classified Restricted or above)	
	CINC FAR EAST	TOP SECRET	
	INFO	DIG 1	SERIAL No.
		RTT	7015
		142/8.	

COSSEA 60

Exclusive for CinC Far East from Chief of the Defence Staff

Reference: W. RTT/121130Z/SEACGS134 — 1596

- Points you make in Reference will have to be considered by the Chiefs of Staff ~~and discussed~~ with the Secretary of State. Australian Naval Board instruction 1285/201/35 dated 28th June will be taken into account. It will therefore not now be possible to seek a collective Ministerial decision on 14th July as intended.
- Reference your paragraph 8, you can be assured that you will not be required to effect this passage before 5th August. You should adjust your escort programme accordingly.

WARNING
NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY
OR REFERENCE

DISTRIBUTION (To include originator)

ES to Secretary of State	
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CAS (5)	Office (2)
DCDS (1) (2)	Room 9 Foreign Office (2)
D of DP	Major General J.M. McNeill
Sec DPS (3)	ORO (2)
AUS (Pol)	Mr. A.A. Golds, JMID
Head of DS 11	

FILE NUMBER	
DRAFTER'S NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS	J.T. FREMANTLE
DIV./DIR./BRANCH	COS SEC
TELEPHONE NUMBER	BUILDING: Main EXTENSION: 6717
RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	John Fremantle
NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS	J.H. LAPSLAW
RANK	A.V.M.

Page 1 of 1 Pages
*Tick appropriate box
This message ☒ refers to a classified message
☐ does not refer

* These sections must be completed

Wc.24226/2746 20,000 pads 6/64 W.H.&S 51/115

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SECURITY WARNINGS

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FROM: J.I.C. LONDON

DTG 12.45 (GMT) 13/7/65

TO: C-IN-C FAR EAST

TEL NO: JIC 679

DATED: 13TH JULY, 1965

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL.

R4B.
159x.

FOR SECRETARY JIC(FE) FROM SECRETARY JIC.

REFERENCE JIC(FE) 82 OF 9TH JULY, PARAGRAPH 6.

YOUR SUMMARY IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF REFERENCE FURTHER REFERS TO ANNEX "A" IN PARAGRAPH 24, BUT WE HAVE ONLY RECEIVED UP TO PARAGRAPH 20 OF ANNEX "A". IS THE COMMENT ON THE PARAGRAPH AT REFERENCE RELATED TO PRESS STATEMENTS OR HAVE YOU SEEN OTHER INSTRUCTIONS, APART FROM THOSE MENTIONED IN JIC(FE) 79, SUPPLEMENT, PARAGRAPH 8, WHICH WE HAVE NOT SEEN ?

1
C

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PLUS:- FAR EAST HEADS OF SECTIONS (20)

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P.e. (161)

FROM SINGAPORE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(Office of the Political Adviser to the Commander-in-Chief Far East)

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Adams

No. 460

12 July, 1965

D. 1130 12 July, 1965

R. 1329 12 July, 1965

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

FILCH

Dist" gic Limited
13⁷/₆₅

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 460 of 12 July,
Repeated for information to Djakarta

Kuala Lumpur
and Saving to Washington

160

Djakarta telegram No. 1484: Indonesian Intentions.

JIC(FE) comments are as follows; references are to paragraphs in Djakarta telegram.

2. Sir A. Gilchrist does not state the time-scale in which he frames his assessment. In these comments we are considering the period covering the proposed passage of escorts through the Sunda Straits and Indonesian Independence Day, 17 August, i.e. the next month or six weeks.

3. Reference paragraph 3: the build up in Borneo has not increased beyond that planned months ago. Whilst in the long term there may be an increase in activity, we do not think that within our time-scale the Indonesians are likely to increase their effort very much beyond what they have been doing recently. There might be a repetition of the Simanggang Road operation but apart from this, recent incidents in East Malaysia have produced no little effect on the general political situation that we do not think they need to be taken into account in the present context. As regards West Malaysia, "A" operations have been going through a bad patch lately and it will take them a little time to build up again, but we do expect some increase. If they are dealt with as effectively as in the past, the effect should not be significant.

4. Reference paragraphs 4-6: we agree with Sir A. Gilchrist as regards the internal aspects, and indeed think that many of the actions to which he points are intended for internal consumption as

/part

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POLAD Singapore telegram No. 160 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

part of maintaining the tension on which alone Sukarno seems able to operate. We feel, however, that the world political climate is very different from that prevailing at the time of the New Guinea campaign. It is of course possible that Indonesian thinking is so rigid that they cannot appreciate this and will act as if conditions have not changed.

5. Reference paragraphs 7-10: we think that Sir A. Gilchrist is reading too much into the naval incidents which he quotes in paragraphs 2(d) and 10. The somewhat highly coloured version of the PuncHESTON incident on which he bases his interpretation was issued for Press purposes and naturally makes the most of it. Sir A. Gilchrist was sent explanation on 8 July. The Aru Sea incident (his paragraph 10) was an operation similar to present-day "A" operations, which was intercepted, as we have intercepted many such; it was not a "crushing Indonesian naval defeat". The PuncHESTON incident, as well as the anti-aircraft fire from the Rhios, antedates the "shoot at sight" orders; we do not yet know how far these sabre-rattling speeches have been reflected in orders to units. The Royal Navy are resuming their practice of patrolling inside the 12 mile limit claimed by Indonesia and we shall not doubt see some reactions on which to base an assessment.

6. In his paragraph 2, Sir A. Gilchrist sets out several factors which all point in one direction. We believe that he has left out some others of a more fundamental sort which would influence us in the opposite sense. These include the fact that the Indonesians rarely carry out well co-ordinated policies; what is put into effect is usually both late and modified by considerations which the originator ignored, either deliberately or through lack of knowledge. In this case, while Sukarno and Subandrio might well like to have a ship sunk, this feeling is unlikely to be matched in the navy, who might not press their attack to the point of getting sunk. In general, the armed forces show much reserve about "confrontation": their leaders go along as far as they think they must in order to keep their places, but we have the impression that none of the Indonesian forces is anxious to try conclusions with the British.

7. Another factor, of a different type, which Sir A. Gilchrist does not mention is the sudden return of Sukarno, while Subandrio and Aidit continue their travels. We have said that we are unable to guess at the reasons for this, but if we had been making a new assessment of Indonesian intentions we should have tried to bring

/this

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POLAD Singapore telegram No. 460 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

this factor in. As it is, we can do no more than say that if something spectacular were brewing we should have expected Subandrio and Aidit to have been around to help stir the pot.

8. None of Sir A. Gilchrist's arguments make us change our views about the Java Sea Passage, except that we now accept the view, which he has expressed in telegrams not repeated to you, that short notice should be given, e.g. at 1300 hours for a passage of the Sunda Strait to be complete by last light. As regards the build-up of tension for 17 August, we have seen nothing to suggest the imminence of major offensive action, but it would be in character for the Indonesians to try something for the great day; this might be military, sabotage, or something like a breach of diplomatic relations. They seem to be afraid of what we might do to them; their reactions to our moves have always been cautious, with the single possible exception of the victorious passage, but if, as is possible, they intensely dislike the proposed passage of escorts through their waters, they might thereafter adopt a tougher attitude. The risk of this would be greater if we had given any publicity to the passage.

9. Commander-in-Chief concurs.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington No. 9.

[Repeated as requested]

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FROM DJAKARTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir A. Gilchrist

No. 1484

10 July, 1965.

D. 1327 10 July, 1965.

R. 1503 10 July, 1965.

PRIORITY

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FILCH

142/20⁸

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1484 of 10 July

Repeated for information to:- Kuala Lumpur

Singapore

and Saving to:- Washington

Tokyo

Peking

Confrontation: Indonesian Intentions.

I have referred in rather scrappy fashion in recent telegrams to my inclination to take a somewhat darker view of Indonesian intentions, and the following is an attempt to pull the various factors together and to analyze them.

2. These factors are:-

(A) The military and subversive operations build-up in Borneo and Sumatra (details obtainable from JIC);

(B) The threatening speeches made by all the Indonesian political and military leaders (reported ad nauseam in my telegrams);

(C) The orders given to the armed forces to "shoot at sight" (see in particular my telegrams Nos. 1359 and 1397);

(D) Recent Indonesian actions; the HMS Puncheston incident of 23 May (see Commander-in-Chief Far East signal 061347Z to Ministry of Defence); anti-aircraft fire near civil aircraft from the Riau Islands; report (which may have no basis) of a fire-fight between patrol boats off Sebatik (my telegram No. 1406 to Foreign Office).

(E) The use by Dr. Subandrio of a forged letter to work up national anger against the British and Americans and the general success of this manoeuvre (my telegrams Nos. 1455 and 1474).

/3. On (A) our

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Jakarta telegram No. 1484 to Foreign Office

-2-

3. On (A), our intelligence committees have much better means of assessing probabilities than I have but my guess is that the increased potential will be increasingly used, i.e., that the Borneo penetrations will be stepped up in number though probably not in size; ditto sampan operations against Singapore and Malaya;

4. On (B) and subsequent headings, the first comment is that the New Guinea pattern is being followed. The aim is to build up inside Indonesia a wave of popular passion and menace which will make such an impact on

(i) The "enemy"; and

(ii) The world in general;

that some form of appeasement will materialize in circumstances not yet clearly foreseen, and Indonesia will secure her objectives, or at any rate a partial victory (e.g., removal of British forces from Borneo) which would guarantee complete success at a later date.

5. But there is a secondary aim on the part of the PKI; they are out to obtain the first essential concession which will pave the way for a Communist take-over, namely the arming of the workers and the peasants, at any rate those who are loyal to the PKI. (The 'take-over' may well be gradual and bloodless once the workers are armed and Army spirits correspondingly dampened.) In pursuing this aim the PKI is obtaining increased support or connivance from Soekarno and Subandrio among the politicians, and from Omar Dhaqi among the military leaders.

6. In order to secure the national and party objectives mentioned above, more tension has to be generated, hence (C) and (E), to create the impression of encirclement and menace by outside aggressive forces - British of course.

7. The next question is, how far the Indonesians will go in generating tension. We do not, of course, know the terms of the actual orders issued. There is a notable difference between what Soekarno said on 17 June (my telegram No. 1333) and later statements: Soekarno said he had issued orders to shoot after refusal to obey warning shots. Martadinata on 19 June referred to orders to shoot at sight (my telegram No. 1359); Soekarno's qualifying phrase has not been repeated. But there are incidents in (D). The Puncheston incident, when the Indonesian ship deliberately trained its guns on an obviously British ship presumably anti-dated Soekarno's order, but in hindsight it seems rather important. If the later orders had been in effect, what would have happened?

/8. It is clear

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Bombarta telegram No. 1484 to Foreign Office

-3-

8. It is clear that the orders issued are likely to encourage subordinate commanders to get themselves involved in incidents involving bloodshed. For some time I was inclined to think that the public statements were for the record and that very possibly the actual orders issued enjoined discretion. But I now have very material and well-founded doubts about this hypothesis.

9. What is likely to happen? Take a case - a casual encounter outside the 3-mile limit but comfortably inside the 12 miles which the Indonesians claim as Indonesian territorial waters, between a British and an Indonesian warship of approximately the same power. Very possibly the Indonesian commander would refer back for instruction, taking no action other than mere menace in the meantime; and instructions when they came (very possibly after contact was over) might well be of a restraining nature.

10. On the other hand, there must now be an appreciable risk that in such circumstances some Indonesian commander, either because his orders actually say so, or because of the excited feelings aroused in his bosom, will open fire, especially perhaps if the British ship were on a course towards Indonesian territory. I believe that an incident of this kind would please Soekarno and Subandrio. They would not be too displeased if their ship was sunk forthwith - it was a crushing Indonesian naval defeat which touched off their political victory over the Dutch.

11. What the political moves would be to exploit such an incident I cannot very well say. Perhaps Russia, Egypt, Pakistan and China might combine to demand a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of British forces from the area, starting off with a request to be allowed to send a peace mission, a kind of imitation of the Commonwealth peace mission to Viet Nam. But this is the merest speculation. The initial move might well be evoked from Japan. Meanwhile, "the peasants and workers" would be getting their rifles.

12. If the above assessment of the Indonesian position is somewhere near correct, what is our own best line of action? Any incident of this kind should be avoided by us if possible. Since it will tend towards Indonesian political advantage by calling world attention to the patrolling activities of British warships in an area close to Indonesia; and this will apply win or lose, so we might as well make sure of winning. I trust our ships will disregard shots fired across their bows in international waters. The difficult point will be this:

/suppose that

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Djakarta telegram No. 1484 to Foreign Office

-4-

suppose that (shall we say because of the necessity of letting the Indonesians have the first go) we actually suffer defeat and lose a small ship and the victorious Indonesian vessel escapes beyond the reach of hot pursuit: are we then to retaliate? Where, when, how, how much, what with? However hard a thought it may be I would be inclined to favour no repeat no retaliation the first time, merely political action coupled with a warning for the future. But I will leave the matter there for the present, except to say that our continued planning may require an early and careful review, in the sense of graduated response.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Washington 346, Tokyo 57, and Peking 32.

[Repeated as requested].

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SSSSS

SECRET

Secretary has seen

With the compliments of
THE PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY'S
DEPARTMENT

Mr G. G. Arthur

For Limited Circulation

5 p.m. Mon 12 July 65

FOREIGN OFFICE S.W.1.

July 12th

, 1965

TOP SECRET

Category AC: no unclassified reply or reference.

CULATION

1596.

Secretary

Deputy Secretary

Assistant Secretary 1

~~Assistant Secretary 2~~

~~Assistant Secretary 3~~

Assistant Secretary 4

From: CINCFE

To: MOD (UK)

121130Z July

Other copies circulated to:-

Date 12.7.65

Rec'd 1839Z

WARNING

NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE

PRIORITY

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EXCLUSIVE

RTT/SEACOS

134 Exclusive for the Chief of the Defence Staff References:

a. RTT/COSSEA 57 DTG: 091535Z July

b. JIC(FE) 50/65 (revised final).

1. Before answering the questions, there are certain principles which I consider must be established:

a. I assume that this is intended to be the first of series of passages to assert our right of innocent passage.

b. Our aim would therefore be to carry out such transits in a peaceful manner. The implications of paragraph 5b(2) of reference a. inconsistent with this aim.

c. Not only do I fully support the reasons given in reference b. for preferring the Sunda Strait but I consider that transit of the Lombok Strait is Militarily unsound because we cannot provide effective support on account of the distance involved.

d. Any consideration of the Forces which would be required depends on the time of the Indonesians are given to decide what to do and to deploy forces. The timing of our notification of the passage is therefore a most critical factor in the whole operations. (See paragraphs 5 and 6 (below).

2. Reference a. paragraph 5a. I consider that the ships should make the transit on 5th August which would allow ARK ROYAL to complete her scheduled maintenance on 3rd August. An earlier date would require altering this maintenance period with consequent security risks. By 5th August BULWARK would be in Aden and Indonesian fears that she might attempt a transit would have been allayed. Although PLYMOUTH and ZEST could sail with Bulwark I would retain them in Australian waters until the right moment. I consider the need for tight security of greater importance than making the earlier passage before the Indonesian campaign to increase tension has built up prior to 17th August, Indonesian Independence Day.

3. Reference a. paragraph 5b(1). To support the passage and be prepared for immediate retaliation, I would require:

TOP SECRET

/a.

a. A Strike carrier to provide fighter and anti surface protection in a suitable position in the South China Sea, but as near to the Java Sea as possible without undue risk of detection.

b. To bring Theatre Air Strike forces discreetly to the appropriate degree of readiness.

c. Selected Ex-Theatre Air reinforcements to be brought to readiness.

4. Reference a. paragraph 5b(2). As we intend to assert a right, we should not ask Indonesia to grant or refuse permission as implied. We should avoid the situation described in this paragraph as our aim is to assert the right of innocent passage without provoking an incident. If, however, this course was pursued I should:

a. Require to bring Theatre Forces to immediate readiness for plan ALTHORPE.

b. Require the despatch of selected Ex-Theatre Air reinforcements for plan ALTHORPE.

c. Have to consider positioning a Strike Carrier in the Java Sea with its attendant risks.

5. Reference a. paragraph 5c. The adequacy of Theatre Forces depends on the amount of notification given to the Indonesians. If there is little or no notification, Theatre Forces would be adequate, as the risk of an incident would be slight. If, however, 48 hours notification was given Theatre Forces would not be adequate and I would need Ex-Theatre reinforcements up to the level required for plan ALTHORPE or in any case if the ships are attacked unexpectedly.

6. Reference a. paragraph 6. I feel that the phrase "48 hours notice" is causing some confusion. I know of no evidence demanding 48 hours notification of passage. Furthermore HM Ambassador in Djakarta has agreed that notification of the transit in question need be no earlier than 1300 on a weekday for passage to be completed by last light on the same day. This would give the Indonesians little opportunity to mount an attack. On the other hand 48 hours warning would allow them time to mount a coordinated attack on our ships and to launch a propaganda campaign. On this occasion the ships concerned would be two small ships as opposed to a strike carrier the movements of which always arouse Indonesian concern.

7. To conclude I strongly recommend that we do not give the Indonesians 48 hours notice but only a minimum warning and the Lombok Strait should not be used for transit.

8. ARK ROYAL begins her maintenance on 19th July. An early decision would therefore be appreciated.

121130

A/C DOC

Part 1 1840/12

Part 2 2040/12

PS to S of S DOC/COSSEC (14)
CDS (7) SEC JIC
CNS (5) Cabinet Office ✓
CGS (4)
CAS (5)
DCDS (1)(2)
D of DP
Sec DPS (2)
AUS(Pol)
Head of DS 11
Head of DS 5

MOD SECRET FORM

COSSEA 57.

(For use only in the Ministry of Defence)
Category AC: no unclassified reply or reference

Instructions on completing this form are in Office Instructions—MOD Manual 2

PRECEDENCE—ACTION PRIORITY		PRECEDENCE INFO DEFERRED		DATE—TIME GROUP 091535 Z		MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS EXCLUSIVE	
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		To (Each address to start on a new line)				TOP SECRET	
		CINC FAR EAST				Sup Sec in High "C" Team	
		INFO		DIG		SERIAL No.	
				RTT		7008	

COSSEA 57

Exclusive for Commander-in-Chief from the
Chief of the Defence Staff

References: A. COS 34th Meeting/65, Minute 5. — 149a
B. JIC(1st) 50/65. — 44 in C file

1. You will have seen Reference A and will have noted that a minute was to be submitted to the Secretary of State recommending that Ministerial authority should be obtained to exercise our right of innocent passage.

2. The Secretary of State has replied to the minute that while he favours taking a suitable opportunity he recognises the need to look carefully at the practical implications with particular reference to the consequences of a decision to go ahead with notifying our intention to make the passage.

3. On the instructions of the Secretary of State a paper is now being prepared seeking Ministerial approval, subject to Australian and New Zealand concurrence, for two RN escorts to return from Fremantle to

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* These sections must be completed

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Wt.24226/2746 20,000 pds 6/64 W.H.B.S. 51/1153

MOD SIGNAL MESSAGE FORM

(For use only in the Ministry of Defence)

Instructions on completing this form are in Office Instructions—MOD Manual 2

PRECEDENCE—ACTION	PRECEDENCE INFO DEFERRED	DATE—TIME GROUP Z	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS	
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	To (Each address to start on a new line)		*SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (Messages referring to a classified message must be classified Restricted or above)	
	INFO		DIG	SERIAL No.

Singapore through the Java Sea on a suitable date as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made.

4. Ministers will wish to be assured that while all preparations for the passage avoid any measures which might be construed as provocative, adequate steps can be taken to adopt a suitable posture for subsequent support of the ships undertaking the passage and retaliatory action should the passage be opposed.

5. Before a final draft of this paper is submitted to the Secretary of State we wish to have your views, as a matter of urgency, on the following aspects:

a. The dates on which the passage should take place. Understand on single service channel that August 5th will be earliest suitable date.

b. What measures you would wish to take in order to be prepared for

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4 Pages

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Category AC: no unclassified reply or reference

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	INFO	DIG	SERIAL No.	

the following contingencies:

(1) Notification has produced no adverse reactions but Indonesians nonetheless attack ships. Support must be provided for them as far as possible by air and naval forces initially from outside the the Java Sea, and available to take appropriate retaliatory action at short notice (see (2) below).

(2) Indonesians refuse permission from the outset, whereupon we deploy forces to demonstrate our intention of going ahead notwithstanding. Obviously scale of our action would be proportionate to resistance which materialises but might have to include air attack on Indonesian naval and air forces and bases in area.

c. Whether British forces currently deployed in the theatre are adequate to cover the possible contingencies, bearing in mind that to lend colour to the claim of innocent passage no overt military measures

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MOD SIGNAL MESSAGE FORM

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	To (Each address to start on a new line)		*SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (Messages referring to a classified message must be classified Restricted or above)	
	INFO		DIG	SERIAL No.

including significant reinforcement of your theatre should be taken near to the time of notification of passage.

6. We note your preference for route and timing of the notification of the passage expressed in Reference B. However Secretary of State may well wish to propose passage through Lombok Straits on political grounds and the standard 48 hour notification.

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PS to S of S CDS (7) CMB (5) CCS (4)
CAS (5) DCDS(1) (2) D of IP Sec DPS (2)
AUS (Pol) Head of DS11 Head of DS5
DOC/COSSEC (14) Secretary JIC, Cabinet Office

FILE
NUMBER

DRAFTER'S NAME
IN BLOCK
LETTERS

R.K. Chater

DIV./DIR./BRANCH

COSSEC

TELEPHONE
NUMBER

BUILDING: MOD
EXTENSION: 6804

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OFFICER'S
SIGNATURE

J. C. FREEMAN

NAME IN
BLOCK LETTERS

J.H. Lapsley

RANK

Air Vice-Marshal

Page 4 of 4 Pages
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* These sections must be completed

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159x

FROM:- C-IN-C FAR EAST.

DTG:- 0920 (GMT) 9.7.1965.

TO:- J.I.C. LONDON.

TOR:- 1642 (GMT) 9.7.1965.

INFO:- BDLS WELLINGTON.

BHC CANBERRA.

BHC OTTAWA.

BRITISH EMBASSY WASHINGTON.

TEL NO: FCK/JICFE 82.

DATED : 9TH JULY 1965.

ROUTINE.

S E C R E T .

R4/3

FROM SECRETARY J.I.C. FAR EAST FOR SECRETARY, J.I.C.

INFORMATION TO SECRETARIES J.I.C. NEWZEALAND, J.I.C. AUSTRALIA,

B.D.L.S. WELLINGTON,

B.H.C. CANBERRA FOR GRIER, B.H.C. OTTAWA FOR BRIND AND BRITISH
EMBASSY WASHINGTON FOR WESTLAKE.

J.I.C.(F.E.) REVIEW OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AS AT 9TH JULY, 1965.

1. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT IS TAKING PLACE
OF 2 K.K.O. MARINE LANDING BRIGADE FROM PULAU BINTAN TO ZATAM,
IN THE RHIOS. THIS WILL INCREASE THEIR POTENTIAL FOR OFFENSIVE
OPERATIONS AGAINST SINGAPORE (PARA. 3 OF ANNEX 'A').

2. IN SARAWAK, NO CONTACT HAS BEEN MADE WITH THE GROUP WHICH TOOK
PART IN THE SERIAN ROAD INCIDENTS ON 27TH JUNE. ON THE BORDER,
THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL INDONESIAN INCURSIONS INTO THE FIRST AND
SECOND DIVISIONS OF SARAWAK DURING THE WEEK, BUT NO MAJOR ATTACKS.
THERE HAVE BEEN NO CONTACTS ALONG THE REST OF THE BORDER. (PARA.8.
OF ANNEX 'A').

/3. MOVES

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

3. MOVES TO PERSUADE THE MODERATE CHAIRMAN AND SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE SARAWAK UNITED PEOPLES PARTY (S.U.P.P.) TO RETAIN THEIR POSITIONS ARE CONTINUING. (PARA. 9. OF ANNEX 'A').

4. A KEY BYE-ELECTION IS BEING FOUGHT IN SINGAPORE ON 10TH JULY WHEN THE BARISAM SOCIALISTS OPPOSE THE P.A.P. IN A STRAIGHT FIGHT. THE RESULT WILL NOT AFFECT THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE ASSEMBLY, BUT A VICTORY FOR THE BARISAM, WHO ARE STANDING ON AN ANTI-MALAYSIA PLATFORM, WOULD BE A MAJOR BOOST TO THE MORALE OF THE COMMUNIST UNITED FRONT. (PARA. 6. OF ANNEX 'A').

5. CELEBRATIONS FOR THE PROPHETS BIRTHDAY IN SINGAPORE, ALSO ON 10TH JULY, WILL BE ON A REDUCED SCALE AND IT IS NOT EXPECTED THAT THERE WILL BE ANY RECURRENCE OF THE COMMUNIST RIOTING WHICH ACCOMPANIED THE OCCASION LAST YEAR. (PARA. 7. OF ANNEX 'A').

6. INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES TO FIRE AT ANY AIRCRAFT OR NAVAL VESSELS VIOLATING INDONESIAN TERRITORY. ALTHOUGH OUR AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN FIRED AT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, THE ORDER FOR FIRING AT OUR NAVAL CRAFT IS A NEW POLICY. (PARA. 24. OF ANNEX 'A').

7. IN NORTH VIETNAM TWO MORE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SITES ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION NORTH OF HANOI, INDICATING THAT A SIX-SITE COMPLEX IS ENVISAGED. (PARA. 26. OF ANNEX 'A').

ENDS.

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J.I.C. NORMAL.

SECRET

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82

159

COS 2018/9/7/65

Copy No.....

Ministry of Defence

9th July 1965

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RECEIVED

12 JUL 1965

J. I. C. (1)

142/8.

Copy to: Chief of the Defence Staff
Mr G.G. Arthur, Foreign Office
Major-General J.M. McNeill, Commonwealth
Relations Office
Mr A.A. Golds, Joint Indonesian/Malaysian
Department
COS Normal List

PASSAGE OF HM SHIPS THROUGH JAVA SEA

1. On instructions from the Chief of the Defence Staff a paper (1) prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) and which has been agreed by the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, on the assertion of right of passage of HM Ships through the Java Sea is attached for your information.
2. The Joint Intelligence Committee have informed me that they did not entirely agree with the conclusions of the JIC (FE) paper attached and are circulating their comments through special channels.

J.H. Lapsley
Air Vice-Marshal
Secretary
Chiefs of Staff Committee

Annex: A. JIC (FE) paper on assertion of right of passage of HM Ships through Java Sea.

Note:

1. JIC (FE) 50/65.- C file (44)

TOP SECRET

12 JUL 1965

J.I.C.

Please initial and pass quickly

1. Secretary *W*

2. ~~D/Secretary~~ *PJ*

~~A/Secretary 1~~ *W*

A/ - do - 2

A/ - do - 3 *✓*

A/ - do - 4 *✓*

3. P.C.

4. Subject File 142/8

Reports File

ANNEX A TO
COS 2018/9/7/65

JIC(FE)50/65(Revised Final)

ASSERTION OF RIGHT OF PASSAGE OF HM SHIPS THROUGH JAVA SEA

Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East)

Reference: CINCPAC 45/65

REQUIREMENT

1. We have been asked to comment on the policy in Reference to sail HM ships through the Java Sea en route from Australia to Singapore thereby asserting the right of passage through and international waterway. In particular:
 - a. Is the Lombok Strait the best Strait to choose bearing in mind likely Indonesian intentions?
 - b. Would the Sunda Strait be better militarily and more effective politically?
 - c. What, if any, notice, should be given of an intention?

DISCUSSION

2. JIC(FE) consider that the Sunda Strait should be chosen for the following reasons:
 - a. Indonesia prevented passage of the Victorious group through this Strait last August and thereby achieved a moral British defeat.
 - b. Right of passage of the Lombok Strait has already been established. In any case the Lombok Strait was only suggested in September, 1964 by the Indonesians, and accepted by HMG, as a face saving political formula suitable to both sides.
 - c. There may be a time when it is militarily important to use the Sunda Strait without prior notice and the sooner we re-assert our right of passage the better.
 - d. The Sunda Strait offers an advantage should the operation need to be called off for any reason. The ships could initially shape a course from the SE for Christmas Island and proceed past the Island on a route which would take them around the North tip of Sumatra. The latest possible decision whether to transit the Strait could thus be taken in the light of circumstances without revealing our original intention.
 - e. The use of the Sunda Strait reduces the time during which the ships would be exposed to interference, particularly by naval forces, as it avoids the passage along the North coast of Java. It would also make it easier for our naval and air forces to provide support. If the Lombok Strait was used this passage would take place when Indonesian ministers had been alerted, and, as in the case of the Victorious incident, might wish to make a demonstration.

ANNEX A TO
COS 2018/9/7/65
(Continued)

f. The warning time for Indonesian naval forces stationed between Java and Singapore would be correspondingly reduced.

3. JIC(FE) consider that the advantages in giving little or no notice of intent are:

a. The Straits in question are a recognised international waterway. Legally no notice of passage is required and no advantages accrue. The degree of Indonesian military and political reaction will be in direct proportion to the length of notice received.

b. Information that Victorious would return from Freemantle through the Sunda Straits allowed the declaration of an exercise area and sufficient time to ensure our knowledge of that fact. Indonesia could again declare a false or fictitious exercise area or close the Strait for other reasons if given any warning. Failure to enforce a passage after the declaration of an exercise area would put us in a worse position, politically and militarily, than we are already.

c. Provided Indonesian air and naval forces have not been previously alerted there will be insufficient time for them to interfere effectively with the passage through the confined waters of the Strait.

4. The advantages of giving some notice are:

a. It could prevent Indonesian commanders from reacting rashly when they learn of the presence of the ships.

b. It would ensure that the Indonesians were aware of the passage and so establish our point.

c. It conforms to recent practice, up to and including the Victorious passage.

5. HM Ambassador, Djakarta, while admitting that the considerations are fairly evenly balanced, comes down in favour of short notice. We believe that the essential point is to secure a safe passage. We do not believe that, except in time of great tension, local commanders would take offensive action against the ships without orders from Djakarta. We therefore conclude that no advance notice should be given. In order to guard against the possibility that the Indonesians would fail to observe the ships, we recommend that the Naval Attache would make a low-level communication the morning after the transit has taken place so that the Indonesians could verify their presence if they wished.

6. As the object of this operation is to achieve a normal passage, publicity should be avoided, since such publicity would itself be unusual. It would also humiliate the Indonesians and so compromise the success of future passages.

CONCLUSIONS

7. We conclude that:

a. The Sunda Strait should be chosen for the assertion of our right of innocent passage through the Java Sea. HM Ambassador, Djakarta agrees.

A - 2

TOP SECRET

ANNEX A TO
COS 2018/9/7/65
(Concluded)

b. No warning of intention should be given to the Indonesians but they should be informed after the passage of the Strait.

c. No publicity should be given to the passage.

E.F. GIVEN

M. HAYWARD-BUTT

A.K. FURSE

W.D.A. GARNIER

B.J.M. TOVEY

V.K. METCALFE (for DSI)

A - 3

TOP SECRET

157

Originating Authority JIC

Reference and Date ... JIC/582/65 ... 9th July 1965 ..

JIC/583/65 12 " " 47.

See 'O' File 142/8/c

Folio No. 46.

156

Originating Authority JIC

Reference and Date JIC/578/65 8* July 1965

See 'O' File 142/8/c:

Folio No. 45

SECRET

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185c

FROM. J.I.C. LONDON.

DTG. 16.35 (GMT) 8/7/65.

TO. C-IN-C FAR EAST.

TELNO. JIC 676.

DATED. 8TH JULY 1965.

PRIORITY.

S E C R E T

142/3

FOR SECRETARY JIC (CFE) FROM SECRETARY J.I.C.

REFERENCE JIC(CFE) 80. — c file 427)

YOUR JICFE 50/65 HAS BEEN PASSED TO CHIEFS OF STAFF WHO HAVE NOW ASKED FOR JIC COMMENTS BEFORE THE WHOLE PROJECT IS CONSIDERED BY MINISTERS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

2. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT CERTAIN JIC DEPARTMENTS HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT YOUR CONCLUSIONS: WE SHALL SIGNAL JIC COMMENTS AS SOON AS APPROVED.

DISTRIBUTION. J.I.C. LIMITED.

SECRET

TOP SECRET

1556

SECURITY WARNINGS

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(DIST AUTH. AT 1343 (GMT) 8.7.65.

FROM:- C-IN-C. FAR EAST.

DTG:- 0845 (GMT) 7.7.1965.

TO:- J.I.C. LONDON.

TOR:- 2345 (GMT) 7.7.1965.

TEL NO: JICFE 81.

DATED : 7TH JULY 1965.

ROUTINE.

142/8

TOP SECRET.

FOR SECRETARIAT J.I.C. FROM CHAIRMAN J.I.C. (F.E.).

REFERENCES: A. JIC FE 77 010850Z } 426. C file
B. JIC FE 80 050507Z } 427.

1. IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF REFERENCE 'A' WE STATED THAT H.M. AMBASSADOR THOUGH THAT CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE AMOUNT OF NOTICE TO BE GIVEN WERE FAIRLY EVENLY BALANCED. HE HAS SINCE MODIFIED HIS VIEWS TO SOME EXTENT, MAINLY FOR POLITICAL REASONS, AND IS NOW STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF GIVING A FEW HOURS NOTICE.

2. WE HAVE THOUGHT CAREFULLY ABOUT THIS BUT STICK TO OUR VIEW THAT THE SAFETY OF THE SHIPS CAN BEST BE SAFEGUARDED BY GIVING NO NOTICE WHILE EX POST FACTO NOTIFICATION WOULD ENSURE THAT THE PASSAGE WOULD NOT GO ENTIRELY UNOBSERVED. WE NEVERTHELESS THOUGH THAT YOU SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE MODIFICATION OF H.M. AMBASSADORS VIEWS FROM THAT STATED IN REFERENCE 'A'.

ENDS.

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TOP SECRET

1559

Originating Authority JIC

Reference and Date JIC/567/65 7* July 1965

See 'O' File 142/8/c

Folio No. 44

EXTRACT from C.O.S. 35¹¹ MEETING/64 held on 6 July 65.

155

121. JAVA SEA

CONFIDENTIAL 142/8.

The Secretary was informed by telephone of the approval of the Chiefs of Staff to a Secretary's minute (1) subject to amendment in accordance with their views (2) (3) (4) (5). The Secretary of State has been minuted accordingly.

Notes:

1. CCS 1976/1/7/65. - 142a.
2. CNS 104/65.
3. MO1/LM/1370/313.
4. CAS 3451.
5. JMID Proposed amendments dated 2 Jul 65.

TOP SECRET

J.I.C./82/142/8

S/F

154

SECRETARY,
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

PASSAGE OF H.M. SHIPS THROUGH THE JAVA SEA

JIC/567/65/142/8 C.

... I enclose a paper (JIC(FE)50/65(Revised Final)) prepared by J.I.C.(F.E.) at the request of the Commander Far East Fleet. It has been seen and agreed to by the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, and I have been requested to pass copies to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. An advance copy had earlier been passed to the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff.

2. An advance copy has also been circulated to the Joint Intelligence Committee and I have been informed that some Departments represented on the Committee disagree with the conclusions of the J.I.C.(F.E.). If, therefore, there is any question of the Chiefs of Staff taking these conclusions into account in their studies, the Joint Intelligence Committee would wish to be given an opportunity to comment.

3. A Confidential Annex to the J.I.C.(F.E.) paper (of which the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff already has a copy) is being sent to you separately with reference to this minute.

(M.G.L. JOY)
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1

6th July, 1965

Telephone request from
COS. Secretariat per 8 July that
they want comments as rapidly as
possible.

Mr Leach is taking action

RJG

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Sec.
153

SECURITY WARNINGS

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FROM: C-IN-C FAR EAST

DTG 05.07 (GMT) 5/7/65

TO: J.I.C. LONDON

TOR 07.22 (GMT) 5/7/65

TEL NO: RTT/JICFE 80

DATED: 5TH JULY, 1965

142/8.

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOR SECRETARY JIC FROM SECRETARY JIC(FED).

REFERENCE RTT/JICFE 77 DTG 010850Z JULY. *-151.*

C-IN-C FAR EAST HAS NOW SEEN THIS PAPER AND AGREES WITH IT.

RESTRICTION ON DISTRIBUTION IS REMOVED. PLEASE PASS COPIES TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF AND OTHER STAFFS CONCERNED.

DISTRIBUTION:- J.I.C. LIMITED.

*Since the depn is
disgrace
If COs are going to
take into account, the
would like to give the
opportunity to comment.*

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET

152a

82

COS 1976/1/7/65

Copy No.....

Ministry of Defence

1st July 1965

CNS
CGS
CAS



Copy to: Chief of the Defence Staff
Mr G.G. Arthur, Foreign Office
Major-General J.M. McNeill, Commonwealth
Relations Office
Mr A.A. Golds, Joint Malaysian/Indonesian
Department
COS Normal List

PASSAGE OF HM SHIPS THROUGH THE JAVA SEA

1. In a previous minute (1) a draft minute to the Secretary of State on the passage of HM ships through the Java Sea was circulated for your approval.
2. On the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff a second draft, Annex A, which supercedes previous drafts has been prepared and you are requested to inform me of your approval to, or your comments on it by 1200 on Monday 5th July 1965.

J.H. Lapsley
Air Vice-Marshal
Secretary
Chiefs of Staff Committee

Annex: A. Second draft minute to the Secretary of State.

Note:

1. COS 1964/30/6/65. *1498.*

TOP SECRET

J.I.C.

- 2 JUL 1965

Please initial and pass quickly

1. Secretary *mf*

2. D/Secretary *mf*

~~A/Secretary~~ *1* *W*

A/ - do - *2*

A/ - do - *3*

A/ - do - *4* *ign*

3. P.C.

4. Subject File

142/8

~~Reports~~ File

ANNEX A TO COS 1976/1/7/65

REVISED DRAFT

Secretary of State

Copy to: Deputy Secretary of State

PASSAGE OF HM SHIPS THROUGH THE JAVA SEA

1. The Indonesian Government claims the entire area within the islands surrounding the Java Sea as "Indonesian internal waters", which would give them a right to control all shipping in that area. How far the Indonesians interpret this right as extending to the right to refuse passage has not been clearly established. However, they have been left in no doubt that HMG does not recognise their claim that the Java Sea counts as "internal waters".
2. Even on the basis on which the Indonesians have established their claim to "internal waters", the 1958 United Nations Convention (of which we but not Indonesia are signatories) would allow us the right of innocent passage through the Java Sea. In our view, the straits giving access to the Java Sea are international ones since they link two areas of the high seas. However, we accept a judgment of the International Court of Justice in 1949 that in times of tension a coastal state would be justified in regulating, though not prohibiting, the passage of warships through such straits, and the Indonesians have not attempted to go beyond this.
3. The last time we exercised our right of innocent passage through the Indonesian claimed waters was in August/September 1964. On this occasion, HMS VICTORIOUS and two escorts passed through the Sunda Strait en route from Singapore to Freemantle.

ANNEX A TO COS 1976/1/7/65
(Continued)

Following this transit, the Indonesians dropped hints that they would resist the return passage of these ships by the same route. HMG felt that they were committed to assert the right of innocent passage on the return voyage because any detour to avoid the Indonesian Straits would have represented a substantial political defeat for the UK.

4. In the course of intensive political and military consideration of the implications, it was at first decided that the VICTORIOUS and her escorts would accordingly have to make the return passage by way of the Sunda Strait. Measures were taken to put our air and naval forces into a posture equivalent to that appropriate for what is now Plan ADDINGTON, so that we could take retaliatory action in case any of HM ships were attacked. This included the positioning of an aircraft carrier just north of the Caspar Straits. It was later decided that since the Sunda Straits are so narrow it would have been indefensible to hazard such a ship as the VICTORIOUS whose freedom of manoeuvre and ability to defend herself would have been restricted. It was agreed, therefore, that only the two escorts should pass through the Sunda Strait and that their passage should be supported by HMS VICTORIOUS from the south of the Sunda Strait and by HMS CENTAUR from the north of the Caspar Strait; VICTORIOUS would then go round Sumatra. At the last moment the Indonesians came forward with a face-saving device, by declaring a naval exercise area enclosing the Sunda Strait and suggesting that HMS VICTORIOUS and her escorts should use the Lombok Strait instead. HMG thereupon decided to notify the Indonesian authorities (both naval and political) of the intended passage of the Lombok and Karimata Straits by HMS VICTORIOUS and her escorts, which had by this time been increased to five, including HMS HAMPSHIRE. Precautions were taken both to avoid provocation

ANNEX A TO COS 1976/1/7/65
(Continued)

by HM ships and to protect them against possible attacks by Indonesian forces. In the event, the passage was completed without untoward incident. Since then none of HM ships has passed through the Straits connecting the Java Sea and the Indian Ocean, although the then Foreign Secretary did in fact suggest an exercise by a Carrier Task Force in the Java Sea last October as a demonstration.

5. If we do not exercise our right of innocent passage and continue to avoid the Java Sea, the possible adverse consequences would be:

a. To lead the Indonesians to think that we are not prepared to resist their claims, thus increasing the risks of Indonesian interference with British merchant shipping (which has so far continued to transit the 'internal seas' without interference) and resulting in a corresponding loss of confidence among the British shipping companies and their customers.

b. To undermine our contention that the Indonesian territorial sea claims are illegal; and give encouragement to other nations who may wish to encroach on the freedom of the seas.

c. From the operational viewpoint, to lengthen the voyage between Singapore and Australia by one to two days.

6. We discussed this situation at our meeting on 29th June and are agreed that from the military point of view we ought in principal to exercise our right of innocent passage at appropriate intervals. Although we would prefer to do this when it fell conveniently in the course of routine naval movements, nevertheless we appreciate that a decision on

ANNEX A TO COS 1976/1/7/65
(Continued)

when and where a passage is made must take account of political factors. If there is a politically ideal moment, it could be engineered to have the appearance of a routine sailing. In any case, we concluded that the longer the next passage is delayed the more difficult it may be. The present time would seem to be quite favourable, following the postponement of the Afro-Asian conference in Algiers until October/November.

7. There are three occasions in the near future on which routine sailings of HM ships could be made through the Java Sea and the straits connecting it with the Indian Ocean. The first would be later this month. HMS BULMARK is due to sail shortly from Singapore to Australia through open waters before returning to the United Kingdom; she will be accompanied by two escorts and we propose that these two ships should return in July to Singapore through the Lombok Straits. The next routine movement is likely to be the relief of the two RAN escorts in the Far East Fleet in August and the third, the passage of a carrier to take part in an exercise in Australian waters in November. You will probably agree that it would be appropriate for the first passage to be made by a HM rather than a RAN ship. In any event consultation with the Australian, New Zealand and Malaysian Governments will be necessary and the US authorities will have to be informed.

8. Notification of these movements to the Indonesian Government would follow the normal routine procedure and would be made by the Naval Attache in Djakarta 48 hours beforehand.

9. Once we have announced our intentions, we must follow it through whatever the Indonesian reaction. Consequently

ANNEX A TO COS 1976/1/7/65
(Continued)

a ministerial decision to retaliate at once if the ships are attacked is needed before we say anything about the passage.

10. There are two cases to be considered:

a. If our notification produced no adverse reaction from the Indonesians, the ships will go through on their own. Should they be attacked we must come to their aid so far as we can with air and naval forces from outside the Java Sea.

b. If our notification meets with an Indonesian refusal to allow the passage, we should immediately deploy a carrier force with appropriate escorting vessels as near as possible to the Java sea and, by aerial sorties and other means, demonstrate to the Indonesians our determination to support the ships on passage by military action if necessary. In the event of a resisted passage, the scale of our action would depend on the scale of Indonesian resistance but it might have to include carrierborne air attacks on Indonesian naval and air forces and their bases in the area.

11. In either case, in order to lend colour to the claim of innocent passage, no overt military measures should be taken in advance of notification, but we should make all appropriate preparations for immediate action if required. For example, a carrier could be discreetly sailed from Singapore.

12. Our current force levels in the Far East are nearly the same as they were when it was decided to send VICTORIOUS through in September last year, and we do not think that any

TOP SECRET

ANNEX A TO COS 1976/1/7/65
(Concluded)

reinforcement is necessary in connection with the Java Sea passage.

13. From a military point of view we recommend that Ministerial authority should be obtained for our right of innocent passage through the Java Sea to be exercised as suggested above, but we would be glad to know your views before a paper is prepared which you could table at a meeting of the DCPC in the near future.

Chief of the Defence Staff

July 1965

A - 6

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Originating Authority JIC

Reference and Date JIC/142/8/c 1st July 1965

See 'C' File 142/8/c

Folio No.

(15)

Originating Authority JIC (FE)

Reference and Date JIC (FE) v/N 1st July 1965

See 'C' File 142/8/c

Folio No.

SECRET

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5. REQUIREMENTS FOR J.I.C. REPORTS ON
MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA

(Previous reference: J.I.C.(65)24th Meeting, Item 1)

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN, JOINT INTELLIGENCE STAFF, recalled that the Committee had instructed the Joint Intelligence Staff to suspend work on their paper "The Outlook for Malaysia and Brunei Over the Next Two Years", pending urgent preparation of a new short term study of likely developments in relations between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. Their decision had been taken on 10th June, 1965 in the light of indications then of an approaching crisis. In preparing their report the J.I.S. had consulted the High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur who considered that, with the departure of Tunku Abdul Rahman, the crisis was no longer imminent. The Tunku was not due back in Malaysia until the end of August. In the circumstances it was proposed, with the agreement of the Commonwealth Relations Office, that the J.I.S. should revert to the preparation of the longer term study, which they could do quickly, incorporating in it a study of the relationship between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, and that they should suspend work on the short term study of the latter problem.

The Committee:-

- (1) Took note.
- (2) Instructed the Acting Chairman, Joint Intelligence Staff, to proceed as at 'X' above.

J.I.C.

F 1 JUL 5

Please initial and pass quickly

1. Secretary

2. D/Secretary

~~A/Secretary~~

A/ - do - 2

A/ - do - 3

A/ - do - 4

3. P.C.

4. Subject File

~~Reports~~ File

Chairman

JIS

142/8.

1496.
158

COS 1964/30/6/65

Copy No.....82

Ministry of Defence

30th June 1965

CNS
CCS
CAS

Copy to: Chief of the Defence Staff
Mr G.G. Arthur, Foreign Office
Major-General J.M. McNeill, Commonwealth
Relations Office
Mr A.A. Golds, Joint Malaysian/Indonesian
Department
COS Normal List

PASSAGE OF HM SHIPS THROUGH THE JAVA SEA

1. At your meeting (1) on 29th June you instructed me to revise the draft minute (2) to the Secretary of State on the above subject in the light of your discussion. A revised draft minute is accordingly at Annex A.
2. In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff, you are requested to inform me of your approval to, or your comments on, the draft minute at Annex A by 1200, Friday 2nd July 1965.

J.H. Lapsley
Air Vice-Marshal
Secretary
Chiefs of Staff Committee

Annex: A. Draft Minute to the Secretary of State

Notes:

1. COS 34th Meeting/65, Item 3.
2. Annex B to COS 1930/23/6/65.



DRAFTANNEX A TO COS 1964/30/6/65

Secretary of State

Copy to: Deputy Secretary of State

PASSAGE OF HM SHIPS THROUGH THE JAVA SEA

1. The Indonesian Government claims the entire area within the Indonesian Archipelago as "Indonesian internal waters". Even if this claim was admitted, the 1958 United Nations convention would allow the right of innocent passage through "internal waters" and International Straits, even though these were within the territorial sea of the coastal state. It has been held that in times of tension a coastal state would be justified in regulating, though not prohibiting, the passage of warships through its straits. Nevertheless the Indonesians have been left in no doubt that HMG does not recognise their extravagant claims.

2. The last time we challenged the Indonesian claims by exercising our right of innocent passage was in August/September 1964. On this occasion, HMS VICTORIOUS and two escorts passed through the Sunda Strait en route from Singapore to Fremantle. Following this transit, the Indonesians reacted strongly in order to impede the return passage of these ships by the same route. HMG felt that they were committed to assert the right of innocent passage on the return voyage because any detour to avoid the Indonesian Straits would have represented a substantial political defeat for the UK with unpredictable effects on our whole military position in the Far East.

3. In the course of intensive political and military consideration of the implications, it was at first decided that the VICTORIOUS and her escorts would accordingly have to make the return passage by way of the Sunda Strait. Measures amounting to instituting what is now Plan ADDINGTON and including the positioning of an aircraft carrier just north of the Karimata Straits were put in hand for retaliatory action in case any of

ANNEX A TO COS 1964/30/6/65
(Continued)

HM ships were attacked. It was later decided that it would have been indefensible to hazard such a ship as the VICTORIOUS by placing her in a situation where her freedom of manoeuvre and ability to defend herself would have been restricted. It was agreed, therefore, that only the two escorts should pass through the Sunda Strait and that their passage should be supported by HMS VICTORIOUS from the south of the Sunda Strait and by HMS CENTAUR from the north of the Caspar Strait. Finally, the Indonesians came forward with a face-saving device, by declaring a naval exercise area enclosing the Sunda Strait and suggesting that HMS VICTORIOUS and her escorts should use the Lombok Strait instead. HMG there upon decided to notify the Indonesian authorities (both naval and political) of the intended passage of the Lombok and Karimata Straits by HMS VICTORIOUS and her escorts, which had by this time been increased to five, including HMS HAMPSHIRE. Precautions were taken both to avoid provocation by HM ships and to protect them against possible attacks by Indonesian forces. In the event, the passage was completed without untoward incident. Since then none of HM ships has passed through the Straits connecting the Java Sea and the Indian Ocean, although the Foreign Secretary did in fact suggest an exercise by a Carrier Task Force in the Java Sea last October.

4. If we do not exercise our right of innocent passage and continue to avoid the Java Sea, the possible adverse consequences would be:

- a. To reduce our defence and political status in the area and create a general loss of confidence in our ability to support our allies against external threats.
- b. To suggest that we can no longer safeguard our own interests in the area, thus increasing the risks of Indonesian interference with British merchant shipping

ANNEX A TO COS 1964/30/6/65
(Continued)

(which has so far continued to transit the 'internal seas' without interference) and resulting in a corresponding loss of confidence among the British shipping companies and their customers.

c. To undermine our contention that the Indonesian territorial sea claims are illegal; and give encouragement to other nations that may wish to encroach on the freedom of the seas.

d. From the operational viewpoint, to lengthen the voyage between Singapore and Australia by one to two days.

5. We discussed this situation at our meeting on 29th June and are agreed that we should not allow this state of affairs to continue indefinitely, but must assert our right of innocent passage at the appropriate time. Although we would prefer to do this when it fell conveniently in the course of routine naval movements, nevertheless we appreciate that when and where a passage is made is a political decision. There seemed to be two choices in deciding on the timing of these passages. They could either be arranged to coincide with a normal routine naval movement which might not be the ideal time politically, or they could be made at a politically ideal moment and engineered to have the appearance of a routine sailing. However, we concluded that the longer the next passage is delayed the more difficult it will be, and that the present time would seem to be quite favourable, following the postponement of the Afro-Asian conference in Algiers until October/November.

6. There are three occasions on which routine sailings of HM ships could be made through the Java Sea and the straits connecting it with the Indian Ocean. The first would be in July. HMS BULMARK is due to sail shortly from Singapore to

ANNEX A TO COS 1964/30/6/55
(Continued)

Australia through open waters before returning to the United Kingdom; she will be accompanied by two escorts and we propose that these two ships should return in July to Singapore through the Lombok Straits. The next routine movement is likely to be the relief of the two RAN escorts in the Far East Fleet in August and the third, the passage of a carrier to take part in an exercise in Australian waters in November. You will probably agree that it would be ~~in~~appropriate for the first passage to be made by a HM rather than a RAN ship. In any event consultation with the Australian, New Zealand and Malaysian Governments will be necessary and the US authorities will have to be informed.

7. Notification of these movements to the Indonesian Government would follow the normal routine procedure and would be made by the Naval Attache in Djakarta 48 hours beforehand. Having announced our intentions and irrespective of the Indonesian reaction, we would necessarily have to be prepared to follow the matter through to the bitter end. If there was no reaction to the notification, it would still be necessary to take suitable defensive measures, as covertly as possible, to protect the ships put at risk. If there was a hostile reaction to the notification, we would have to take all necessary measures, perhaps as discreetly overt as may be considered desirable, to impress the Indonesians of our intention to ensure the ships' safe passage. Since our current force levels in the Far East are nearly the same as they were when it was decided to send the VICTORIOUS through in September last year, reinforcing movements would not need to be made on the same scale and therefore would not be so evident.

8. We would be grateful for your views on whether and when it might be politically possible to exercise our right of innocent

TOP SECRET

ANNEX A TO COS 1964/30/6/65
(Concluded)

passage through the Java Seas. If you so wished, a memorandum on this subject could be prepared for you to table at a meeting of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee in the near future.

Chief of the Defence Staff

A - 5

TOP SECRET

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of *m jg, sec Jic*

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 61

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO
COS 34TH MEETING/65, HELD ON TUESDAY
29TH JUNE 1965 AT 3.30 pm

3. PASSAGE OF HM SHIPS THROUGH THE JAVA SEA

(Previous Reference: COS 55th Meeting/64, Minute 1A)

The Committee had before them a Secretary's Minute (1) covering a report by the Navy Department (2) on a paper (3) by the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, reviewing the policy for passages by HM Ships through the Java Sea.

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that the Indonesian Government claimed a Territorial Sea that enclosed as "Indonesian internal waters" the entire area within the Indonesian archipelago, viz, the Java Sea, Flores and Banda Seas, the Southern part of the Macassar Strait and the Molucca Passage. HMG did not recognise the validity of this claim under the 1958 UN Convention on the Territorial Sea. Even if the Indonesian claims were admitted, the Convention would still allow foreign vessels a continued right of innocent passage through the enclosed "internal waters" and, moreover, a right of innocent passage through International Straits even though these might be within the Territorial Sea of the Coastal State. Nevertheless no HM Ships had transitted the Java Sea or the Straits connecting the Java Sea and the Indian Ocean since HMS VICTORIOUS and her escorts passed through the Lombok Strait in September 1964. The Navy Department's report generally supported the Commander-in-Chief, Far East's views and proposed a programme designed to re-establish our right of innocent passage as a matter of routine.

SIR DAVID LUCE said that there were three occasions in the next five months in which the right of innocent passage could be exercised. The first was in July when the escorts which accompanied HMS BULMARK to Australia on her way to home waters, could return through the Lombok Straits. The next occasion would be in August and the last in November. All these passages were of a routine nature.

If it was agreed that we should exercise our right again, it should be done as soon as possible; the longer the delay the harder it would be politically. The passages would have to be made as unobtrusively as possible as would any defensive measures we might take. Once the notice of our

Notes:

1. COS 1930/23/6/65.
2. CNS 104/65.
3. COS 89/65.

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Part I to COS 34th Meeting/65
29th June 1965

intention to make passage through the Java Seas had been given, we would have to be ready to go through with it in the face of any political or military opposition from Indonesia.

The amount of notice to be given to Indonesia was a matter for careful judgement, but he thought that more than 48 hours notice would, if the Indonesians were opposed to the passage, enable them to deploy additional forces; whereas the normal minimum notice of 48 hours would not give them time to carry out any significant redeployments. He had selected the Lombok Strait for the first of the series of passages as it would be less provocative than one through the Sunda Straits, although it would be easier to protect ships in passage through the latter.

At present only one escort would be accompanying HMS BULWARK to Australia. If the Committee wanted to have an effective force to exercise the right of innocent passage in July, a signal would have to be sent that night giving instructions for a second escort to sail.

In discussion, the following points were made:

- a. There were two choices in deciding on the timing of these passages. They could either be arranged to coincide with a normal routine naval movement which might not be the ideal time politically, or they could be made at a politically ideal moment and engineered to have the appearance of a routine sailing.
- b. It was difficult to estimate exactly what the Indonesian reaction would be but there was no doubt that they feared our retaliatory capability.
- c. There was no reason at the moment to wish to force an escalation by using the passage of HM Ships to provoke the Indonesians into taking action which might justify a decisive retaliation by us.
- d. As our present strength in the Far East was now almost equal to that which we required before agreeing to sail VICTORIOUS through the Sunda Straits in September 1964, there would not be the same need to reinforce the theatre before a similar passage.
- e. In exercising innocent passage we could not provide continuous protection for the ships but we would have to be prepared to take action should the Indonesians attack them without warning.
- f. In the event of Indonesia ignoring our notice, the ships would still sail and all possible precautions would have to be taken to provide for their protection without being provocative.

Part I to COS 34th Meeting/65
29th June 1965

g. Now that the Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers had broken down the present time might be a suitable one for exercising our right.

Summing up, LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that they agreed that they should take steps to exercise the right of innocent passage through the Java Sea and the Straits connecting it with the Indian Ocean. Whether and when these passages should take place was a matter for political decision. It would be preferable if such a passage could coincide with a routine naval movement. In this connection they agreed that a second escort should sail with HMS BULWARK. He considered that the Secretary of State should be informed of their views on the subject emphasising the importance of being ready to complete the passage in the face of Indonesian political or military opposition.

The Committee:

- (1) Agreed with the remarks of the Chief of the Defence Staff in his summing up.
- (2) Took note of the report by the Navy Department (2) and the Commander-in-Chief, Far East's paper (3).
- (3) Instructed the Secretary to prepare a draft minute to the Secretary of State informing him of their views, for clearance out of Committee.

Notes:

2. CNS 104/65.
3. COS 89/65.

EXTRACT from C.O.S. 34¹² MEETING/64 held on 29 June 65

149a

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Originating Authority JIC (FE)

Reference and Date JIC (FE) 46/65 (final) 24th June 1965,

See 'C' File 142/E/C:

Folio No.

000004

IMPORTANT THAT THIS MESSAGE BE PASSED BY A HIGH GRADE CYPHER

FROM MOD EDC

TO CABINET OFFICE PASS ROUTINE

ROUTINE 240448Z

FM CINCFE

TO CABINET OFFICE

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147

FROM:- C-IN-C FAR EAST

DTG 04.48 (GMT) 24.6.65.

TO J.I.C. LONDON

TOR 20.40 (GMT) 24.6.65.

TEL NO. RTT JIC(FE) 74

DATED 24TH JUNE, 1965.

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REFERENCE YOUR JIC 630 DATED 23RD JUNE, 1965.

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SECRETARY J.I.C. (5)

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J.I.C. 24 JUN 1965

Please initial and pass quickly

1. Secretary *W*

2. D/Secretary *W*

~~A/Secretary 1~~ *W*

A/ - do - 2 *W*

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A/ - do - 4

3. P.C.

4. Subject File 142/8

Reports File *W*

146a

COS 1930/23/6/65

Copy No.....

Ministry of Defence

23rd June 1965

CNS
CGS
CAS

Copy to: Chief of the Defence Staff
Mr G.G. Arthur, Foreign Office
Major-General J.M. McNeill,
Commonwealth Relations Office
PS to S of S
COS Normal List

PASSAGE BY HM SHIPS THROUGH THE
JAVA SEA

1. In a previous paper (1), the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, reviewed the policy for passage by HM Ships through the Java Sea and concluded that such passages were desirable and that their possibility should be considered on every suitable occasion.

2. At Annex A is a report (2) by the Navy Department which examines the Commander-in-Chief's paper; the Navy Department proposes a series of passages through the Java Sea commencing in July 1965 and they have invited the Chiefs of Staff:

- a. To agree that transit of the Indonesian-claimed seas should be progressively re-established on the basis of the programme proposed.
- b. To propose to the Secretary of State that he seeks the Foreign Secretary's early agreement to the principles set out.
- c. To invite the Commonwealth Relations Office to request the Australian Government to agree to the routing of their escorts as specified.
- d. To invite the Commonwealth Relations Office to seek the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand and Malaysian Governments to these proposals.
- e. To request the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, to make plans in accordance with their proposals.
- f. To invite the Navy Department to keep the US Navy informed through Naval channels.
- g. To take note of the Commander-in-Chief's original paper (1).

Notes:

1. COS 89/65, originally CINCPAC 45/65.
2. No 104/65 dated 18th June 1965.

TOP SECRET

COS 1930/23/6/65
(Concluded)

A draft minute to the Secretary of State, enclosing drafts to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaries, on the lines proposed at paragraph 2b. above is attached at Annex B.

3. In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff, this subject will be placed on the agenda for your meeting on Tuesday 29th June; I will show this minute as being relevant.

J.H. Lapsley
Air Vice-Marshal
Secretary
Chiefs of Staff Committee

Annexes: A. Passage by HM Ships through the Java Sea.

B. Draft Minute to the Secretary of State.

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ANNEX A TO COS 1930/23/6/65

PASSAGE BY HM SHIPS THROUGH THE JAVA SEAMemorandum by the Navy DepartmentThe Problem

No HM Ships have transited the straits connecting the Java Sea and Indian Ocean since HMS VICTORIOUS and her escorts passed through the Lombok Strait in September 1964 (See Appendix 1 for full account). Failure by HM Ships to pass through these waters from time to time is likely to be regarded as a tacit acceptance by HMG of an exclusion from them and recognition of Indonesia's extravagant claims to territorial waters. It is considered, therefore, that plans should now be made which would progressively re-establish the routine passage by HM Ships through Indonesian-claimed waters and straits. As nine months have already passed since the VICTORIOUS episode, the first passage of these waters in 1965 will need careful planning in order to make it as unprovocative as possible and give the Indonesians no cause for complaint. On the other hand, a half-hearted attempt would be worse than none at all: once we have made it clear that we intend to make a passage we must be ready to go through with it. It will be necessary, therefore, to seek advance authority from Ministers for the successful prosecution of the passage, in the face of any opposition that the Indonesians might be likely to mount as may be indicated by intelligence at the time.

Legal Position

2. The Indonesian Government claims a Territorial Sea that encloses as "Indonesian internal waters" the entire area within the Indonesian archipelago, viz, the Java Sea, Flores and Banda Seas, the Southern part of the Macassar Strait and the Molucca Passage (see (1)). HMG does not recognise the validity of this claim under the 1958 UN Convention on the Territorial Sea. Even if the Indonesian claims were admitted, the Convention would still allow foreign vessels a continued right of innocent passage through the enclosed "internal waters" and, moreover, a right of innocent passage through International Straits even though these may be within the Territorial Sea of the Coastal State. It has been held that in times of tension a coastal state would be justified in regulating, though not prohibiting, the passage of warships through its straits. Strictly speaking foreign states are not obliged to give advance notice of intended passage of their warships through such Straits but as a matter of courtesy, the RN have since 1962 given the Indonesian authorities prior informal notice of any unusual RN movements through waters close to Indonesian territory. The Indonesians, nevertheless, have been left in no doubt that HMG does not recognise their extravagant claims.

CINCFE's Proposals

3. In his report (2) CINCFE concluded that:
- a. It is desirable for HM Ships to make passage from time to time through the Indonesian archipelago.
 - b. The possibility of sailing ships through the Java Sea should be considered on every suitable occasion.
 - c. Agreement with Australian and New Zealand Governments is necessary before any RN/RAN/RNZN ship is sailed through the area.

Notes:

1. COS 242/64
2. COS 89/65

TOP SECRET

The CinC also draws attention in his report to suitable occasions in 1965 when ships could be sailed through the area.

Navy Department's Views

4. The Navy Department's observations are as follows:

- a. The longer the first passage is delayed the more difficult it will be politically as Indonesia will have come to look upon our withdrawal from the archipelago since last September as a tacit recognition of her authority. The Navy Department therefore considers that the first passage should be made as soon as possible consistent with favourable political and military circumstances. It will require Ministerial approval and adequate consultation with Australian, New Zealand, Malaysian and United States Governments. Since there is to be an Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers at the end of June and, as this would make an excellent platform for Indonesia to denounce any passage of these waters before this, it is suggested that the first of a series of passages during 1965 should take place in July.
- b. The right of innocent passage should be asserted on the first occasion in as unprovocative way as possible and should take place in the course of a routine movement in which transit of the Karimata/Lombok/Sunda Straits would plainly follow the normal and most direct route. The choice of ship(s) should be such as to avoid raising the stakes too high in terms of either tempting the Indonesians with too valuable a target or involving a vessel or vessels which, in the last resort, we would prefer not to expose to direct Indonesian attack. This would indicate a preference for escorts rather than a larger ship.
- c. Our legal right of innocent passage is indisputable. The only qualification is that it may be necessary to accept some measure of Indonesian regulation in the course of passage through International Straits which they claim as their territorial waters.
- d. Beyond this, however, there would be no room for concession. Once our intention to make a passage has been made known, we must be ready to go through with it in the face of any political or military opposition from Indonesia. Otherwise, instead of our having achieved anything, it would be the Indonesians who would have established their ability to refuse us passage and the political and military consequences could be very serious. Moreover, British merchant shipping, which now plies regularly through these seas, might in these circumstances feel unable to continue to do so.

Proposed Action

5. The Navy Department have considered the suggestions in paragraph 10 of CinCFL's report against the considerations set out above and put forward the following revised proposals for a series of passages in 1965:-

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ANNEX A TO
COS 1930/23/6/65
(Continued)

- a. BULWARK is due to go in July from Singapore to Australia before returning direct to Home Waters. If two Escorts could be detached from the Far East Station to accompany her to Australia (not through Indonesian claimed waters) it would be natural that these Escorts should return to Singapore through the Sunda or Lombok Straits. To reduce provocation to the minimum it is considered this passage should be through the Lombok Straits.
- b. Two RAN Escorts in the Strategic Reserve are due to be relieved in late August. As proposed by CinCCE they could sail from Singapore to Fremantle through the Sunda Strait and at the same time the two relieving ships could sail from Darwin to Singapore up the Java Sea.
- c. In November, Exercise WARRIOR will be held in Australian waters. As we normally send a Carrier to take part in these exercises, this would be a good opportunity to send a Carrier through the Indonesian-claimed seas, if one is available.

6. It would be the intention to notify intended passage in such a way as to give all possible emphasis to its routine nature. The timing would be subject to discussion with the political departments and would have to balance conflicting considerations: if too short it would give the Indonesians justifiable cause for complaint and might risk Indonesian military units not having been informed: if too long it might encourage them to hinder or prevent the passage by military or political action.

7. The above series of proposed passages is designed to re-establish our right of passage as a matter of routine with the minimum of provocation, and it is likely that there would be no opposition or, at the most, no more than verbal representations from the Indonesians. It would be necessary to establish beforehand in principle that any such representations would have to be firmly brushed aside. But the possibility of physical opposition cannot be ruled out, and an intelligence assessment will have to be made shortly before each passage. It will be necessary for contingency plans to be drawn up, and again for a decision in principle to be taken beforehand that in the unlikely event of physical resistance, any necessary military countermeasures should be taken to ensure a successful passage.

8. It will be necessary to consult the Australian, New Zealand and Malaysian Governments in view of their close association in confrontation matters and in the case of Australia because RAN escorts would be good candidates for a passage (paragraph 5b). The United States Government should also be kept informed of our intentions.

9. The Foreign Office have been consulted in the preparation of this paper.

Recommendations

10. The Chiefs of Staff are invited:

- a. To agree that transit of the Indonesian-claimed seas should be progressively re-established on the basis of the programme proposed in this paper;

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ANNEX A TO
30g 1930/23/6/65
(Concluded)

- b. To propose to the Secretary of State for Defence that he seeks the Foreign Secretary's early agreement to the principles set out in paragraph 7;
- c. To invite the Commonwealth Relations Office to request the Australian Government to agree to the routing of their escorts in accordance with paragraph 5b.
- d. To invite the Commonwealth Relations Office to seek the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand and Malaysian Governments to these proposals.
- e. To request Commander-in-Chief Far East to make plans in accordance with paragraph 5.
- f. To invite the Navy Department to keep the US Navy informed through naval channels.

APPENDIX: 1. VICTORIOUS, August/September 1964.

A - 4

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A
TO COS 1930/23/6/65

VICTORIOUS August/September, 1964.

HMS VICTORIOUS and two escorts passed through the Sunda Strait en route from Singapore to Fremantle in August 1964. Following this transit, the Indonesians reacted strongly in order to impede HM Ships return passage by the same route. HMG felt that they were committed to assert the right of innocent passage on the return voyage because any detour to avoid the Indonesian Straits would have represented a substantial political defeat for the UK with unpredictable effects on our whole military position in the Far East.

2. In the course of intensive political and military consideration of the implications, it was at first decided that the VICTORIOUS and her escorts would accordingly have to make the return passage by way of the Sunda Strait and measures were put in hand for full retaliatory action against all Indonesian forces, including their air bases, if HM Ships had been attacked. It was later decided that it would have been indefensible to hazard such a ship as the VICTORIOUS by placing her in a situation where her freedom of manoeuvre and ability to defend herself would have been restricted. It was agreed, therefore, that only the two escorts should pass through the Sunda Strait and that their passage should be supported by HMS VICTORIOUS from the south of the Sunda Strait and by HMS CENTAUR from the north of the Caspar Strait. Finally, the Indonesians came forward with a face-saving device, by declaring a naval exercise area enclosing the Sunda Strait and suggesting that HMS VICTORIOUS and her escorts should use the Lombok Strait instead. HMG subsequently decided to notify the Indonesian authorities (both naval and political) of the intended passage of the Lombok and Karimata Straits by HMS VICTORIOUS and her escorts, which had by this time been increased to five, including the HAMPSHIRE. Precautions were taken both to avoid provocation by HM Ships and to protect them against possible attacks by Indonesian forces. In the event, the passage was completed without untoward incident.

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ANNEX B TO COS 1930/23/6/65

DRAFT

Secretary of State

Copy to: Deputy Secretary of State

PASSAGE OF HM SHIPS THROUGH THE JAVA SEA

1. None of HM ships have passed through the Straits connecting the Java Sea and the Indian Ocean since HMS VICTORIOUS and her escorts passed through the Lombok Strait in September 1964. Our absence from these waters is likely to be regarded both as tacit acceptance by HMG of our exclusion from them and as recognition of Indonesia's extravagant claims to territorial waters. We therefore seek your agreement to a programme of routine passages by HM ships through these waters.
2. The Indonesians claim the entire area within the Indonesian archipelago as "Indonesian internal waters"; HMG does not recognise the validity of this claim. Even if the claim were admitted, the 1958 UN Convention would allow a right of innocent passage through both "internal waters" and International Straits even though these are within territorial waters; however, the right to regulate, though not to prohibit, the passage of warships through such straits exists.
3. We have concluded that the longer the next passage is delayed the more politically difficult it will be and consider that it should therefore be made as soon as possible consistent with favourable political and military circumstances. Consultation with Australian, New Zealand, Malaysian and United States Governments will be necessary; we are advised

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ANNEX B TO COS 1930/23/6/65
(Continued)

that it may be preferable to await the completion (or abandonment) of the Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers to avoid its use as a platform for the denunciation of such a passage.

4. We therefore propose that the first of a series of passages during 1965 should take place in July. This passage should be as unprovocative as possible, should take place in the course of a routine movement, and should involve ships which will not offer too valuable or tempting a target. Subject to the agreement of Political Departments, notification of these movements to the Indonesians would, following normal routine procedure, be made by the Naval Attache, Djakarta, 48 hours beforehand.

5. HMS BULWARK is due to sail in July from Singapore to Australia before returning direct to UK; we propose to detach two escorts to accompany her (through open waters) and that these two ships should return to Singapore through the Lombok Straits. In late August two RAN escorts are due to be relieved from Singapore; we propose that they should transit the Sunda Straits and that their replacements should sail from Darwin up the Java Sea. Lastly, we would normally send a carrier to take part in exercises in Australian waters in November; this would form a good opportunity to send such a ship through Indonesian-claimed areas, if one is available.

6. The above series of passages is designed to establish our right of passage as a matter of routine with the minimum of provocation; it is likely that there would be no opposition or, at most, no more than verbal representations from the Indonesians. It will be necessary to establish beforehand in principle that any such representations would be firmly

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ANNEX B TO COS 1930/23/6/65
(Concluded)

brushed aside. However, the possibility of physical opposition cannot be ruled out and it will be necessary to prepare plans against this contingency; it will again be necessary to decide beforehand in principle that, in the unlikely event of physical resistance, any necessary military counter-measures should be taken to ensure a successful passage.

7. You will note that time is short if the first passage is to be made in July, bearing in mind that there is no little planning and consultation involved. In this connection, should approval not be forthcoming in time for the return passage of BULMARK's escorts in July, we might be placed in the embarrassing position of asking the Australians to go first. We therefore seek your agreement in principle to the execution of the series of passages of Indonesian waters noted above, regardless of Indonesian reactions both verbal and physical, and to the planning necessary to ensure a successful passage in the worst event. On the assumption that you will wish to consult your colleagues I attach draft minutes to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaries.

June 1965

Chief of the Defence Staff

Appendix: 1. Draft Minute to Foreign Secretary.

B-3

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DRAFT

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX B TO COS 1930/23/6/65

Foreign Secretary

Copy to: Commonwealth Secretary

PASSAGE OF HM SHIPS THROUGH THE JAVA SEA

1. None of HM ships have passed through the Straits connecting the Java Sea and the Indian Ocean since HMS VICTORIOUS and her escorts passed through the Lombok Strait in September 1964. Our absence from these waters is likely to be regarded both as a tacit acceptance by HMG of our exclusion from them and as recognition of Indonesia's extravagant claims to territorial waters. I consider that we should now re-establish routine passage by HM ships through these waters; and I seek your agreement to this course of action.
2. You will be familiar with the legal implications; in brief, the Indonesians claim the entire area within the Indonesian archipelago as "Indonesian internal waters"; HMG does not recognise the validity of this claim. Even if the claim were admitted, the 1958 UN Convention would allow a right of innocent passage through both "internal waters" and International Straits even though these are within territorial waters; however, the right to regulate, though not to prohibit, the passage of warships through such straits exists.
3. We have concluded that the longer the next passage is delayed the more difficult it will be politically and consider that it should therefore be made as soon as possible consistent with favourable political and military circumstances. This action will require Ministerial approval and adequate consultation with Australian, New Zealand, Malaysian and United States Governments. It will be preferable to await the completion (or abandonment) of the Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers to avoid its use as a platform for the denunciation of such a passage.

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX B TO COS 1930/23/6/65
(Continued)

4. We therefore propose that the first of a series of passages during 1965 should take place in July. This passage will be as unprovocative as possible, will take place in the course of a routine movement, and will involve ships which will not offer too valuable or tempting a target. Subject to your agreement, notification of these movements to the Indonesians would, following normal routine procedure, be made by the Naval Attache, Djakarta, 48 hours beforehand.

5. HMS BULWARK is due to sail in July from Singapore to Australia before returning direct to UK; we propose to detach two escorts to accompany her (through open waters) and that these two ships should return to Singapore through the Lombok Straits. In late August two RAN escorts are due to be relieved from Singapore; we propose that they should transit the Sunda Straits and that their replacements should sail from Darwin up the Java Sea. Lastly, we would normally send a carrier to take part in exercises in Australian waters in November; this would form a good opportunity to send such a ship through Indonesian-claimed seas, if one is available.

6. The above series of passages is designed to establish our right of passage as a matter of routine with the minimum of provocation; it is likely that there would be no opposition or, at most, no more than verbal representations from the Indonesians. It will be necessary to establish beforehand in principle that any such representations would be firmly brushed aside. However, the possibility of physical opposition cannot be ruled out and it will be necessary to prepare plans against this contingency; it will again be necessary to decide beforehand in principle that, in the unlikely event of physical resistance,

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX B TO COS 1930/23/6/65
(Concluded)

any necessary military counter-measures should be taken to ensure a successful passage.

7. You will note that time is short if the first passage is to be made in July, bearing in mind that there is no little planning and consultation involved. In this connection, should approval not be forthcoming in time for the return passage of BULWARK's escorts in July, we might be placed in the embarrassing position of asking the Australians to go first. I therefore seek your early agreement, and that of the Commonwealth Secretary, in principle, to the execution of the series of passages of Indonesian waters noted above, regardless of Indonesian reactions both verbal and physical, and to the planning necessary to ensure a successful passage in the worst event.

Secretary of State for Defence

June 1965

B1-3

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146

Originating Authority JIC/FE).....

Reference and Date JIC/FE) 44/65 final 22nd June 1965.....

See 'C' File 142/8/c.....

Folio No. 37.....

145

Originating Authority JIC

Reference and Date JIC (65) 44 Terms of Reference
16th June 1965

See 'C' File 142/2/c

Folio No. 36

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144

FROM: J.I.C. LONDON

DTG 16.05 (GMT) 15.6.65.

TO C-IN-C FAR EAST

TEL NO. JIC 599

DATED 15TH JUNE, 1965.

PRIORITY

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142/8

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SECRETARY J.I.C. (5)

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142/8.
142/2
146/7

1. REQUIREMENTS FOR J.I.C. REPORTS ON
MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA

MR. ROGERS said that, as had been reported in the Weekly Survey, there now seemed to be a serious danger of a collision course in Malaysia. The Commonwealth Relations Office believed that a paper should be produced soon on the consequences of a head-on clash between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. Such a paper could examine possible developments, from the best case down to the worst (including, for example, the arrest of Lee, the closing of the Johore causeway, and an appeal by Lee to Peking for assistance). It would then discuss the consequences for the Borneo Territories, etc., and finally the implications for British policy and the employment of British forces. J.I.C.(Far East) might be asked to produce a first draft urgently in collaboration with the High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur.

MR. LEAHY said that the paper commissioned on the "Outlook for Malaysia and Brunei for the Next Two Years" was now in draft form, but this framework was not entirely appropriate for the proposed new study. The time scale was perhaps too long and the paper in draft dealt with prospects but did not deal with the implications for British policy.

THE CHAIRMAN said that there had been independently a Foreign Office suggestion that there was a requirement for a more detailed study of the confrontation threat than was contained in "Possible Political Developments in Indonesia over the Next Twelve Months", which the Committee had approved a fortnight ago, and which mentioned confrontation in paragraph 22. There had since been some lively discussion of the likely course of confrontation and, in particular, whether it was likely to be stepped up. Tentative terms of reference had been prepared which really fell into two parts, firstly an assessment of Indonesian military capabilities and, secondly, an examination of the political factors which might influence Indonesian decisions.

The following points were made in discussion:-

- (a) The most urgent need was for a study of likely developments in relations between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. There might be a crisis within a month, possibly after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference.
- (b) The conclusions of the paper now in draft and those relating at any rate to the second part of that now suggested by the Foreign Office would depend on the conclusions of the paper at (a) above.
- (c) Though the proposed paper at (a) would have to seek contributions from J.I.C.(F.E.) and from the High Commission in Kuala Lumpur, it might be preferable for the draft to be prepared here. J.I.C.(F.E.) were in any case heavily pre-occupied on other matters. It was desirable

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that telegrams should be despatched by the weekend asking for comments. This precluded formal J.I.C. approval of terms of reference before work on the paper started.

The Committee:-

- (1) Invited the Commonwealth Relations Office, in consultation with the Chairman, Joint Intelligence Staff, to decide on terms of reference for the proposed paper and on the best distribution of labour between the Joint Intelligence Staff, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, and to telegraph accordingly to the High Commission in Kuala Lumpur and to J.I.C.(Far East).
- (2) Instructed the Secretary to circulate the terms of reference for this paper when they had been agreed by the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Chairman, Joint Intelligence Staff.
- (3) Agreed to suspend work on the "Outlook for Malaysia and Brunei over the Next Two Years" pending the conclusion of the present paper.
- (4) Instructed the Secretary to circulate terms of reference for a paper on the future of confrontation from both military and Indonesian political points of view, for clearance out of Committee.
- (5) Instructed the Chairman, Joint Intelligence Staff, to put in hand immediately the study of Indonesian military capabilities, for the study referred to at (4) above, on lines to be agreed between the Joint Intelligence Staff and the Defence Intelligence Staff.

EXTRACT from Minutes of J.I.C.(65)24th Meeting (Directors)
held on THURSDAY, 10th June, 1965

43a

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LOOSE MINUTE

SEA 0301/DI(MI)2

143

Secretary JIC

(6)

JIC(FE) 14/65 and JIC(FE) 24/65

142/8

142/2

1. I refer to JIC/475/65.
2. We have no comments.

A/Su 2 has seen

J.H. Humphrey-Pullman
Major

Colonel GS
DI(MI)2
Ext 2026
8 Jun 65

RESTRICTED

+ 4 copies destroyed
for B.

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FROM:- J.I.C. LONDON

DTG. 10.40 (GMT) 2/6/65.

TO:- C-IN-C FAR EAST

TELNO: JIC 561

DATED: 2ND JUNE 1965.

ROUTINE

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J.I.C./475/65

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

142/8
142/4.

INDONESIAN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AGAINST
EAST AND WEST MALAYSIA - J.I.C.(F.E.) 14/65 FINAL -136

INDONESIAN AIRBORNE ASSAULT OPERATIONS AGAINST
MALAYSIA - J.I.C.(F.E.) 24/65 FINAL

Draft Comments by the Joint Intelligence Committee
(Previous Reference: J.I.C./419/65) - 130

I believe you will wish to approve the comments at Annex 'A' and 'B' which have been prepared by the Joint Intelligence Staff on the above two J.I.C.(F.E.) Papers, for distribution to the Chief of Staff and J.I.C.(F.E.), and unless I am informed to the contrary by 5.00 p.m. on THURSDAY, 10th JUNE, 1965, they will be issued as an expression of your views.

(Signed) J.M.C. VIVIAN

for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

2nd June, 1965.

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J.I.S.('B' Team)
C.O.S. Secretariat

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Annex 'A' to J.I.C./475/65

INDONESIAN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AGAINST EAST
AND WEST MALAYSIA - J.I.C.(F.E.)14/65

In our view this report greatly oversimplifies the problems in planning and implementing amphibious operations and largely because of this overstates the threat. For example we do not agree that the Indonesians are unconcerned with the problem of resupply; and although the paper only sets out to consider the assault phase of a seaborne landing, we believe that in fact the problems of resupply should be taken into account in assessing the Indonesian amphibious capability.

2. In addition we -

- (a) believe the serviceability of craft may be much less than indicated in Annex 'B' of the report;
- (b) discount the concept of tanks and A.P.C's swimming from "shore" to "shore" because of logistic and, at night, navigational problems;
- (c) assess that Indonesia has a potential sea lift of 4,000 troops in one wave and discount the idea of the same craft returning for an immediate second wave. In the very worst case two to three thousand seaborne troops might be landed, in small groups over a period of one or two nights, against widely separated objectives. The number that would arrive at the right place in a condition to fight is a matter for conjecture;
- (d) would not credit the Indonesians with a capability to give an amphibious force adequate escort to meet the threat they must expect from Commonwealth forces in the area;
- (e) emphasise that even the smallest amphibious assault operation requires very careful planning and considerable logistic effort: to mount a major seaborne assault would require an unprecedented effort by the Indonesians and we doubt whether they are capable of it or that the craft could be assembled without "attracting too much attention";
- (f) believe, that while we cannot exclude the possibility that Sukarno might order a major assault and that in addition the armed forces would agree to carry out such a dangerous operation, the likelihood is very remote.

3. Detailed comments on the aspects outlined above are given at Appendix.

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Appendix to Annex 'A' to
J.I.C./475/65

INDONESIAN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AGAINST EAST
AND WEST MALAYSIA - J.I.C.(F.E.)44/65

DETAILED COMMENT

We have detailed comments on the paragraphs enumerated below -

- (a) Paragraph 4. We do not agree that the Indonesians are unconcerned with the problem of resupply.
- (b) Paragraph 8. We would not credit the Indonesians with the capability of giving such protection to a conventional amphibious force as would be adequate to meet the threat posed by United Kingdom forces.
- (c) Paragraph 9. This is true but we would expect to have sufficient warning to allow our forces to deal with the threat once it entered territorial waters.
- (d) Paragraph 15(c). Serviceability may be much less than that indicated in Annex 'B'. We rather doubt that the Indonesians could assemble the craft without "attracting too much attention".
- (e) Paragraph 15(d). Even the smallest amphibious assault operation requires very careful planning and quite a considerable logistic effort.
- (f) Paragraphs 16 and 17. Tanks and A.P.C's could not be expected to swim any great distance, particularly in the dark. If they did so their high fuel consumption in the water would present a refuelling requirement soon after landing. As regards the escort problem see remarks at sub-paragraph (b) above.
- (g) Paragraph 18. J.I.C.(F.E.) assess three landings of 1,000 each making 3,000 in the first wave and then the boats returning to bring back a further 3,000 making a possible maximum total of 6,000. We assess the potential sea lift as 4,000 in one wave. We assessed that in the worst case only 3,000 would land over a period of one or two nights against widely separated objectives. The number that would arrive at the right place in a condition to fight was a matter for conjecture. We discount the idea that it would be possible for the Indonesians to return with the same boats to bring in a second wave.
- (h) Paragraphs 21- to 23. Operations on this scale and of this type would require an unprecedented Indonesian effort and are probably beyond their current capability. Furthermore the organisational and logistic problems would be considerable.
- (j) Paragraphs 24 and 25. Even to hold out for the period postulated would involve considerable logistic problems.
- (k) Paragraph 30. A further reason why the likelihood of a major amphibious attack is remote is that a land attack against the territory of Sarawak would be less hazardous and simpler to execute.

SECRET

(l) Paragraph 32(a). This is true but ignores the problem of capability - see paragraph 12 of paper.

(m) Paragraph 32(b). We doubt the Indonesian capability to mount this type of operation - see comments at sub-paragraphs (e) and (g) above.

(n) Paragraph 32(c). We believe that the maximum number of troops which could be launched has been over-assessed - see comment at sub-paragraph (h).

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Annex 'B' to J.I.C./475/65

INDONESIAN AIRBORNE ASSAULT OPERATIONS -
J.I.C.(F.E.) 24/65

In general we agree with this paper. Whilst we believe that the Indonesians have a total of 14,000 paratroops as opposed to the figure of 9,000 given by J.I.C.(F.E.) we agree with the figure of 1,500 men as the Indonesian maximum para-drop capability. We assess that with extensive servicing and conservation of flying hours, the transport force could initially achieve about 70 per cent serviceability. When considering the short range transport it should be noted that Indonesia has three MI.6 (HOOKS) helicopters which can each carry around eighty troops.

2. In the unlikely event of the Indonesians carrying out a large scale airborne assault (paragraphs 10-13) we would not expect them to mount "preliminary operations to destroy our air defensive and offensive capability". We do not believe that the Indonesians would conclude that they could achieve this before they had provoked retaliatory action which amongst other things could pre-empt the airborne assault.

3. Detailed comments on the aspects outlined above are given at Appendix.

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Appendix to Annex 'B' to
J.I.C./475/65

INDONESIAN AIRBORNE ASSAULT OPERATIONS -
J.I.C.(F.E.) 24/65

DETAILED COMMENT

We have detailed comment on the paragraphs enumerated below -

(a) Paragraph 3. J.I.C.(F.E.) state the Indonesians "have trained a sizeable force of approximately 9,000 paratroops to operational standard". Our own records show that the Indonesians have formed parachute units totalling 14,000 men. Perhaps J.I.C.(F.E.) do not reckon that all these are up to "operational standard".

(b) Paragraph 4(a), Long Range Transport. Six C.130s and four AN.12s could be made available giving a paratroop lift capability of 384 and 280 respectively. The total for one lift is, therefore, nearer to 670 than 650 paratroops.

(c) Paragraph 4(b), Short Range Transport. We believe that there are thirty-four C.47 (DAKOTAS) and ten IL.14 (CRATES) as against thirty-five and twenty-one respectively. The availability figures therefore, are twenty-four C.47s and seven IL.14s giving a paratroop lift capability of 648 and 126 respectively. The total for one lift, therefore, is nearer to 800 than 750 paratroops. It should be noted that three Mi.6 (HOOKS) were supplied to Indonesia at the end of November, 1964 and all three have been seen flying. These helicopters can carry around eighty troops each and so the total short range Transport Force, if the occasion arose, has a theoretical total lift capability of around 1,000 troops.

(d) Paragraph 5, Overall Theoretical Capability. Assuming Garuda can airlift 250 paratroops, the Indonesians have an overall theoretical capability to drop some 1,900 and not 1,700 paratroops as mentioned in paragraph 5. The likely number of paratroops to be dropped in one operation is not known. However, in view of their known limitations we assess that the Indonesians could not drop more than 1,500 men in a single operation.

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

INDONESIAN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AGAINST
EAST AND WEST MALAYSIA - J.I.C.(F.E.) 14/65 FINAL 136

INDONESIAN AIRBORNE ASSAULT OPERATIONS AGAINST
MALAYSIA - J.I.C.(F.E.) 24/65 FINAL

Copies of these two papers were circulated on 26th March and 27th April respectively. A corrigendum to J.I.C.(F.E.)14/65 Final was also circulated on 13th April.

2. Extracts from J.I.C.(65)19th Meeting, item 2 (Thursday, 6th May) are reproduced below for convenience.

- (a) "The Committee had their weekly discussion of current intelligence.

The point was made in discussion that J.I.C.(F.E.) 14/65 (Final), Indonesian Amphibious Operations against East and West Malaysia, and J.I.C.(F.E.) 24/65 (Final), Indonesian Airborne Assault Operations against Malaysia, had been prepared by J.I.C.(F.E.) with a view primarily to alerting the Malaysians and imparting a greater sense of urgency to Malaysian defensive preparations. These papers were designed for passing to the Malaysians via the Combined U.K./Malaysian Intelligence Staff Committee (C.I.S.C.) but they had also been given wide circulation in London in connection with the recent visit of C-in-C, Far East. Members of the Committee had a number of reservations regarding Indonesian capability and intentions expressed in these papers and it was therefore important both that the J.I.C. view should be made known generally in London and that detailed J.I.C. comments should be forwarded for the information of J.I.C.(F.E.)"

- (b) "The Committee instructed the Chairman, Joint Intelligence Staff, to submit draft J.I.C. comments on J.I.C.(F.E.)14/65(Final), Indonesian Amphibious Operations against East and West Malaysia and J.I.C.(F.E.)24/65(Final), Indonesian Airborne Assault Operations against Malaysia."

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3. Departments are invited to forward their comments on the two papers under reference to reach the Chairman, Joint Intelligence Staff by TUESDAY, 25th MAY. D.I.S. contributions should be sent to D.I.(40) by FRIDAY, 21st MAY.

(Signed) J.M.C. VIVIAN

for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

12th May, 1965

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J.I.C.
J.I.S.('C' Team)

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Originating Authority JIC

Reference and Date JIC/414/65 11th May 1965

See 'C' File 142/8/c

Folio No. 35

138

Originating Authority FIC

Reference and Date FIC/402/65-7th May, 1965

See 'C' File 142/8/c

Folio No. 34.

137

Originating Authority JIC

Reference and Date JIC/395/65 5th May 1965

See 'O' File 142/8/c

Folio No. 33.

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18-37
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INDONESIAN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AGAINST
EAST AND WEST MALAYSIA

Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East)

INTRODUCTION

1. A recent report(1) has concluded that:

"Large scale Indonesian seaborne and airborne landings across the Straits of Malacca entail considerable difficulties and are unlikely in the near future but might be attempted in a final effort to crush Malaysia if all else fails".

2. A large and varied collection of troops, ships and landing craft gives the Indonesians the capability to pose such a potential threat of amphibious operations against Malaysia.

AIM

3. The aim of this paper is to examine the Indonesian capacity and capability for amphibious operations against Malaysia, the likelihood of operations of this nature being mounted and the warning we could expect of attack.

DISCUSSION

4. For the purpose of this paper, we only consider the aspects of a seaborne landing which culminate in the assault phase. Such evidence as is available does not appear to indicate any concern by the Indonesians as to the problem of resupply or major overt reinforcement. In addition we do not consider the question of co-ordination with a simultaneous assault by paratroops, although it should be noted that the Indonesians have the capacity of dropping about 1500 troops in a single wave.

5. Types of Amphibious Operation. The following types of amphibious operations are considered:

- a. Conventional long haul.
- b. Conventional short haul.
- c. Large scale seaborne infiltration.

CONVENTIONAL LONG HAUL

6. Definition. A formed amphibious force properly escorted by Naval and Air units with a distance of over 80 miles to travel from staging points to target area.

7. The Indonesians have a number of LSTs, attack transports and a large number of merchant ships suitable for use in a conventional long haul amphibious operation. Details of these ships are at Annex A. If only some of these ships were made available, the Indonesians would have no difficulty in providing the lift capacity for a brigade, together with armour and artillery.

8. However, the ability of the Indonesian Navy and Air Force to protect an amphibious operation of this nature both on passage and in the assault phase is

/assessed

Notes:

1. JIC(FE)190/64(Final)
CISC/P(65)1

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JIC(FE)14/65(Final)

assessed as low. Even a very limited threat from opposing maritime forces would cause the Indonesians to reduce the size of the amphibious force envisaged above to a level commensurate with their escort and defence capabilities.

9. The point should nevertheless be made that it would be perfectly legal to sail an amphibious force from its rear bases in Java towards Malaysia (a distance of from 600 - 1000 nm) and no interdiction would be possible under existing rules of engagement until the force entered Malaysian territorial waters.

10. Despite this, it is considered that the disadvantages of this type of operation would contain too high an element of risk for any Indonesian commander to accept.

11. It is thought more likely that landing ships, armed transports and merchant ships will be used to transport troops and equipment to staging points within short range of the target areas.

12. To summarise, the Indonesians have the capacity but not the capability to mount a conventional long haul amphibious operation.

CONVENTIONAL SHORT HAUL ASSAULT

13. Definition. The use of small landing craft, amphibious tanks and vehicles for an amphibious landing with some armour and artillery, relatively lightly escorted and having a distance of under 80 miles to travel from staging post to target area.

14. The relative geographical positions of Indonesia and Malaysia favour an attack over this distance. Some examples of possible embarkation and target areas are given below:

<u>Area</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Distance</u>
E Malaysia	NW Kalimantan	Sarawak coastline West of Kuching	60 miles
	Nunukan/Sebatik	Tawau	10-40 miles
W Malaysia	Rhios	Singapore, SE and SW Johore	Up to 30 miles
Malacca Straits	Senebui	Port Swettenham	40-50 miles
	Dumai	Malacca	about 50 miles
	Bengkalis	Batu Pahat/Muar area	50-60 miles

15. The Indonesians may feel attracted to this type of attack for the following reasons:

a. The distances are fairly short and are in relatively sheltered waters. One exception could be the threat of line squalls in the Malacca Strait in summer, but these are predictable from the Sumatra side.

b. The whole operation can be carried out in darkness. Troops could embark at last light (approx 1830 local time), make a 5 to 8 knot passage in darkness and arrive off the landing area at first light (0630 local time).

c. Plenty of craft are available (details are at Annex B). In addition they could be assembled over a period of time at embarkation points without attracting too much attention.

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JIC(FE)14/65(Final)

d. The operation would involve a minimum of planning and logistics (but see large scale seaborne infiltration below) and would thus appeal to the Indonesians.

16. Probable Nature of Assault. The KKO are the only service trained in amphibious assault and it is considered they would spearhead such an operation. Dependent on distance travelled amphibious tanks and vehicles could either swim from shore to shore or travel part way in LCMs. Troops could be carried in LCMs, LCVP, LVTs, etc.

17. The transit would be made under cover of darkness with the amphibious craft planned to be off the landing area during darkness or at first light. Escort against surface interference would be by frigate-size warship and below, and Komar class PTGs would probably figure prominently.

18. Troops Available. The numbers of troops involved would be limited by:

a. The inability to organise and make logistic support available at jumping off points.

b. Numbers of craft available.

The probable maximum number in any one landing area is assessed at 1,000 men but craft could be made available to enable three similar sized groups to be landed simultaneously. These could be reinforced by a second similar wave making a possible maximum total of 6,000 men, but the greatly increased risk of interdiction would make such a follow-up action extremely unlikely.

19. To summarise, the Indonesians have the capacity and the capability to mount a conventional short haul amphibious assault.

LARGE SCALE SEABORNE INFILTRATION

20. Definition. Distances of less than 80 miles using miscellaneous small craft and protected from surface attack.

21. The attractions of this type of seaborne attack are basically the same as those listed in paragraph 15 above with the following additional points:

a. As large pieces of equipment such as tanks or artillery will not be carried, the Indonesians will not be forced to use specifically constructed landing craft, and can use any type(s) of vessel at their immediate disposal. Details of small coasters and landing craft (Kumpit, Kotak, LCVP, LCM, BT boats) are at Annex B.

b. Organisational and logistic problems are minimal.

c. Concentration of craft for the lift and troops to be lifted could be delayed until the last minute, thus reducing the risk of detection.

22. Nature of the Assault. It is considered that the most likely form the assault would take would be the simultaneous infiltration of a number of groups of troops before dawn. The aim of this type of attack would be the formation of the first elements of a guerilla force and setting up pockets of resistance.

23. Troops Employed. Several groups of up to 1,000 landed simultaneously. Numbers involved would be limited only by the Indonesians' ability to organise, but at a guess the probable ceiling would be 6,000. Any type of troops could participate in the attack, but it is thought that they would probably need some training in seamanship for the passage.

/INDONESIAN

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SECRETINDONESIAN AIMS IN MOUNTING AN ATTACK

24. We think that the Indonesians would mount a seaborne attack with the main objective of landing and expropriating as much territory as they can in the initial phase of their attack. They would then hope to hold this territory against counter-attack for a period, which they might consider to be about 10 days, by which time they could hope that international (Afro-Asian) opinion would be mobilised to force the cessation of the fighting.

25. The Indonesians could base their logistics on the foregoing assumption. They would thus be relieved of the problem of resupply of their forces.

Target Areas

26. Targets for seaborne and airborne attacks most frequently mentioned in past reports of Indonesian intentions have been Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. Such attacks are envisaged as a reply to retaliation by Malaysia and her allies. We think that attacks on these two towns are unlikely, but we cannot entirely exclude this possibility. An attack on Singapore might take the form of the large scale seaborne infiltration, with up to 6,000 men (possibly half of them volunteers) being committed.

27. Another possibility is that a seaborne attack, possibly coincident with an airborne assault, would be aimed towards areas where the Indonesians could expect to co-ordinate their actions with dissident elements. These areas(2) could include:

Former "Black" areas of Johore - Batu Pahat, Pontian and Mersing

Malacca State

Perak - Pantai Remis

Nagri Sembilan - Kuala Pilah

Selangor - North West Sungai Besar

The Tawau area

The area West of Kuching

A seaborne attack of this type might be co-ordinated with previous infiltrations by small parties. This co-ordination would have two main advantages:

a. Providing an excuse for the "invasion". Indonesian troops would be sent to assist the 'popular' uprising against the present government.

b. An uprising would dissipate the Malaysian military effort.

28. Attempts might also be made to launch supplementary seaborne attacks over a longer range than 80 miles (say from the Medan area to the Pangkor area) whilst Security Forces were occupied elsewhere, but part of the passage would have to be made in daylight hours with the attendant risk of detection.

WARNING TIMES

29. Some warning of a seaborne assault would be reflected in movement of troops and ships, and logistic preparations in the staging areas. On this basis, we would expect 28 days warning in the case of a long haul conventional assault (but see paragraph 9 above). In the case of a large scale infiltration we would expect 14 days warning from the beginning of the assembly of troops and transport. When troops have been deployed and staging areas prepared embarkation could take place without detection.

/LIKELIHOOD

Notes:

2. Based on Special Branch Malaysia's (M)SF 133/111/1/1(S)

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SECRETLIKELIHOOD OF ATTACK

30. Any large scale seaborne attack on Malaysia would amount to an act of open war. We have assessed elsewhere that the Indonesians do not intend to initiate open warfare and that they are still seeking to keep the scale of their military operations below what they consider to be the threshold of major retaliation. We therefore consider that unless there is a radical change of policy by the Indonesians, the likelihood of a major amphibious attack will be remote.

CONCLUSIONS

31. As we have assessed elsewhere(3) we conclude that large scale seaborne and airborne landings across the Straits of Malacca entail considerable difficulties and are unlikely in the near future but might be attempted in a final effort to crush Malaysia if all else fails.

32. It is concluded that:

a. The Indonesians are capable of mounting a conventional long haul amphibious assault against Malaysia. The risk of detection and inability to afford protection from interdiction to the major units required would deter them from attempting this type of operation.

b. The Indonesians have the capacity and are capable of mounting and escorting a conventional short haul assault involving a passage of up to 80 miles, probably by night, to achieve maximum surprise. Three units of up to 1,000 men could be transported. The KKO, who are well trained in this type of assault, could provide amphibious tanks and artillery and could comprise up to 50% of the force.

c. A large scale seaborne infiltration of groups of about 1,000 men is within the Indonesian capability and is the most likely method to be used to land men in Malaysia. At a guess the maximum number of troops which

1 could be launched in this way is probably 6,000.

33. It is further concluded that some warning of an impending operation could be expected from troop movements and logistic preparations but once troops and craft have been deployed, embarkation could well take place without detection.

G.F. HILLER

D.R. SHEPPARD (for A.K. FURSE)

M.L. STEELE-PERKINS

M. HAYWARD-BUTT

D.L. STEWART

B.J.M. TOVEY

J.F.H. GOODRIDGE

HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND

22nd March, 1965

This paper contains 8 pages

Annex A - 1 page

Annex B - 1 page

Notes:

3. JIC(FE)190/64(Final)

/Distribution:

JIC(FE)14/65(Final)

Distribution:

Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East)
Joint Intelligence Committee (London)
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Sec (Int)
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ANNEX A TO
JIC(FE)14/65(FINAL)

VESSELS AVAILABLE FOR CONVENTIONAL LONG HAUL

1. Naval Vessels

<u>Type</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Average Number available</u>	<u>Capacity</u>	<u>Speed</u>
LST (Landing Ships Tank)	8	6	25 Tanks or 30-35 LVT's	9 kts
APA (Attack Transport)	2	2	1 Battalion (850 men)	12 kts

2. Militarised Merchant Ships

During the West Irian campaign it is believed that approximately 44 merchant ships were taken over by the military and used as troop or supply ships for the planned assault against Biak. Seventeen merchant ships formed part of the task force and these together with ALRI LST's and Auxiliaries had a total lift capacity of over 6,000 men. The number of merchant ships available for amphibious operations is far in excess of the number used in 1962, hence it can be assumed that the troops lift capacity of the Indonesian Merchant Fleet would not be a limiting factor.

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ANNEX B TO
JIC(FE)14/65(FINAL)

SMALL CRAFT AND BOATS AVAILABLE FOR SEABORNE LANDING PURPOSES

1. Craft available for Conventional Short Haul Assault

Type	Total No Held	No Available	Capacity	Speed Knots	Endurance N miles
Landing Craft Mechanised Mk 4 (LCM)(4)	41	30	100 Troops or 1 PT-76 Tank or 1 LVT	8 - 10	150
Landing Craft Mechanised 8 (Local built)	44	36	30 troops or 1 tank 30 troops or	· ?	· ?
Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP)	100	80	36 or 1 jeep	8 - 10	100
Landing Vehicle (Tracked)(Mk4?) (LVT)(4)	50	40	25	5½ water 25 mph (land)	75
PT - 76 Amphibious tanks	120	100	3 crew	5½ water 25 mph (land)	62
Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC)	60	40	10	5½ water 25 mph (land)	-
Tracked Amphibious Miscellaneous	25	15	10	-	-
Landing Vehicle Tracked (A) (LVT(A))	60	40	5	-	-
40 Foot Motor boats	20	15	30	8 - 10	-

2. An extensive building programme has been undertaken by the Indonesians in recent years, but details of craft completed and their capabilities are not complete and may considerably increase the figures in para. 1 above.

3. Additional Craft Available for Large Scale Infiltrations

Type	No. Held	No. Available	Capacity (Troops)	Speed Knots	Endurance N miles
MFV-Size coasters	Numerous	Numerous	100 - 150	6 - 10	Over 100 miles
Kotaks	"	"	50	-	"
Kumpits	"	"	50	-	"
B.T. craft	"	"	50	-	"

Plot.
4.5 193 coasters of under 500 tons are registered in the Lloyds List of Shipping. Recent reports have indicated that the Indonesians are embarking on a programme of construction of small craft suitable for amphibious operations. One report mentions the existence of 5 craft, with an additional 35 on order, at Tj. Pong. These craft, at present awaiting engines are 30 feet in length and have a capacity for 30 fully equipped troops. Their designed speed is 3½ knots and range is reported as 100 nms.

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Originating Authority JIC

Reference and Date JIC/54/65 20th January 1965...

See 'C' File 142/6/c

Folio No. 32.

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FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (FAR EAST)

JIC(FE)6/65(Final)

Copy No. 27... of ... 85..

142/8

ANZAM JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

ANZAM JIC Report No. 4/64 and ANZAM JIC (64) 13 Revise

Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East)

1. We have examined copies of the above papers forwarded under reference (1).
2. We consider that in view of the considerable changes to the situation since the provisional papers were prepared that a complete recast of the Military and Subversive Threat paper is required.
3. Our suggested format is at Annex A. On substance we suggest that you draw on our latest assessment in JIC(FE)190/64(Final) and other papers referred to in the Annex.
4. We have no comments on format or content of JIC 64(13).

C.F. HILLER

A.K. MURSE

M.L. STEELE-PERKINS

M. HAYWARD-BUTT

C.O. SHIPP (for D.L. STEWART)

D.M. CHRISTIE

B.J.M. TOVEY

RECEIVED
22 JAN 1965
J. I. C.

HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND

19th January, 1965.

Distribution:

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ANZAM Joint Intelligence Committee
British Defence Liaison Staff, Wellington
British Defence Liaison Staff, Canberra

This document consists of 4...pages

Annex A - 3 pages

Internal:

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Notes:

1. ANZAM JIC 7.20.1. Issued 21st 1965.

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ANNEX A TO
JIC(FE)6/65(FINAL)

ANZAM JIC REPORT NO. 4/64 - THE MILITARY AND SUBVERSIVE THREAT FROM INDONESIA TO THE MALAYSIAN AREA UP TO JUNE 1965 - REVISED FORMAT

AIM

The aim of the paper will be to review the present military and subversive threat from Indonesia to Malaysia, and to project the size and nature of that threat up to June, 1965.

REFERENCES

ANZAM JIC 4/64

- BACKGROUND -

Military Situation

- a. Brief account of Operations in Malays, Singapore and Borneo to end of 1964.
- b. Failure of operations so far.
- c. Operations in the Celebes.
- d. Decision to commit much larger forces to confrontation.

ANZAM JIC 4/64 para 5-17
(condensed and up-dated).

JIC(London) 052339Z Jan.
para 15-16. ANZAM JIC 4/64
para 22 (rewrite).

JIC(FE) 190/64 para 1, 2.

Political Situation

- a. Indonesian withdrawal from the United Nations.
- b. Indonesian relations with Russia and China.

JIC(FE)190/64 para 3.

JIC(FE)190/64. para 8 (China).

INDONESIAN OBJECTIVES

Broad framework of Indonesian objectives

- Long term aims -
- Short term aims - Eradication of Western influence.
- Distintigration of Malaysia.

as in reference

JIC(FE)165/64 para 3.

THE THREAT TO EAST MALAYSIA

It is envisaged that this section will draw extensively on JIC(FE) 190/64(Final)

Build up in Kalimantan

Latest assessment

Internal discontent

JIC(FE)190/64 para 5.
ANZAM JIC 4/64 para 23-31
condensed and up-dated.

CCO attitude

JIC(FE)190/64 para 6.

Likely Indonesian tactis

JIC(FE)190/64 para 11-17.

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ANNEX A TO
JIC(FE)6/65(FINAL)

THE THREAT TO WEST MALAYSIA

'A' Operations

Latest assessment

Role of Army Strategic Reserve units deployed to Sumatra.

JIC(FE)190/64 para 15.

The threat from the North

Latest assessment.

Likely Indonesian objective.

More specifically, this section might include an examination of the following points:

- a. Recall that aim of confrontation to bring about disintegration of Malaysia by fomenting revolution from within.
- b. Performance to date including forces and political parties used e.g. PMU, MPSE, Chinese Communists.
- c. Objective up to time of Pontian and Labis landings e.g. formation of reception committees leading to establishment of guerilla bases leading to rallying and training of dissident groups leading to revolt under banner of TNRM.
- d. Attempts to foment racial trouble in Singapore.
- e. Effect of disastrous failure of Pontian and Labis landing. Smaller groups to keep pot boiling.
- f. Increasing use of regulars and Sukarelawan.
- g. Special effort at year end.
- h. Possible present review of policy and objective of leading to attempts to swamp security forces with numerous simultaneous landings (forward bases loaded).
- j. Scanty reports of Indonesian attempt to rally CTO and foment trouble among irredentists in Kelantan and South Thailand.

SUGGESTED CONCLUSIONS

1. We conclude that Indonesia will step up confrontation against Malaysia throughout the period under review. Nevertheless, she will try to avoid escalation into open war and will continue to keep confrontation below what she considers to be the threshold of major retaliation. At the same time, she will keep up a war of nerves, appeal to international opinion even more vociferously than hitherto about alleged encirclement by Malaysia and her allies, encourage efforts at mediation by third parties and continue to foster subversive and dissident organisations within Malaysia.

2. The Indonesians are marshalling the following forces:

(Insert latest assessment)

/3.

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ANNEX A TO
JIC(PE)6/65(FINAL)

3. We think that the Indonesians plan:

a. A major intensification of guerilla operations from Kalimantan against East Malaysia aimed at the establishment of liberated areas, the setting-up of puppet governments together with the fostering of an armed revolt by the CCO and widespread insurrection elsewhere.

b. A continuation of subversive, sabotage and guerilla operations against West Malaysia.

4. If she fails to achieve her aims by these methods and if she considers the international situation favourable at the time, Indonesia will be tempted to embark on major acts of aggression against East and West Malaysia whose justification may be engineered.

A - 3

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J.I.C./82/142/8

CABINET OFFICE,

Whitehall,

London, S.W.1.

19th January, 1965

See 131.

Thank you for your letter APC/4/65 of 14th January, enclosing the paper "India versus Malaysia".

I asked Michael Butler (who has just taken over from Teddy Youde) to try out on Far East Heads of Sections the question in your paragraph 2. They were agreed that there was no evidence to support press stories about a Sino/Indonesian military alliance. Such evidence as we have is rather to the contrary. The Chinese have never used phrases like "China will not stand idly by" when talking about the possibility of a British attack on Indonesia as they have about the situation in Vietnam. They only say something to the effect that all the Asian peoples would be deeply concerned.

(M.G.L. JOY)

A.P.P. Crick, Esq., O.B.E.,
British Embassy,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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TOP SECRET

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MR. M.D. BUTLER

In sending me the paper at Annex to my minute below, Mr. Crick wondered, with reference to para. 5 of the paper, if we gave any weight to the suggestion aired in the press that the possibility of a military alliance between Indonesia and China had recently been under discussion in Djakarta. I should like to return a reply, but it does not seem to me worth while circulating this question as a J.I.C. minute. Perhaps you would sound out Heads of Sections and let me know the outcome?

ME

(M.G.L. JOY)

18th January, 1965

Copy given Mr Butler 16th morning.
JG 9/11

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Originating Authority Jic

Reference and Date Jic/47/65 Jan 18th 1965

See 'C' File 142/P/C

Folio No. 31.

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21 JAN 1965
J. I. C. 20

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132

FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF (FAR EAST)

JIC(FE) 190/64(Final)

Copy No...37..of...119...

BUILD UP OF FORCES IN KALIMANTAN AND SUMATRA

PROBABLE INDONESIAN INTENTIONS

Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee(Far East)

142/8

1. Attached at Annex is a further interim assessment, on the above subject. We have taken in account views exchanged with the Inspector General of the Royal Malaysian Police.

2. It is our intention to circulate this paper to London, Canberra and Wellington and pass a copy to the Americans. In addition the paper is tabled for discussion with the Malaysians at the next CISC meeting on January 19th 1965

G.F. HILLER

A.K. FURSE

M.I. STEELE-PERKINS

R.F. NICHOLLS(for
M. HAYWARD-BUTT)

C.O. SHIPP

D.M. CHRISTIE

B.J.M. TOVEY

HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMAND

16th January 1965

Distribution

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D of P & O
Sec Plans

This document consists of 6 pages
Annex A - 5 pages

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ANNEX A TO
JIC(FR)190/64(21141)

BUILD UP OF FORCES IN KALIMANTAN AND SUMATRA

PROBABLE INDONESIAN INTENTIONS

BACKGROUND

1. It has become clear that during the autumn of 1964, decisions were taken by KOTI to commit large additional regular forces for use in military confrontation. The Indonesian intention is to deploy two and probably more additional Army brigades and one Police (MOBRIC) unit to West Kalimantan; a force assessed as a KKO (marine commando) brigade headquarters and one KKO battalion, capable of receiving further reinforcement of two more battalions, to East Kalimantan; and three additional Army brigades to Sumatra. Although one brigade may have already arrived in West Kalimantan, the bulk of the forces destined for Kalimantan and part of the forces destined for Sumatra could reach their respective deployment areas during January, 1965. However the whole deployment is unlikely to be completed before the end of February.

2. Whilst our knowledge of the above deployments is not complete it seems clear that the Indonesian main effort will be exerted in Kalimantan and will constitute a far greater overland threat to East Malaysia than hitherto. Furthermore, this threat may be further increased by the possibility of sea and air landings in Sabah and Sarawak.

3. The withdrawal of Indonesia from the United Nations has created a political stir, though we cannot yet be certain of Indonesia's motives in taking this step. It was probably taken partly for internal reasons (to divert attention from her failure to crush Malaysia by January 1st 1965), and partly out of pique at Malaysia's admission to the Security Council. At the same time, although there is no evidence so far of military motives behind this move, it does suggest a heightening of confrontation. The Indonesians may have calculated that it will give them the best of both worlds - i.e. by ridding themselves of their obligations under the UN Charter, while still being able to get one of her friends (e.g. Russia) to arraign Malaysia and her allies before the UN in the event of Malaysian retaliatory action.

DISCUSSION

Indonesian Aims and Tactics

4. Indonesia's concept of military operations in Kalimantan and Sumatra should be viewed against the background of her broad political aims and tactics. The aim of Indonesian confrontation is the disintegration of Malaysia. Hitherto, Indonesia has avoided actions that might in her opinion lead to open war. We have, too, seen some evidence in the past that the Indonesian armed forces themselves are anxious to avoid this. We believe that Sukarno will continue the same tactics over the next few months, though confrontation will almost certainly be intensified and expanded, and will become more efficient. Nevertheless, we think that Indonesia will still try to avoid escalation into open war which might imperil Java and Sumatra and will keep confrontation below what she judges to be the threshold of major retaliation.

5. Widespread internal unrest in East Malaysia, and particularly a CCO revolt in Sarawak, would be of great help to Indonesia in her pursuit of confrontation and of advantage, also, in making her actions in Kalimantan

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ANNEX A TO
JIC(WF)190/64(MITAL)

more acceptable in the eyes of world opinion. Hitherto Indonesia has not supplied arms to the CCO on any large scale but this policy may change and Indonesia may attempt to promote such an uprising. She may also attempt to occupy pockets of territory in the Borneo States in which she could set up some form of puppet regime.

6. Whereas the overall policy of the CCO remains one of caution and long term preparation, with emphasis being placed on its inability to launch an armed struggle at the present time in view of lack of progress in racial work, this policy could quickly be changed if there were successful and widespread Indonesian infiltrations into CCO dominated areas. There are already signs, especially in the Third Division of Sarawak of a more militant attitude on the part of some elements of the organisation, and there are indications in other Divisions that members of the CCO satellite organisation, the Sarawak Farmers' Association, have been warned that they will be called upon to provide non-militant support in the event of deep major Indonesian incursions. It is evident, c.f. the North Kalimantan National Liberation League, that the CCO is prepared to accept whatever assistance it can obtain from Indonesia in achieving its objectives both within Sarawak and in the Borneo States as a whole, although it must also be evident to the CCO leadership that the end results of such co-operation might not be compatible. In the event of massive Indonesian infiltrations the CCO would, we feel, be certain to instruct its members and sympathisers to offer considerable non-militant support and might, depending upon the depth and scale of the incursions and the success achieved, decide that it could no longer hold back from initiating insurgent action.

7. The current Indonesian redeployments, besides enabling Indonesia to intensify confrontation as required, almost certainly contain an element of international blackmail. With the example of West Irian still fresh in her mind, Indonesia may have calculated that a significant military build-up along the frontiers of Malaysia would so alarm world opinion, particularly among the Afro-Asians, that pressure will be exerted on Malaysia to make concessions in order to keep the peace.

8. Finally, an important factor in Indonesia's policy on confrontation but one on which we have little hard intelligence is her present relationship with China. There is evidence that Sukarno reached some kind of understanding with Marshal Chen Yi during the latter's visit to Indonesia in December. It would be reasonable to suppose that they agreed to work for the complete removal of western influence from South East Asia to their mutual advantage and that Chen Yi urged Sukarno to step up confrontation in parallel with the tempo of operations in South Vietnam.

Potentialities of Deployed Forces Against East Malaysia

9. To assess that the offensive potentiality of the forces being deployed against East Malaysia will be impaired by the following factors:

- a. Their inability to master the problems of logistic support for units of battalion size and over.
- b. The restrictions imposed by the terrain on movement and communications, which would make it difficult to carry out co-ordinated formation attacks.
- c. The absence of close support artillery, although the provision of light support weapons and some light anti-aircraft must be anticipated.

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ANNEX A TO
JIC (FE) 190/64 (PHILL)

d. The lack of support afforded in general by the border population with the exception of Communist elements and members of Indonesian communities.

These handicaps will not, however, affect the Indonesian ability to wage guerilla warfare with the minimum of conventional logistics. They will in particular, not affect shallow penetrations, but will restrict the scope and scale of deep penetration if there is no local support.

10. Thus we can expect that in the initial phase of the Indonesian deployment they will concentrate on supplementing their present border positions and camps, primarily along the First and Second Divisions of Sarawak and in the area opposite Tawau, by company groups. Defence in depth will probably be retained by placing reserve battalions and brigade headquarters astride communication axes to these positions. It is possible that a number of Hook and Hound helicopters may be made available later for logistic and troop movement roles to improve flexibility and logistic support.

Employment of Forces in Kalimantan

11. We do not know how the Indonesians intend to use their forces when their deployment is complete. We believe, however, that they will pursue the following objectives, but will adapt their policies according to their degree of success, and their assessment of the reactions of Malaysia, her allies and world opinion. We also believe that the success of her operations against the Dutch in West Irian has already influenced her thinking and will continue to do so. In addition, it is certain that the Indonesians have already appreciated that they can go further in Kalimantan than elsewhere in stepping up confrontation without provoking major retaliation.

12. Indonesian tactics may progress along the following lines:

a. The increase of present pattern of cross-border operations by raids of company size and over in many areas, supported if necessary by comparable parachute drops in rear areas with the aim of swamping the Security Forces and making Civil administration impossible.

b. Promoting an armed revolt by the CCO and widespread unrest elsewhere in Sarawak and Sabah through other dissident groups. They could also attempt to occupy territory, not necessarily a known "dissident" area, in which they could establish some form of puppet regime. Suitable areas however which could be objectives, could be those of:

Bau	The Lower Bejang
Serian	The Brunei Bay area.

c. Making a major infiltration aimed at Kuching or an attack on Tawau in the hope that world opinion would be sufficiently alarmed to demand a cease fire; but leaving Indonesia in control of some portion of East Malaysia.

The Threat to Kuching

13. The threat of a major infiltration aimed at Kuching could develop from incursions which initially had more limited objectives. Indonesian forces moving through the jungle to avoid Security Forces could be on the outskirts of Kuching within three days and indeed have only fifteen miles to penetrate before effecting lodgement areas among the CCO. We assess that given time

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ANNEX A TO
JIC(EE)190/64(FINAL)

the Indonesians have the capability to mount and direct such an operation but from the slight evidence we have of the current Indonesian deployments, troop dispositions do not point to a concentration of force opposite the Bau valley but rather to a deployment on a broad front. An immediate and direct major infiltration would be by its very nature tantamount to open war. Political indications that we have point to an avoidance of such acts. The possibility of a threat to Kuching is therefore more likely to develop later from successful incursions.

The Threat to Tawau

14. The threat of a major infiltration aimed at the Tawau Residency could develop from overland operations against Wallace Bay, infiltration overland or by river directed via Kalabakan, and by small infiltrations by sea. Whilst the deployment of KKO (Marines) in the area increases the potential amphibious and overland threat, we assess that an inhibiting factor at present, as far as sea borne attack is concerned, is the lack of sea lift by landing craft of these forces which is restricted to a company lift. However, more craft could be allocated and thus a direct assault is a possibility but, similar to a direct infiltration at Kuching, would amount in practice to open war. Whilst we need to keep the situation and Indonesian intentions in this area under review, we consider a threat of this nature to Tawau, if it does develop, is more likely to come from successful overland incursions.

Employment of Forces deployed in Sumatra

15. The purpose for which additional brigades are being deployed in Sumatra is not yet clear. Possible explanations are:

- a. The defence of Sumatra and internal security.
- b. Psychological warfare, e.g. by creating a threat of invasion parallel to the threat imposed by reinforcements in Kalimantan.
- c. Large scale seaborne operations across the Straits of Malacca, supported if necessary by elements of the parachute brigade. Whilst such an operation would pose considerable military difficulties in its mounting and execution, it is not out of the question. The Indonesian Services are also aware of these difficulties. There is also the consideration that the Indonesian Service Commanders might wish to keep their forces intact against the day when they may have to use them against Communists and they would oppose any operation which might involve their forces in heavy losses or demoralisation. Nevertheless if Sukarno were to order such an operation, he might be obeyed by Commanders who were either over optimistic or fearful of losing their jobs.

Provocation

16. We think that if the Indonesians wish to attempt open attacks on a large scale either in Kalimantan or across the Straits of Malacca they would probably precede and justify their aggression by attempting to push the Malaysians into some form of "provocative" action or alleging that such action had taken place.

/CONCLUSIONS

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ANNEX A TO
JIC(FE)190/64(FINAL)

CONCLUSIONS

17. We conclude that:

a. Indonesia is going to step up considerably her confrontation activities. She will probably refrain, however, from any course that carries the risk of more than limited local retaliation and will closely watch the reactions of the Malaysians and their allies, adapting her policies accordingly. Indonesian operations in East and West Malaysia will be co-ordinated. In the near future Kalimantan will probably be the area where the main Indonesian pressure will be exerted but infiltration operations against West Malaysia will continue and perhaps be stepped up.

b. The Indonesians' concept of operations against East Malaysia, once their deployments have been completed might follow the following progression:

- (1) Increase the depth and frequency of cross-border infiltrations from Kalimantan against East Malaysia.
- (2) Seek to foment an armed revolt of the OCO and create widespread unrest elsewhere.
- (3) Occupy pockets of East Malaysia with the object of setting up a puppet regime.
- (4) Large scale infiltrations aimed at Kuching and Tawau are possible but less likely in view of the risk of escalation and to a lesser extent the military difficulties involved.

c. At the present time the role of the Sumatra deployments is not clear. But they are likely to be used to create a threat of invasion against West Malaysia. Large scale seaborne and airborne landings across the Straits of Malacca entail considerable difficulties and are unlikely in the near future, but might be attempted in a final effort to crush Malaysia if all else fails.

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(131)

Originating Authority British Embassy, Washington

Reference and Date (APC/4/65) 14th January 1965

See 'C' File 142/81c

Folio No. 30

130
A

Originating Authority JIC (FE)

Reference and Date JIC (FE) 2/11 Final 9 Jan '55

See 'C' File 42/8/c

Folio No. 288

Originating Authority *British Embassy.*

Reference and Date *APC 1/1/65* *6th January 1965*

See 'O' File *142/8/c*

Folio No. *28A*

Originating Authority Jic

Reference and Date Jic/29/65 11th January 1965

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- 7 JAN 1965

J. I. C.

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

COS 1ST MEETING/65 HELD ON TUESDAY
5TH JANUARY 1965 AT 2.45 PM

1. OPERATIONS IN MALAYSIA

(Previous Reference: COS 75th Meeting/64, Minute 1)

Meeting with Lord Head the British High Commissioner
in Malaysia

LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that the Committee would wish to extend a warm welcome to Lord Head the British High Commissioner in Malaysia. Before asking him to give his views on the political aspects of the Commander-in-Chief, Far East's recent requests the Committee would wish to hear the latest intelligence picture from the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence).

SIR NORMAN DENNING (Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence)) said that it was clear that a considerable build-up by Indonesian forces was occurring in Kalimantan with the probable objective of extending their offensive operations against us.

President Sukarno was clearly a very sick man and it was considered that he was suffering from Uraemia which is a disease which decreases mental activity considerably. It was obvious that he was being given drugs to bolster him up for his public appearances. Afterwards reaction would probably set in and his power of decision was likely to be unpredictable. It was thought that his decision to withdraw from the United Nations may have been made during a period of reaction to the drugs. Although Indonesia had withdrawn it is probable that her case would still be represented at the United Nations by her friends.

He drew the Committee's attention to a signal (1) in which it was reported that the Canberra Times had published an article which virtually disclosed the details of Plan MASON and of the strength of the Indonesian build-up. He considered that a leak had occurred as a result of information that had been supplied to the Malayan Government.

LORD HEAD (British High Commissioner to Malaya) said that the Malaysian Government was very insecure and from his experience it was likely that anything they were told would be known in Djakarta very quickly. However, he felt that the article in the Australian paper would not have done any great harm. On previous occasions the appearance in the Press of our intentions to take action against Indonesia had had a salutary effect on Sukarno. The present article might have the same affect of warning him that we were not prepared to tolerate major aggressive acts on his part.

Note:

1. Canberra to CRO No 3 dated 4th July 1964.

- 1 -

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PART I to COS 1st Meeting/65

He had been considering what action could be taken against the 16,000 Indonesians that were being drawn up against us in Kalimantan. He was very tempted to favour taking some action now to disrupt the Indonesian build-up and thereby forestall any attack they might make subsequently across the border into Borneo. However, it was clear that in the present political climate both at home and in the United Nations, any significant action we took would have to be taken after an attack in strength across the frontier by the Indonesians.

He had been thinking about air operations as a retaliatory measure and was concerned that such operations would escalate requiring us to implement ADDINGTON which in the long term would be very detrimental to our image and influence in the area. On the other hand he felt that a commando type raid would not have the same political stigma. He realised that when this suggestion was originally made the Malaysians insisted that commando raids should be carried out by them. However, he felt that the Malaysian Government could be persuaded to change their mind.

Up to now the Indonesians had not made a number of attacks simultaneously on different parts of the frontier and consequently we had been able to concentrate our forces to eliminate each attack as it was made. Should Indonesia, with their present strength in Kalimantan, make several simultaneous attacks he was concerned that they might succeed in making some deep penetrations into Borneo. In these circumstances he would like to know whether sufficient additional forces were available to restore such a situation.

He thought it might be an appropriate moment to reopen negotiations with the Australian and New Zealand Governments for their forces to assist us in Borneo. The best way for this approach to be made would be for him, on his return to Kuala Lumpur, to persuade the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia to hold a meeting with the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, and the High Commissioners of Australia and New Zealand. The Deputy Prime Minister could then ask the Australian and New Zealand High Commissioners for the assistance of their forces in Borneo. Once this approach had been made the matter could then be taken up between the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Australian and New Zealand Governments. He would be seeing the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations after this meeting and would seek his views.

SIR DAVID LUCE said that if the Indonesian attacks into Borneo materialised we should be ready to take decisive offensive action and not just remain on the defensive. We could not continue to meet the Indonesian reinforcements by brigade with battalions, the Indonesian supply of brigades was greater than our supply of battalions. The sort of plans he had in mind were raids on Pontinac or Tarakan with the purpose of destroying the important base installations hitting them in their tenderest part which was their logistic support, thereby severely disrupting Indonesia's ability to continue major operations in Eastern Malaysia. He did not consider that operations against the Rhio Islands were a suitable retaliation for determined Indonesian border crossings into Borneo.

SIR RICHARD HULL said that he strongly supported the Chief of the Naval Staff and that should any significant Indonesian force cross the borders into Borneo, then after due warning we should take out, by all available means, such vital areas as Tarakan or Pontinac.

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PART I to COS 1st Meeting/65

The recent reinforcements that had been sent to the Far East had almost used up the stock-pile of equipment. If further reinforcements were sent nearly all their equipment will have to follow them by sea, this aspect would apply particularly to armoured car reinforcements. Furthermore when three more battalions are moved into the front line the increased ammunition consumption might create difficulties particularly in respect of some types which were in short supply.

Should it be necessary to send further reinforcements to the Far East one battalion could be sent from the United Kingdom but any further battalions would have to be withdrawn from BAOR.

SIR NEIL PRITCHARD (Commonwealth Relations Office) said that he agreed that the time had come for a fresh approach to be made to the Australian and New Zealand Governments for the use of their forces in Borneo. Once the Malaysians had made the opening request then the Commonwealth Relations Office would discuss the subject with the Australian and New Zealand Governments. In the meanwhile he thought it would be advisable to inform the Australians and New Zealanders through military channels of the recent developments and our intentions in Eastern Malaysia.

As regards taking decisive military action against the Indonesians in Kalimantan it was quite clear that it would not be politically acceptable to initiate such operations without credible provocation. Further it might be desirable for a further round to be played in United Nations before taking retaliatory action.

In discussion the following points were made:

a. If undeniable raids were authorised they should be carried out as far across the border as was required to achieve their object, and not be limited in their depth of penetration by arbitrarily determined distances.

b. When the previous approach was made to the Australian Government for the use of her forces in Borneo it had been stated that there would be no question of withholding Australian assistance once open aggression had occurred. In making the fresh approach to the Australian Government the present Indonesian build-up should be used to indicate that open aggression might be imminent.

c. Mr Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia was at present on a voyage across the Pacific and would not be back until the beginning of February. Although no decision could be expected before his return, this should not delay the approach to the Australian Government for assistance.

d. It was important that an approach be made to the Australians in the near future, as they were considering the disbandment of one battalion to provide jungle warfare instructors to assist the United States in South Vietnam. Once this battalion had been disbanded Australia would have difficulty in finding one for operations in Borneo.

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PART I to COS 1st Meeting/65

In summing up LORD MOUNTBATTEN said that their discussion with Lord Head had been valuable before their meeting with the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, on 12th January 1965. It was clear from the considerable build up of Indonesian forces in progress in Kalimantan that their intention was to step up offensive actions against us in Borneo. We could not go on matching Indonesian reinforcements, and it would be necessary to consider with the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, some form of retaliatory action in Borneo on the lines proposed by the Chief of the Naval Staff. Such action could only be taken after the Indonesians had made a significant assault into Malaysia territory. The time seemed propitious for a renewed request to Australia and New Zealand for the use of their forces for operations in Borneo and the Committee fully supported such a request. Finally, he felt that the Committee would wish him to express their gratitude to Lord Head for his valuable contribution to their discussion.

THE COMMITTEE:

- (1) Agreed with the remarks of the Chief of the Defence Staff in his summing up.
- (2) Took note that the British High Commissioner in Malaysia would discuss a request for Australian and New Zealand forces with the Commonwealth Secretary.
- (3) Took note that the Chief of the Defence Staff would instruct the Heads of the British Defence Liaison Staffs in Canberra and Wellington to inform the Chiefs of Staff of their respective countries of the latest developments and intentions in Eastern Malaysia.

EXTRACT from C.O.S.(65) 1st MEETING held on 5 Jan 65

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

COS 75TH MEETING/64 HELD ON WEDNESDAY
30TH DECEMBER 1964 AT 2.45 pm

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31 DEC 1964

(2)

J. I. C.

1. OPERATIONS IN MALAYSIA

THE COMMITTEE had before them a draft minute to the Secretary of State and two draft signals to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, arising from a recent exchange of signals (1) with the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, on the measures required to counter the increasing Indonesian threat.

SIR CHARLES ELWORTHY (Acting Chief of the Defence Staff) said that before deciding on the more urgent problems and on what recommendations should be made to Ministers, the Committee would wish to hear the latest intelligence assessment on the Indonesian build-up in Kalimantan.

A. Intelligence Assessment

11/2/3

(Previous Reference: COS 74th Meeting/64, Minute 2)

MAJOR-GENERAL OSWALD (Representing Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence)) said that the JIC Far East Heads of Sections at their meetings on 21st and 29th December had considered and reported (2) (3) on Indonesian reinforcements and deployments in Kalimantan and possible offensive action by these forces. He endorsed the views expressed in these reports as to the likely purpose of these reinforcements and their probable timings, although there were indications already that these timings were unlikely to be fully met in all cases. A recent assessment received from the Far East (4) differed in minor details from our own assessments, but he had no reason on that account to alter the views expressed in our own assessments.

Notes:

1. SEACOS 305, 306, 307 and 315.
COSSEA 260 and 261.
2. JIC/1025/64.
3. JIC/1040/64.
4. JIC(FE) 189/64 (Final).

C.A. I. A.

In discussion the following points were made:

a. There was no evidence to suggest that the primary purpose of the Indonesian build-up in Kalimantan was in the nature of a bluff designed to draw our forces away from the Malayan Peninsular to Kalimantan, although this might be a secondary object.

b. The rate of the Indonesian build-up was such that an increased threat, justifying the reinforcement of our own forces in Kalimantan, would exist by mid-January 1965 and that thereafter there would be a continuing increase to this threat until mid-March 1965 or later.

c. In the short term this increased pressure would be felt initially in the First Division and later in the Second Division. Increased pressure against the Third Division seemed unlikely, although the Director of Borneo Operations thought otherwise (5).


THE COMMITTEE:

(1) Took note.


30 DEC 1964

To. day's COS hlg
Hien & refus
J.I.C.


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1. ~~Secretary~~ 

2. ~~D/Secretary~~

~~A/Secretary 1~~ 

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3. P.C.

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COS 3586/29/12/64

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29th December 1964

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J. I. C.

Copy to: Chief of the Defence Staff
Mr G.G. Arthur, Foreign Office
Major-General J.M. McNeill,
Commonwealth Relations Office
Mr A.A. Golds, Joint Malaysian/Indonesian
Department
Mr J.D. Higham, Colonial Office
DCDS (I)
AUS (Pol)
D of DP

OPERATIONS IN MALAYSIA

1. In a signal (1) the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, has expressed his concern over the build up of Indonesian forces in Kalimantan and requested early reinforcements and extensions to his authority to undertake operations across the border into Kalimantan. The conclusions of an appreciation by the Director of Borneo Operations on the immediate threat against Sarawak posed by the Indonesian build up and the immediate steps which the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, proposes to take were forwarded in a subsequent signal (2). In outline the Commander-in-Chief plans to move an additional brigade headquarters and two battalions from within his theatre to Borneo by mid-January and states that it will be necessary to ask for reinforcements from the United Kingdom for all three Services. These requirements were signalled (3) and in outline were:

a. Navy. Four fast escorts to arrive by end January and four CMS and two SDBs to be taken out of reserve in Singapore.

b. Army. One infantry battalion to arrive in Hong Kong by 15th January, another one to arrive in Singapore early in January; in addition certain small administrative units were required as increments for Headquarters 3rd Commando Brigade. Further reinforcements might be required in February 1965 to replace the units sent to Borneo from Western Malaysia and to provide additional units against the increasing build up. The total might amount to the addition of a brigade headquarters, an infantry battalion, a close support regiment, a squadron of armoured cars and certain logistic units.

Notes:

1. SEACOS 305.
2. SEACOS 306.
3. SEACOS 307.

- 1 -

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COS 3586/29/12/64
(Concluded)

c. Air Force. The principal requirement was a squadron of 12 Wessex helicopters.

2. The Commander-in-Chief stated (1) that he had prepared a paper on the latest situation in Malaysia. When this is received it will be possible to make a detailed examination of his proposals.

3. In the meantime the Acting Chief of the Defence Staff has instructed me to place this matter on the agenda for your meeting on Wednesday 30th December 1964, when he wishes to discuss the following aspects of the situation:

a. To be given the latest intelligence situation and appreciation with particular reference to timings and Indonesian intentions.

b. To discuss what reinforcements demands should be met by, say, mid-January and which can or must be delayed, eg helicopters.

c. To instruct the Defence Planning Staff based on the Far East paper and a. and b. above, to examine the situation in the Far East which is likely to arise in the next six or nine months, the deployment required to meet this situation and the reinforcements if any, required to be despatched.

d. The paper resulting from c. above should be available for your meeting on 12th January and it is for consideration whether the Commander-in-Chief should be formally invited to attend.

J.H. Lapsley
Air Vice-Marshal
Secretary
Chiefs of Staff Committee

Note:

1. SEACOS 305.

- 2 -

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126

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Reference and Date JIC / 1025/64 2nd Dec. 1964

See 'C' File 1025/64

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125

Originating Authority JIC

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See 'O' File 142 / E / c

Folio No.

124

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

MISSILES FOR INDONESIA

Note by the Secretary

The Chiefs of Staff (C.O.S. 72nd Meeting/64, Part I, Item 101, dated 3rd December have taken note of the above-quoted report by the Joint Intelligence Committee.

(Signed) M.G.L. JOY

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

9th December, 1964

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MISSILES FOR INDONESIA

Note by the Secretary

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(Signed) M.G.L. JOY

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

9th December, 1964

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11 DEC 1964

J. I. C.

9th December, 1964

JIC/142 787

JIC,
Cabinet Office,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

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JIC(AUST)(64)40 FINAL

1. Copies No. 7374 and 75 of the above paper are returned.
2. There is no requirement now, and in the foreseeable future, for this paper in this Office. A senior British officer of the Intelligence Division in SHAPE agrees with our views.
3. It is interesting to know that such documents as this are available.

E. E. Westlake

(E.E. WESTLAKE)
CAPTAIN, ROYAL NAVY

*Noted
Sent in Enman
P. B. Wright*

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EXTRACT from C.O.S. 72nd MEETING/64 held on 8 Dec 64

101. MISSILES FOR INDONESIA
JIC(MT)(64)8 (FINAL) - 114 112/8

RESTRICTED

The Chiefs of Staff took note of a report by the Joint Intelligence Committee.

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4.14.27

119

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Joint Intelligence Committee
c/- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

CANBERRA. A.C.T.

27 NOV 1964

The Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee,
Cabinet Office,
LONDON U.K.

Enclosed are copies Nos. 57-76 of JIC (AUST)(64)40 -
"Indonesian Military Capabilities".

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- 7 DEC 1964

J. I. C.

(G.R. DUNBAR)
Joint Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee

Copies to:

- (a) Senior External Affairs Representative,
Australia House, Strand, London
- (b). Head of AJSS in the United Kingdom,
Australia House, Strand, London
- (c) British Defence Liaison Staff (2) (One for BHC)

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (AUSTRALIA)

JIC (AUST) (64) 40
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INDONESIAN MILITARY CAPABILITY

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28 OCT 1964

J.I.C.

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3. P.C.

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FINAL
NOVEMBER, 1964

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

INDONESIAN MILITARY CAPABILITY UP TO THE END
OF 1966 AND 1969

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Appendix C

Air Force Order of Battle

Map S - Indonesia showing:-

- (a) EW/GCI Coverage; and
- (b) Maximum Jet Fighter Cover

Map T - South-East Asia/Australia showing
maximum radii of action of:-

- (a) Jet Bombers; and
- (b) Reconnaissance Aircraft.

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JIC(AUST)(64)40
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NOVEMBER, 1964

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

INDONESIAN MILITARY CAPABILITY UP TO THE END OF
1966 AND 1969

AIM

To assess Indonesia's present military capability, her capability up to the end of 1966 and, where possible, up to the end of 1969.

SUMMARY

GENERAL

2. Our assessment is given in the paper at Annex, and summarized in the following paragraphs.
3. Indonesia will continue to develop an offensive capability to enhance her national prestige and give military backing to her external policy which includes the attainment of regional hegemony. Training, familiarization with new equipment and the control and administration of her widespread archipelago will occupy a large proportion of her military effort.
4. Although the size of the armed forces in Indonesia is formidable, her logistic capability to support such forces is severely restricted by economic problems and administrative inefficiency. It is unlikely that Indonesia, unaided, could sustain operations in a limited war in defence of her own territory for more than a few months at the most. In the event of a limited war situation involving air and sea attacks against targets throughout Indonesia it is unlikely she could maintain effective operations for more than a few weeks.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FACTORS

5. While President Sukarno remains in power and does not take any step that would irrevocably cost him the support of the Army, and while the views of the Army and PKI in respect of confrontation apparently continue to coincide, we do not consider Indonesia's military capability will be seriously affected. In the event of limited war, the inevitable deterioration of the domestic situation and the

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II.

probable discrediting of the Army through serious reverses would be exploited by the PKI and are likely to pose serious internal security problems limiting the Army's capacity to pursue the war (Paras 15 and 16).

6. There is no evidence of any significant communist subversion of the armed forces; however, in spite of screening and indoctrination processes by the armed forces, some PKI members will gain opportunities for military training and infiltration (Paras 7 to 11).

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

7. Indonesian military capacity will continue to be limited by the lack of a diversified industrial structure and inadequate technical expertise. Most items required to sustain a large-scale military campaign would have to be imported as Indonesia is not self sufficient in her main strategic material requirements, with the one exception of her basic POL needs.

8. Owing to a critical shortage of foreign exchange Indonesia will continue to rely heavily on foreign credits for her overseas purchases. While confrontation continues the only important source of such credits for arms purchases appears to be the USSR (Paras 17 to 20).

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

9. Except in Java, Indonesia is almost entirely dependent on shipping for her internal communications. The disruption of these communications either in support of large-scale troop movements or in a limited war would entail severe internal dislocation and shortages. With the purchase of the additional shipping Indonesia hopes to make, she should have sufficient ships for her inter-island trade provided the system is efficiently operated and maintained. There is no evidence of this. Overseas trade will remain dependent on foreign shipping (Paras 21 to 23).

10. Road and rail networks in Java and Sumatra have continued to deteriorate. Although Indonesia is currently engaged in a rolling-stock re-equipment programme, extensive repairs to railtracks and roads will be necessary before there is any significant improvement in logistic capacity (Paras 24 to 28).

11. Air services are inadequate and airport facilities poor. Telecommunications coverage could be adequate by the end of 1966 if the VHF and Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunications Network systems being installed or contracted for are completed to plan. While a gradual improvement in overall logistic capacity can be expected during the period up to 1969, the system will remain inadequate unless there is a vastly increased expenditure and/or a foreign aid programme. (Paras 29-31)

.../III

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III.

ARMY (TNI)

12. The Indonesian Army of about 300,000 men is mainly an infantry force, with 130 infantry battalions. The Army is unbalanced by Western standards in that it lacks adequate supporting arms, but this position will improve as existing and proposed overseas contracts are concluded and deliveries made. An army-wide standardization of weapons is unlikely to be achieved for some years because equipment is still being received from many countries, but small arms and ammunition are being standardized within units (Paras 32 and 38).

13. There are at present some 9,000 men in parachute units who have reached at least a reasonable standard of training. In addition up to 3,000 men a year receive full parachute training (Paras 39-40).

14. Although the Army as a whole is not an efficient modern force adapted to conventional warfare, we believe that at present some 30 infantry battalions with limited but possibly sufficient supporting arms could be made available for external operations. These battalions lacking the necessary supporting elements could not be employed and supported as a co-ordinated fighting force. However, with the expected increase in supporting arms and services this could be rectified by 1969. At present, in view of the level of leadership, command, staff and technical competence, the Army is only capable of employing and supporting in operations, of a conventional type over an extended period, a force of up to 5,000 men (i.e. an augmented brigade group). However, for a short period a much larger force could be made available (Paras 35,46 and 47).

POLICE UNITS

15. The National Police Force has a field force, the Mobile Brigade, which is responsible for internal security within the framework of the police organization. The Mobile Brigade is organized into 32 battalions each of three or four companies giving a total of about 100 companies. The battalions are basically organized and equipped on army lines. Total strength of the Brigade is about 20,000 and is considered to be an efficient force. Should a state of war or military emergency be declared units of the Brigade can be placed under command of the local military commander for special operations.

MARINE CORPS (KKO)

16. The Marine Corps, which is part of the navy, is reasonably well trained and efficient. Its strength of about 15,000 is organized into five battalions with additional training and administrative units. The assault strength of 4-6,000 would normally be organized for specific operations into a balanced task force of infantry and supporting arms. However on the present policy of deployment it is unlikely that more than two battalions could be readily available. (Para 55).

..../IV

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IV.

NAVY (ALRI)

17. The more effective elements of the Indonesian Navy include one cruiser, seven destroyers, ten escorts, twelve submarines, twelve missile-firing fast patrol boats and a large number of auxiliaries. It is a formidable force by South-East Asian standards. There are 28,000 officers and men excluding the Marine Corps. Basic training in elementary subjects such as seamanship and navigation is sound and a fair standard of discipline exists. However, owing to training, manning and logistic problems, together with inadequate maintenance facilities, its efficiency is well below that of Western navies. (Paras 57 to 67).

18. Soviet technical assistance is still required at all levels. Given three months notice, we believe the Navy could put to sea up to 80 per cent of its strength. However, its ability to supply and maintain these ships in an operational state over an extended period is doubtful. (Paras 68 and 69(b)).

19. Although the submarine force would be capable of gaining some successes against unescorted merchant ships, it has not yet reached the stage where it is likely to carry out determined attacks against well trained forces. Nearly all ALRI ships have the ability to lay mines, although there has been no evidence of training in this role. Anti-aircraft capability is limited. The air arm possesses a small capability for maritime reconnaissance, anti-submarine strike and aerial minelaying. Its overall capability would be supplemented by the acquisition of Beagle IL-28 light bombers believed to be on order. (Para 69).

20. With the exception of additional RIGA class destroyers and possibly submarines, we do not expect any further significant expansion of the Indonesian Navy up to 1969. However, we believe that during this period its capability will steadily improve both in professional efficiency and maintenance standards although it will still remain well below that of Western navies. (Paras 63 and 70).

AIR FORCE (AURI)

21. AURI's primary role is that of a tactical air force with additional responsibilities for home defence, particularly in Java. It has a strength of over 550 aircraft of which we believe only about 300 are in squadron service. There are more than 30 different types of aircraft divided among thirteen squadrons, the more important elements of which comprise, 3 jet fighters, 1 jet light-bomber, 2 jet medium-bomber and 2 transport squadrons. The training wing consists of almost 200 aircraft. AURI has about 18,000 personnel including only about 350 aircrew, and its morale is high (Paras 72 to 75).

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V.

22. The medium-bomber aircrew have probably attained limited all weather operational effectiveness. However, medium bombers equipped with "Kennel" missiles are not yet operational and will probably not accomplish missile launchings before mid 1965. By 1966 we believe that AURI will have a reasonably effective strike force capable of dropping conventional bombs by day or night within 1800 nm from its medium-bomber bases and 700 nm from its light-bomber bases. Tactical support could be given to ground forces for short periods. AURI's capability will improve as aircrew become proficient in handling the high performance jet aircraft supplied by the USSR; and more aircrew and technicians become available when the AURI Academy reaches its full output within the next three years (Paras 80 and 88).

23. However, AURI will continue to be handicapped by its lack of capable planners and experience in modern tactics. Its operational capability will be limited by a shortage of trained aircrew, technical musterings, staff officers and instructors, together with a poor logistic system, inadequate maintenance standards and facilities, the small number of operational airfields, poor bulk POL handling facilities outside Java and the low standard of ground controlled interception (Paras 75, 81 and 82).

JOINT OPERATIONS

24. The number of landing craft limit the first wave assault in an amphibious operation to about 4,500 men, depending on the composition of the force. This could be increased to 7,700 for a short-haul operation (up to 80 miles)(Para 104).

25. Assuming a 75 per cent serviceability AURI could airlift 1,977 troops or 1,509 paratroops or 232 tons of equipment. The requisitioning of civil aircraft would increase this to 2,259 troops or 260 tons. We assess an initial serviceability rate of between 60 and 75 per cent which would rapidly decrease after the first few days. The addition of Soviet Hook (MI-6) helicopters will significantly increase the short-range transport capability (paras 92, 107).

26. The operational effectiveness of the navy and air force will severely limit the protection and support these Services can provide for joint operations .(Para 102).

ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES

27. There are a number of surface to air missile firing sites around Djakarta and Surabaya, some of which have an operational capability. We do not believe they will be deployed outside Java. Other anti-aircraft defences are at present very light and would not be effective against aircraft at high altitude (Paras 110, 111, and 112).

(Sgd) O.L. DAVIS
O.H. ISAKSSON
N.E. McDONALD
J.I. ADAMS (for I.S. PODGER)
A.W. McMICHAEL (for W.H. KING)

CANBERRA, A.C.T.

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Piece.....33.....

J.I.C. (AUST) (64) 40
Annex & Appendices FINAL.
NOVEMBER 1964

RETAINED BY
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UNDER
SECTION 3 (4)

(date).....7/9/01.....

(Signed).....A. Lavelle.....

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118

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1. Category 'A' Cypher telegram. Paraphrase NOT required.
2. A telegram which contains a reference to any classified telegram or correspondence must itself be classified.
3. The Cabinet Office Communications Centre (Tel. No. WHI 5422 Ext. 196/197) must be consulted if it is desired to distribute or release this telegram, or any part of it, to a person or nation who would not normally be authorised to receive it.

FROM:- B.D.S. WASHINGTON

DTG: 21.39 (GMT) 24/11/64

TO:- J.I.C. LONDON

TOR: 06.30 (GMT) 25/11/64

TEL NO:- ZO 458

DATED:- 24TH NOVEMBER 1964.

PRIORITY

~~11/8~~ 11/2/8.

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FOR SECRETARY J.I.C. FROM SECRETARY JILC(W).

NO OBJECTION TO JIC(MT)(64)8 FINAL BEING PASSED.

DISTRIBUTION:-

SECRETARY J.I.C. (5)

A/S/1
~~A/S/1 to sec.~~
Clerks for action plan.
V
Actioned 26/11/64
123/201

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S/F (117)

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J.I.C./942/64

COPY NO. 43

CABINET

142/8

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

SOVIET TACTICAL SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES
FOR INDONESIA

(Reference: J.I.C.(M.T.)(64)8(Final) - 114

Departments may wish to note that the above report has been passed to the following:-

Prime Minister
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Secretary of State for Defence
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations
Deputy Secretary of State for Defence and
Minister of Defence for the Army.

(Signed) J.B. WRIGHT

for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

24th November, 1964

DISTRIBUTION

J.I.C.

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E.R.

TOP SECRET

116

J.I.C./82/332/5

MR. W.I. McINDOE

SOVIET TACTICAL SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES
FOR INDONESIA

I attach Sir Burke Trend's copy of the report of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Missile Threat Coordination Sub-Committee on the above subject - J.I.C.(M.T.)(64)8(Final).

2. The Sub-Committee was requested to consider a number of reports from secret sources implying that the supply of various Russian surface-to-surface missiles to Indonesia was discussed with Mikoyan during his visit to Indonesia in July. In the light of all available evidence, the conclusion is that there is no indication that Russia has supplied or has undertaken to supply Indonesia with tactical surface-to-surface missiles. Even if Russia did supply such missiles, the possibility that she would also provide nuclear warheads is thought most unlikely. The type of missiles which Russia could supply to Indonesia, together with deployment areas, missile detection and weapon effectiveness are also discussed in the report.

3. I recommend that I be authorised to issue this report to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State for Defence.

Thuyon

(M.G.L. JOY)

17th November, 1964

↓ agree - plus C. wealth Sec 7.

Mr. Joy

Si

27/11

A Sec 1.

→ Check for action
A/S/3

Ref

4942/64
24/11/64

TOP SECRET

Originating Authority JIC

Reference and Date JIC/913/64 14th Nov 1964

See 'C' File 142/P/c.

Folio No.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group/Class.....CAR 163.....

Piece.....33.....

J.I.C.(MT)(64) 8 (FINAL)

ANNEX

6TH NOVEMBER 1964

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(date).....7/9/01.....

(Signed).....A. Farnelly.....

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Category AC: no unclassified reply or reference.

(113)

From: CINC FE

070508Z November

Date: 7.11.64.

To: MOD UK

Recd: 1418Z

142/8

V

W A R N I N G

NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE

PRIORITY

TLL/SEACOS 273 for CDS.

References:

- a. TLM/SECSEA 162/051722Z
- b. TLL/SEACOS 248/121025Z Oct. — 106.
- c. TLL/SEACOS 271/050540Z.

In view of reference a., I thought you would wish to know that we have a study on the effect of deniable operations now with the planning and intelligence staffs.

2. We think that as a result of deniable operations in Borneo over the past four months we have achieved a measure of domination of the border area which may account for the decrease in incidents during the past weeks.

3. If this proves to be so, I believe there will be a case - observing that our experience has been that these operations have caused no significant protest from the Indonesians - for putting on the screw and seeking some extension from Ministers to the present 3000 yard rule for the depth of deniable operations and for carrying out defensive fire as in para 3 of reference b.

4. I hope that this study will be available before Tun Razak meets the Secretary of State (reference c. refers).

070508Z

Advance copy sent DOC 071435

DC

GSDO AFor

/Distribution overleaf

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PS/Sec of State
CDS (7)
PS/Minister (Navy)
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VCNS
DCNS
ACNS
CGRM
DN Plans (5)
DNAP
DNTWP
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AUS (NS)
AUS (O)(N)
DS 4/5
PS/Minister (Army)
CGS (2)
MO1 Sec (6)
DASD
ASD 2
QMG Sec
Q (Ops)
Q (Mov) Plans
AUS (GS)
DS 6
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LMM/

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Originating Authority JIC

Reference and Date JIC/885/64 4th November

See 'C' File 142/p/c

Folio No.

(111)

Originating Authority JIC

Reference and Date JIC/FE) 15 8/64 25 Oct 1964

See 'C' File 142/8/c

Folio No.

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J.I.C.(M.T.) 15/64

COPY NO. 16

IMMEDIATE

CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

MISSILE THREAT CO-ORDINATION SUB-COMMITTEE

142/8
332/5.

SOVIET TACTICAL SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES FOR INDONESIA
(Previous reference: J.I.C.(M.T.) 14/64) - 108

Your Working Party's report on the above subject (J.I.C.(M.T.)(64) 8 (Draft)) together with a proposed distribution list was circulated for the consideration of the Missile Threat Sub-Committee on 19th October, 1964. I believe you will wish to approve this report and unless I hear to the contrary (Extension 139) by NOON, 28th OCTOBER, 1964 your approval will be assumed and a final version of the report, together with the proposed distribution, will be circulated to the Joint Intelligence Committee for their approval. I attach a suitable draft note at Annex.

(Signed) G.W.W. WADDINGTON

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

23rd October, 1964

DISTRIBUTION

J.I.C.(M.T.)

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ANNEX TO J.I.C. (M.T.) 15/64

DRAFT

J.I.C.(M.T.)(64) 8 (FINAL)

NOTE

J.I.C./817/64 circulated a requirement for the Missile Threat Working Party to report on the likelihood of the Soviet Union making short range surface-to-surface missiles available to Indonesia. This has been completed and the Missile Threat Co-ordination Sub-Committee has now approved the attached report (J.I.C.(M.T.)(64) 8 (Final)).

2. I believe you will wish to agree with this report and its proposed distribution, and unless I hear to the contrary by NOON, 4th NOVEMBER, 1964 your approval will be assumed and the report issued.

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

23rd October, 1964

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3. SOVIET MISSILES FOR INDONESIA

142/8

(Previous reference J.I.C.(M.T.)W.P.) 64 21st Meeting, item 2)

The Working Party had before them a Secretary's minute (J.I.C. M.T. 14/64) and a draft paper, (J.I.C.(M.T.)(64) 8), both of which dealt with the supply of Soviet tactical Surface-to-Surface missiles for Indonesia.

MR. KING tabled a minor amendment to Annex 'A' regarding the reliability of sources of information.

The Working Party -

- (1) Endorsed the paper as amended in discussion as suitable for submission to the Missile Threat Sub-Committee (M.T.S.C.)

- (2) Instructed the Secretary to forward the paper to the Missile Threat Sub-Committee for their consideration at a convenient opportunity.

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S/F (108)
142/8
332/5

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J.I.C.(M.T.) 14/64

COPY NO. 16

CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

MISSILE THREAT CO-ORDINATION SUB-COMMITTEE

SOVIET TACTICAL SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES FOR INDONESIA
(Previous reference: J.I.C./817/64)

The draft report on Soviet Tactical Surface-to-Surface Missiles for Indonesia (J.I.C.(M.T.)(64) 8 (Draft)) which has been prepared by the Missile Threat Co-ordination Working Party and take into account the points listed in J.I.C./817/64, has been circulated for the consideration of the Missile Threat Co-ordination Sub-Committee on whose agenda it will be placed for a convenient meeting.

(Signed) G.W.W. WADDINGTON

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

16th October, 1964

DISTRIBUTION

J.I.C.(M.T.)
J.I.C.(M.T.)(W.P.)

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15 OCT 1964

J.I.C.

Please initial and pass quickly

1. Secretary *WF*

2. ~~D/Secretary~~ *Sh*

~~A/Secretary 1~~

A/ - do - ~~2~~ *Sh*

A/ - do - ~~3~~

A/ - do - *✓* 4 *Sh*

3. P.C.

4. Subject File *142/8*

Reports File

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79

107

COS 3065/14/10/64

Copy No.

Ministry of Defence

14th October 1964

VCNS
VCGS
VCAS

RECEIVED
15 OCT 1964
J. I. C. (9)

Copy to: Chief of the Defence Staff
Mr G.G. Arthur, Foreign Office
Major-General J.M. McNeill,
Commonwealth Relations Office
Mr A.A. Golds, Commonwealth
Relations Office
AUS (Pol)
Head of DS 11
DS 11 (Mr Holton)

142/3

RETALIATORY FIRE ACROSS THE KALIMANTAN BORDER

1. At a meeting of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (1) on 29th April 1964, it was agreed that authority should be conveyed to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, for United Kingdom forces in the Borneo territories to engage in self-defence, enemy guns or mortars firing at them across the Indonesian border and to cross the border up to a depth of 3,000 yards in hot pursuit of a retreating enemy group. This authority was conveyed to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, by signal (2).

2. In his signal (3) dated 13th October 1964, the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, has requested an extension of the authority for opening fire across the Kalimantan border. Increasing use of mortars by the Indonesians has led Malaysian Ministers to enquire why we did not use artillery to fire back across the border on Indonesian posts. The Commander-in-Chief, Far East, believes that there would be military advantage if the current authority could be extended so that any suitable military targets within 3,000 yards of the border could be engaged with fire from our side of the border in cases where there was no risk of civilian casualties. Such an extension of authority would, in the Commander-in-Chief's opinion, help to deter the Indonesians from their hit-and-run tactics and to assist us to dominate the border area.

4. In accordance with the instructions of the Acting Chief of the Defence Staff this matter has been placed on the agenda of your meeting on Thursday, 15th October 1964, and I will show this minute as relevant to your discussion.

J.H. Lapsley
Air Vice-Marshal
Secretary
Chiefs of Staff Committee

Notes:

1. DO(64)19th Meeting, Minute 6.
2. COSSEA 98.
3. SEACOS 248.

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fc

1064

Category AC: no unclassified reply or reference.

121025Z October

From: CINCFE

Date: 13.10.64

To: MOD (UK)

Recd: 0054Z

Info: UK Rep Kuala Lumpur

14/8

W A R N I N G

NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE

PRIORITY

TLL/SEACOS 248.

For CDS.

Reference: A. COSSEA 98 of 291858Z April.

1. During the past fortnight there has been a marked increase in Indonesian activity in Borneo. There have been nine incidents, four of which have been attacks by mortar fire on S.F. posts and five patrol clashes at various strengths up to that on 5th October by 120 Indonesians.
2. This revival in activity was the subject of discussion at National Defence Council on the 6th October. The increasing use of mortars by the enemy led Ministers to enquire why we did not use artillery to fire back across the border at Indonesian posts. I explained the present rules and then was invited to investigate the possibility of initiating such action.
3. At present Ref A authorises us to fire back across the border at any weapon which fires at us but at no other target. I believe that there would be military advantage if this could be extended so that we could engage any suitable military targets within 3,000 yards of border with fire from our own side of the border in cases where there was no risk of civilian casualties. This might help to deter Indonesians from their hit and run raids and help us to dominate the border area. I do not think that such action is likely to cause escalation as the Indonesians have not at present got anything larger than mortars available with which to retaliate.
4. I appreciate that it may be difficult to get Ministerial agreement at this time. In view however of Malaysian Ministers wishes in the matter request my present authority be extended as in Para Three above.

121025Z

/Distribution:

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VCNS		D of DP	
DCNS		Sec DPS	(12)
ACNS		JAPS	
CGRM		Sec PPO/PAO Committee	
DN Plans	(5)	DFP	
DNAP		DGI	(2)
DNTWP		DCDS(I)	
DNAW		DNI	
DNOT		DMI	(3)
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DS 4/5		DI 86D	(4)
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MO 1 Sec	(6)	DUS (P and B)	
DASD		DUS (Pol)	
ASD 2		DUS (Admin)	
QMG Sec		AUS (Pol)	
Q (Ops)		AUS (M)	
Q (Mov) Plans		AUS (G)	
AUS (GS)		DS 11	(2)
DS 6		DS 12	
PS/Minister (RAF)		DS 15	
CAS		DPR	
VCAS		Sec JIC Cabinet Office	(5)
AMP		Mr. Laskey Cabinet Office	
ACAS (Ops)	(2)	JIR Cabinet Office	
ACAS (Pol)		Room 9 Foreign Office	(6)
D Air Plans		Maj Gen McNeill CRO	(3)
D of D Plans (Air)		CRLO	
D of Ops (AT)		Mr. Higham, Colonial Office	(6)
DAP		BDS Washington (by bag)	(4)
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J.I.C./817/64COPY NO. 42

CABINET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

SOVIET MISSILES FOR INDONESIA142/8
332/5

There is a requirement for the Missile Threat Working Party to report on the likelihood of the Soviet Union making short range surface-to-surface missiles available to Indonesia.

2. The Working Party have been asked to particularly consider the following points -

- (a) In the light of all the available evidence, whether the Soviet Union have supplied or intend to supply short range surface-to-surface missiles to Indonesia.
- (b) The likelihood that we would be able to detect the arrival of such missiles in Indonesia or in transit to the likely deployment areas within Indonesia.
- (c) The likelihood that we would be able to identify the support and maintenance areas, or the actual firing points after deployment, by photographic reconnaissance.
- (d) To consider which missiles the Russians would be most likely to make available.
- (e) To assess the most likely areas for the deployment of these missiles and their support and maintenance facilities for use against the mainland of Malaya, with particular reference to Singapore.
- (f) To summarise the effectiveness of these missiles with high explosive warheads.

3. The Chairman of the Missile Threat Working Party has been instructed to take the necessary action and as soon as his report is available a meeting of the Missile Threat Co-ordination Sub-Committee will be held to consider it.

(Signed) G.W.W. WADDINGTON

for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

12th October, 1964.

DISTRIBUTION

J.I.C.
J.I.S. (1st Team)
J.I.S. (2nd Team)
M.T.C.S.C.
M.T.W.P.
D. of D.I.C.
Area Officer of Area No. 2, Defence Intelligence Staff

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1

Telephone: Whitehall 7022, ext. 2882

9th October 1964.

142/8

Please address any reply to
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
(DI(AI)3/TS.70/6A)

and quote:

Your reference:

Secretary,
Missile Threat Sub-Committee,
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

Copy to: Chairman, Missile Threat Co-ordination Working Party.

SOVIET MISSILES FOR INDONESIA

1. You are aware that the Missile Threat Working Party have been asked to report on the likelihood of the Soviet Union making short range surface-to-surface missiles available to Indonesia.

2. The Working Party have been asked to particularly consider the following points:-

- a. In the light of all the available evidence, whether the Soviet Union have supplied or intend to supply short range surface-to-surface missiles to Indonesia.
- b. The likelihood that we would be able to detect the arrival of such missiles in Indonesia or in transit to the likely deployment areas within Indonesia.
- c. The likelihood that we would be able to identify the support and maintenance areas, or the actual firing points after deployment, by photographic reconnaissance.
- d. To consider which missiles the Russians would be most likely to make available.
- e. To assess the most likely areas for the deployment of these missiles and their support and maintenance facilities for use against the mainland of Malaya, with particular reference to Singapore.
- f. To summarise the effectiveness of these missiles with high explosive warheads.

3. Will you please send a note to the members of the Missile Threat Co-ordination Sub-Committee, informing them that the Working Party have been given this task and that as soon as their report is available a meeting of the Sub-Committee will be held to consider it. Will you please also send a copy of the note to D. of D.I.C. and to the Area Officer of Area No.2, Defence Intelligence Staff.

(A.P. SPANTON)

Wing Commander

A/Group Captain (AI) 1.

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CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

COS 59TH MEETING/64 HELD ON 6TH OCTOBER
1964, AT 2.45. P.M.



1. OPERATIONS IN THE FAR EAST - TO TAKE STOCK

(Previous Reference COS 58th Meeting/64 Minute 4)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a Secretary's Minute (1) covering a number of matters relating to operations in the Far East requiring consideration.

A. Western Malaysia

SIR RICHARD HULL (Acting Chief of the Defence Staff) said that there were a number of matters relating to operations in Western Malaysia which the Committee would wish to discuss. Replies had now been received from Sir Robert Menzies (2) and Mr Holyoake (3), both of which indicated an acceptance of United Kingdom proposals for future operations against Indonesia should these be required. The position regarding the previous delegation of authority to the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur had now been clarified (4), and both Australia and New Zealand had accepted that there would be adequate time for consultation before mounting Operation SHALSTONE. Mr Holyoake had however, made an additional point regarding the Malaysian attitude in the event of an attack on the Singapore Naval Base or one of the RAF Stations. The Committee would wish to consider this point in the general context of the assessment of current Indonesian intentions and to hear the views of the political departments on the matter.

The situation was still comparatively quiet in Malaysia generally, and it would seem prudent to use the present lull in Indonesian activity for a critical examination of our military posture in the Far East theatre. It was expected that Plan ADDINGTON would be available for examination by the Defence Planning Staff early in the next week and the DPS report would form the basis for considering the force levels which should be maintained in the Far East.

Notes:

1. COS 2984/2/10/64.
2. Canberra to CRO No. 1060.
3. Wellington to CRO No. 397.
4. CRO to Canberra No. 2015.

PART 1 to COS 59th Meeting/64

Sukarno would be unlikely to give up his confrontation policy in the foreseeable future and it would therefore be necessary for us to continue to provide forces in sufficient strength to deter the Indonesians from rash actions. In addition due weight should be given to the Malaysian wish to preserve the Afro-Asian support they had gained in the course of the Security Council debate and also to the recent assessment by our representative at United Nations (5) with regard to the most effective Malaysian tactics should a further approach to the Security Council be required.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) There was nothing at present which could be added to the latest Joint Intelligence Committee assessment (6) with regard to Indonesian intentions and, although there would be continued activity on the political front, the lull in military operations could be expected to continue until Sukarno returned to Indonesia.
- (b) It had been noted at a previous meeting that as there would be opportunity for consultation between the time of a further Indonesian raid and the mounting of Operation SHALSTONE, time would be available for reinforcement of the Far East should we have withdrawn any of our present forces and require to reinforce once again under Plan ADDINGTON. In addition as it now seemed likely that the Malaysians might wish to make a further approach to the Security Council before requesting the use of our forces under Operation SHALSTONE, there would be even more time available for reinforcing the Far East than had previously been assessed. When considering any reduction in the present force levels, this point should be taken into account.
- (c) Although the Committee had had opportunity to consider the targets to be attacked in the event of mounting Operation SHALSTONE, no detailed plan for the operation had been received. The Secretary should be instructed to ascertain from the Head of Secretariat, Far East the order of forces planned for use in SHALSTONE since, in seeking Ministerial agreement to mount attacks, Ministers would wish to know the scale of effort involved.
- (d) In his reply to the Prime Minister, Mr Holyoake had asked if the British were satisfied the Malaysians would agree to counter-action in the event of an attack on the Singapore Naval Base or one of the RAF Stations. The Commonwealth Relations Office had asked the views of the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur on this matter (7). In reply Lord Head had stated (8) that whilst the Malaysians would be unlikely to feel as much emotionally involved over an Indonesian attack on British bases as over one against a purely Malaysian target, it would be recognised that they could not object to our acting in defence of our bases and at the same time expect us to continue to defend Malaysia. In any event

Notes:

5. New York to Foreign Office No. 2009 and 2027.
6. JIC/792/64.
7. CRO to Kuala Lumpur No. 2453.
8. Kuala Lumpur to CRO No. 1836.

PART 1 to COS 59th Meeting/64

any Indonesian attack involved a violation of Malaysian sovereignty and the main point to be noted was that in the event of an attack on our bases, the initiative in mounting a counter-attack would rest with us, and we would seek Malaysian agreement for our proposed action.

- (e) In considering the attacks to be mounted under Plan ADDINGTON it would be prudent for our air strikes to be concentrated within the shortest possible period of time. Our actions would have to be reported to the Security Council within a 48-hour period and to continue to mount attacks for an extended period after making such a report would make our position politically untenable.
- (f) At a previous meeting the Committee had noted that although the use of Darwin was not necessarily essential to our plans it would be useful should we need to attack the most easterly of the Indonesian airfields. Air strikes against the most easterly airfields were however, in the opinion of the Air Commander, Far East, essential since Indonesian aircraft would have the necessary range to attack Singapore and to use Medan in North West Sumatra for refuelling during the recovery phase.
- (g) At a previous meeting it had been stated that only the V-Bombers could attack the most easterly of the Indonesian airfields. However, it should be noted that a strike carrier could be deployed in five days from Singapore and in four days from Hong Kong to an area from which air operations could be mounted against these bases.

Summing up, SIR RICHARD HULL said, although there were indications that further Indonesian attacks were planned, the present lull might be expected to continue until President Sukarno returned. We should use this time to readjust our deployment to meet a possible continuation of Indonesian threats, but before making firm proposals it would be necessary to examine Plan ADDINGTON. It would seem, however, that the urgency to implement the limited attacks envisaged in Plan SHALSTONE had been reduced and that the Malaysians would take the next Indonesian incursion to the Security Council unless it was significantly more severe than their recent attacks.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Agreed with the remarks of the Acting Chief of the Defence Staff in his summing up.
- (2) Instructed the Secretary to take action as at (c) above.

B. Evacuation Planning

SIR RICHARD HULL said that in his telegram (9) dated 23rd September 1964, the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur had drawn attention to the concern now being felt by the British community about the future in Malaya and Singapore. Lord Head had therefore considered that an urgent and strictly confidential study should be carried out in London to discover what means of transport would be available to move United Kingdom citizens, both Service and civilians, from Malaya and Singapore. This was clearly a most delicate topic calling for action in the first instance by the Political Departments, whose views the Committee would wish to hear before considering the matter further.

MR GOLDS (Commonwealth Relations Office) said that the Political Departments fully appreciated the sensitive nature of this problem. It was nevertheless proposed to initiate confidential discussions with both the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Aviation with a view to establishing the requirement for an operation involving the evacuation of some 50,000 souls. They would also investigate the extent to which this subject could safely be discussed with shipping and airline companies. It was likely that in view of the serious consequences which would arise from any leak on this subject, no action of this sort would be possible.

THE COMMITTEE:-

(3) Took note.

Note:

9. Kuala Lumpur to CRO No. 125 SAVING.

C. Naval Forces in the Far East

SIR DAVID LUCE recalled that Ministers had agreed in September 1964 to the despatch of four frigates from the Mediterranean to reinforce the Far East Station. It was hoped that it would prove possible to return these frigates to the Mediterranean by the end of the year and with this in mind the Navy Department had signalled the Commander, Far East Fleet, who had expressed the view that when additional frigates became available in November it would be possible for the reinforcements to be withdrawn.

With regard to the Strike Carrier VICTORIOUS, the Committee would wish to note that she would leave dock on the 29th October and after a short period of sea trials and working up would again become operational.

Summing up, SIR RICHARD HULL said that the Committee would agree to consider the matter of the withdrawal of the four frigates from the Far East when Plan ADDINGTON was discussed in detail, and any request for the views of the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, on this matter should await the outcome of that discussion.

THE COMMITTEE:-

(4) Agreed with the remarks of the Acting Chief of the Defence Staff.

D. Burma - Staging and Over-flying Facilities

SIR CHARLES ELWORTHY said that at their previous meeting the Committee had noted that the Air Force Department were currently discussing with the Foreign Office the recent ban by the Burmese authorities on staging and over-flying facilities for short range military aircraft. The ban created certain problems for the Air Force Department as Burma was used for staging short range aircraft to the Far East since, unless an aircraft had in-flight refuelling capability, this was the only alternative to sea transport. In the next few months the Royal Air Force were due to undertake a fairly complicated change over of Javelin all weather fighter aircraft. The object was to re-equip the resident force in the Far East with Javelins having no in-flight refuelling capability and to reconstitute the two Javelin Squadrons, in the United Kingdom and Cyprus respectively, with flight refuelling aircraft. This was obviously the sensible posture in view of reinforcement responsibilities. The plan envisaged flying the non-flight refuelling Javelins out via Burma.

Although it might be that the Burmese would not maintain their ban indefinitely, it was only prudent to plan on the assumption that the ban would remain in force. The Air Force Department were therefore replanning the operation on the basis of moving the non-flight refuelling Javelins out to Singapore by sea. This could be achieved with a minor delay of perhaps one month, although it would mean that more Javelins would be out of action than in the original plan. The Air Force Department were accordingly arranging matters on the basis of, first, that the Far East resident strength would be fully maintained throughout the change-over period; secondly, that the full strength in Cyprus would be maintained by stationing a flight of Lightning aircraft on the Island to supplement the temporarily reduced Javelin force; thirdly, that Fighter Command would suffer a temporary reduction in strength but the QRA commitment to SACEUR would be maintained.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (h) It should be noted that the Army Commander in the Far East normally used the staging and over-flying facilities granted by the Burmese authorities when making liaison visits in connection with Gurkha business in Nepal. A permanent ban by the Burmese would greatly increase the difficulties of making such visits which had to be carried out using MRT aircraft with a good short field capability.
- (j) The Acting Chief of the Defence Staff was meeting General Ne Win, the Burmese Prime Minister, on Thursday, 8th October 1964, and the Foreign Office would be preparing a brief for his use in the discussion which would include this matter.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (5) Took note of the statement by the Chief of the Air Staff.
- (6) Took note that the Foreign Office were taking acting as at (j) above.

PART 1 to COS 59th Meeting/64E. Operations in Eastern Malaysia

SIR RICHARD HULL said that we had had some recent successes in Operations in Eastern Malaysia and the Committee would wish to consider the sending of a congratulatory signal to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East.

It was, however, to be noted from a recent signal (10) from the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, that the Indonesians appeared to be accepting operations which were carried out on their side of the border as a normal extension of patrol activities. Furthermore, the scale of an operation, provided it was near to the border, was unlikely to make much difference to Indonesian reaction. Although the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, had been given authority to plan for undeniable operations this had been on the clear understanding that authority for operations to be mounted could only be granted by Ministers in London. The Committee would wish to confirm the Commander-in-Chief, Far East's understanding that authority for undertaking undeniable operations across the Indonesian border cannot be given at this stage.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (7) Agreed with the remarks of the Acting Chief of the Defence Staff.
- (8) Instructed the Secretary to despatch signals to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, accordingly (11).

Notes:

- 10. SEACOS 237.
- 11. Subsequently despatched as COSSEA 226 and COSSEA 227.

F. Joint Confrontation Department

MR PECK (Foreign Office) said that the Committee would wish to note that with effect from the 5th October 1964, the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office had set up a "Joint Confrontation Department" to handle all problems arising from Indonesian confrontation against Malaysia which affected more than one Government Department. This new department would be headed by Mr. Golds of the Commonwealth Relations Office, who would speak both for the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office on all matters affecting Indonesian confrontation.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (9) Took note.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

6TH OCTOBER 1964.

- 5 OCT 1964

J.I.C.

Please initial and pass quickly

1. Secretary *W*

2. ~~D/Secretary~~

~~A/Secretary 1~~

A/ - do - 2

A/ - do - 3

A/ - do - 4

3. P.C.

4. Subject File *142/8*

~~Reports File~~

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COS 2984/2/10/64

Copy No. 34

103

Ministry of Defence

2nd October 1964



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142/8

Copy to: Chief of the Defence Staff
Mr G.G. Arthur, Foreign Office
Mr E.H. Peck, Foreign Office
Mr A.A. Golds, Commonwealth Relations
Office
Mr J.D. Higham, Colonial Office
AUS (Pol)
Secretary, JIC

OPERATIONS IN THE FAR EAST

1. At your meeting on Tuesday, 6th October 1964, you will wish to take stock of the situation in the Far East. Although answers have not yet been received from Australia and New Zealand to the Prime Minister's telegram (1) and although the Commander-in-Chief's plan for the destruction of Indonesian air strike capability Plan ADDINGTON has not been received, the following matters need consideration at the meeting.

2. Assessment of Indonesian Intentions

JIC/792/64 is relevant. (Restricted distribution).

3. Possible Malaysian Reactions to Further Indonesian Incursions

You may wish to take note of two telegrams; one from the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur (2) giving the views of certain Malaysian Ministers on the action that Malaysia should take in the event of further Indonesian landings, the other (3) from the United Kingdom Mission to United Nations setting out the possible reaction in the United Nations to retaliatory measures that we might undertake against Indonesia.

4. Evacuation Planning

In a telegram (4) Lord Head has urged that preliminary action be taken to consider ways and means by which the British Community in Malaya and Singapore could be evacuated should such a drastic step be necessary. You may wish to consider what action to take in response to Lord Head's views in paragraph 5 of his telegram (4).

Notes:

1. CRO to Canberra. 1969
2. Kuala Lumpur to CRO Telegram No 1798.
3. New York to Foreign Office Telegram No 2009.
4. Kuala Lumpur to CRO No 125 SAVING.

- 1 -

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COS 2984/2/10/64
(Concluded)

5. Operations in Eastern Malaysia

In a telegram (5) the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, has outlined recent successful deniable operations and has listed three further suitable objectives for undeniable operations. It is for consideration whether or not a reply should be sent to the Commander-in-Chief to acknowledge his signal and to re-emphasise the importance of keeping operations on a deniable basis.

6. On the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff, I will place this matter on the agenda for your meeting next Tuesday, 6th October 1964, and will show this minute as relevant.

J.H. Lapsley
Air Vice-Marshal
Secretary
Chiefs of Staff Committee

Note:

5. SEACOS 237.

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

SOVIET MISSILES FOR INDONESIA

There is a requirement for the Missile Threat Working Party to report on the likelihood of the Soviet Union making short range surface-to-surface missiles available to Indonesia.

2. The Working Party have been asked to particularly consider the following points -

- (a) In the light of all the available evidence, whether the Soviet Union have supplied or intend to supply short range surface-to-surface missiles to Indonesia.
- (b) The likelihood that we would be able to detect the arrival of such missiles in Indonesia or in transit to the likely deployment areas within Indonesia.
- (c) The likelihood that we would be able to identify the support and maintenance areas, or the actual firing points after deployment, by photographic reconnaissance.
- (d) To consider which missiles the Russians would be most likely to make available.
- (e) To assess the most likely areas for the deployment of these missiles and their support and maintenance facilities for use against the mainland of Malaya, with particular reference to Singapore.
- (f) To summarise the effectiveness of these missiles with high explosive warheads.

3. The Chairman of the Missile Threat Working Party has been instructed to take the necessary action and as soon as his report is available a meeting of the Missile Threat Co-ordination Sub-Committee will be held to consider it.

(Signed) G.W.W. WADDINGTON

for Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

12th October, 1964.

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D. of D.I.C.
Area Officer of Area No. 2, Defence Intelligence Staff

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102

Originating Authority *JIC Hs of S*.....

Reference and Date *JIC/792/64 1 Oct 64*.....

See 'C' File *142/8/C*.....

Folio No.

(101)

Originating Authority *J.I.C.*.....

Reference and Date ..*91C(64) 44th m/9*..... *3 Sept 64*
C.F. 5.

See 'C' File*142/8/C*.....

Folio No.

100

Originating Authority DN.1

Threat to Passport
& Sunda Strait
Reference and Date 2 Sept 64

See 'O' File 142/8/C.

Folio No.

(99)

Originating Authority *GICFE*.....

Reference and Date *GICFE 130/64. 19 Aug 64.*

See 'C' File *142/8/C.*.....

Folio No.

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BAGS JOHORE PD THIS IS BASD ON CODEWORD MATERIAL AND PRELIMINARY
INTERROGATION OF INFILTRATORS CAPTURED SO FAR PD 2 PD IN VIEW OF ITS
LENGTH AND BECAUSE ITS TRANSMISSION WOULD DELAY RECEIPT OF
OPERATIONAL TRAFFIC VIA CODEWORD CHANNELS AT PHOENIX PARK CMH WE DO
NOT PROPOSE TO SIGNAL THIS ASSESSMENT WHICH REACHES NO STARTLING
CONCLUSIONS PD 3 PD UNLES YOU ADVISE US OTHERWISE THEREFORE PROPOSE
SENDING COPIES BY BAGS DEPARTING HERE 20TH AND 23RD AUGUST
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~~Secretary~~

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have no objection.

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ARE MEETING 19 AUG TO CONSIDER SITUATION FOLLOWING INDONESIAN

LANDINGS JOHORE PD THEIR REPORT SHOULD REACH LONDON BEFORE 191000Z

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Secretary J. I. G. (5)

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See JIC 121
96 S/P

FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (FAR EAST)

Copy No. 15 of 57.....

JIC(FE)111/64(Final)

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES

Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East)

1. We have compiled at Annex A the Order of Battle of the Indonesian Armed Forces. This is a periodic revision of the paper(1) we prepared for release to the Malayan Government in July, 1963 which is now superseded.

G.F. HILLER

C.R. SIMS

P.S.D. GRIFFEN (for M.F. STEELE-PERKINS)

A.K. FURSE

D.L. STEWART

D.M. CHRISTIE

B.J.M. TOVEY

HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND

18th July, 1964

Distribution: Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East)
Joint Intelligence Committee (London)

Notes:

1. JIC(FE)141/63(Final) — SIF 15

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ANNEX A TO
JIC(FE)111/64(FINAL)

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES

SECTION 1 - COMBINED ARMED FORCES STAFF

1. The President is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. During 1962 a government re-organisation moved General Nasution into the position equivalent (on paper) to a combination of the United Kingdom Minister of Defence and Chairman of the Defence Staff. In his capacity of Co-ordinator Minister for Defence and Security/Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Nasution exercises command and control of the four services - Army, Navy, Air Force and Police - through the respective Service Ministers/Commanders. The Armed Forces Staff comprises an integrated staff of officers and enlisted men from all services. Organisation of the High Command is shown at Appendix 1 to Section 2.

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ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCESSECTION 2 - THE INDONESIAN ARMY (ADRI)Chain of Command

2. The Minister/Army Commander (Lieutenant General Yani) commands and controls the Indonesian Army from Army Headquarters in Djakarta through the Headquarters of Inter-Regional Commands or Military Area Commands. The Army chain of command is outlined at Appendix 2.

Territorial Organisation

3. The Military Area Command (KODAM) structure consists of three Inter-Regional Commands and seventeen Military Area Commands. KODAM Commanders are responsible for all internal security operations in their areas and for the administration of units under their command.

4. KODAM Headquarters exercise control of units through regimental headquarters. The term "division" is sometimes used as an alternative title for certain Command Headquarters; it is misleading and does not imply a tactical formation. KODAMs have been further sub-divided into smaller Military Districts for ease of operational control. The Inter-Regional Command is an administrative echelon.

Tactical Organisation

5. The infantry battalion is the basic tactical unit of the Army. "Regiments" are merely static headquarters mainly concerned with administration. Operational requirements are met by the grouping of battalions into Regimental Combat Teams of approximately brigade size, or companies into Battalion Combat Teams. Headquarters of combat teams are provided from the staff of existing regimental or battalion headquarters. Composition and grouping of combat teams are not standard. Where necessary an ad hoc headquarters is provided by Army HQ to command a number of combat teams.

6. The Army is currently studying divisional organisations and in 1961 the Army General Reserve Corps, now called the Army Strategic Command, was formed. It is to consist of two divisions, conventionally organised, but so far only one division is being raised. Units belonging to this Division are assigned on paper only and no attempt has been made to group them into an organised, and centralised, strike force.

Composition

7. The ADRI is basically composed of lightly armed infantry units and, by comparison with western armies, is extremely weak in supporting arms and services. Its strength is currently estimated to be some 330,000 men. Major combat units are:

a. Infantry. 134 battalions; these units have a diversity of small arms, notably Lee Enfield's and US .300 Brownings. However, acquisition of Soviet type weapons has led to the introduction of this pattern in some areas. The outline organisation of the infantry battalion at its current stage of development is shown at Appendix 3.

/b.

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ANNEX A TO
JIC(FE)111/64(FINAL)

b. Armour. 8 Cavalry Battalions. Due to the generally poor roads and low bridge classifications in the Archipelago, equipment has been restricted to light tanks and armoured cars. New equipment includes French AMX13 tanks, British Saladin, Saracen and Ferret armoured cars. Maintenance of these equipments in the field is poor due to the shortage of trained technicians within the arm.

c. Artillery. An artillery brigade was formed for operations in West Irian, but the basic unit is an independent battery for employment in support of the local infantry battalion.

(1) Field Artillery. Ten battalions, each with an establishment of twelve guns. Equipment types include:

75 mm pack how	-	US
25 pdr	-	British
105 mm	-	Yugoslav pack howitzer

(2) Anti-Aircraft Artillery. Seven battalions (two light and five medium) and a number of independent light batteries. Equipment includes:

12.7 mm Soviet HAAMG
20 mm Bofors and Oerlikons
37 mm Soviet
40 mm Bofors
17 mm Soviet

An artillery rocket battalion using Soviet surface-to-air missiles has been formed for air defence in the Djakarta area.

d. Airborne Forces. The Indonesian airborne forces comprise three elements:

(1) Parachute Brigade. Whilst a regular parachute brigade is in being as part of the Strategic Command, some 8,000 - 10,000 men have completed parachute training. Most of these troops completed a very basic course of only three (3) jumps and in landings in West Irian the casualty rate during 'drops' was about 10%.

(2) Army Commando Parachute Regiment (RPMAD). Comprising three battalions totalling about 2,500 men who are regarded as the elite of the TNI.

(3) Air Force Parachute (PGT) Units. With an estimated strength of 1,500 organised into two battalions. The primary role of these units is the capture and defence of airfields.

Staff Table

8. This is listed at Appendix 4 to this Section.

/Dispositions

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ANNEX A TO
JIC(FE)111/64(FINAL)

Dispositions

9. These are listed at Appendix 5 to this Section.

Unit Identification

10. Infantry battalions are designated by three-figure numbers identifying them with their Military Area Command (KODAM) and where applicable the Inter-Regional Command as follows:

a. Sumatra Inter-Regional Command

<u>Battalion Serial Number</u>	<u>Kodam</u>
110 - 119	I
120 - 129	II
130 - 139	III
140 - 149	IV

b. Java

200	V
300 - 399	VI
400 - 499	VII
500 - 599	VIII

c. Kalimantan Inter-Regional Command

600 - 699	IX - XII
-----------	----------

d. East Indonesia Inter-Regional Command

700 - 799	XIII - XVI
-----------	------------

Note 1: No battalions have yet been raised in Kodam XVII; units in this area being operationally deployed from other Kodams.

Note 2: Arms and service units are numbered serially within the type of unit and usually have the Kodam numbers affixed i.e. 1/VI Fd Arty Bn.

Note 3: It should be noted that not all these serial numbers have been allotted e.g. in Kalimantan only 600 - 609 are allotted.

Training

11. The Army Commander exercises command and control of army training through the Army Training Command. This Command executes its responsibility by:

- a. Control of the Training Centres of the Arms and Services.
- b. Technical supervision of the Base Regiments, of which there is one in most Military Area Commands (KODAMS).
- c. Co-ordination of research on and development of an Indonesian military doctrine.

/12.

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ANNEX A TO
JIC(FE)111/64(FINAL,

12. The general standard of training within the ADRI, whilst currently assessed as low is gradually improving. The main weaknesses are in the technical and staff aspects. It is considered that Indonesia is capable of training its own other ranks and officers up to infantry battalion level. Training to brigade level has been undertaken since 1961 by selected units.

13. Officer training is carried out at the following institutions:

- a. National Military Academy.
- b. Academy for Military Law.
- c. Command and General Staff College.
- d. Army Technical Academy.

In addition to the Military Academies, selected other ranks are trained at Officer Training Courses of eighteen months duration.

14. Several foreign countries have exerted varying degrees of influence on training, United States Army concepts predominating. It should be emphasised however, that Indonesian military leaders are well aware of the dangers of accepting unreservedly foreign training methods, doctrine and tactical doctrine. They are determined to develop methods, doctrine and organisation tailored to Indonesian conditions.

Intelligence

15. The standard of positive intelligence within the ADRI is fair; security however, is poor. Considerable effort is being made to increase the effectiveness of the counter-subversion element of the intelligence service.

Logistics and Administration

16. Logistics and Administration are controlled and directed by the Logistics and Personnel Departments of Indonesian Army Headquarters. The Army more or less follows the United States Services System, although the technical services are limited in type, number of units, training and capacity. Because the logistics system is still in the formative stage there is much improvisation of methods and organisation to meet the ever increasing demands on the army for operational and civic action tasks. Repair, maintenance, recovery and salvage of material and equipment are the responsibility of individual services and place unnecessary strain on the administrative system. Any expansion of the Army or any large operational commitment will increase the limitations of the logistics system.

17. The present limitations of the Indonesian Army logistics system are principally due to:

- a. The lack of formations higher than battalion level, which renders the co-ordination and planning of logistic support a difficult task for Army Headquarters.
- b. The difficulties in acquiring and providing spare parts and maintenance facilities for equipment obtained from diverse sources.

/c.

c. The lack of any equivalent to an Electrical and Mechanical Engineers organisation which overloads an already strained logistics system.

d. The lack of normal reserves of technicians.

18. The administrative services of the Indonesian Army are unsophisticated and in a formative stage. They are barely adequate for administration in peace but a considerable degree of development from the current system of improvising on a day-to-day basis would be vital in time of war.

Mobilisation Potential and Conscription

19. The mobilisation potential in man-power exceeds ten million, but the existing Army system could neither administer nor equip and maintain such a force. The present re-equipment and training programmes will do much towards creating a balanced force capable of sustained operations, but the size of such a force would be limited for some years to come.

20. Conscription is in force in Indonesia and its purpose appears two-fold. Firstly it helps to reduce the high average age of the Army's rank and file and secondly creates a trained emergency reserve. However, it is an indictment of conditions of service within the Army (particularly of the poor rates of pay and badly organised veteran re-settlement schemes) that conscription is necessary in a country where unemployment is rife.

Civil Defence

21. The Civil Defence organisation is an integral part of the existing system of national defence and is subordinate to the Co-ordinating Minister for Defence and Security. It was brought into being as another means whereby the Army was able to retain its influence and extend its control over the people after the lifting of the State of Emergency. The programme of Civil Defence overlaps the activities of the Army through its Territorial Affairs and Peoples' Defence organisation, the Nationalist Front, Civic Action programme, selective compulsory training of public servants and students and activities in trade unions.

22. The tasks of the Civil Defence organisation are generally as follows:

- a. Local Defence, which envisages a form of village home guard training.
- b. Training and employment in the field of social affairs, such as welfare, education, public health and air raid protection etc.

Civic Mission

23. The aim of Civic Mission, through the Civic Action (or Karya Operation) is to use the Armed Forces equipment and administrative experience for economic development. The Army has set up an establishment for training troops to assist at village level in agricultural improvement works and other types of rural betterment, as in addition to major public works, much of the programme is concerned with small-scale activity at this level. The United States has provided training for serving and ex-service Army personnel and also a large supply of tools and equipment. The USSR has agreed to substitute some public works and engineering equipment for military supplies covered by existing aid agreements.

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24. The presence of troops on Civic Action tasks at village level enables constructive and practical work to be carried out locally, and provides Army discipline and ideology as a counter to Communist influence. Civic Mission also delays the implementation of general demobilisation and reduction in strength of the Army and provides opportunities for veteran re-settlement. A major field of action for the Army is the employment of battalions to assist in works of national importance in terms of Indonesia's economic development plans.

25. Certain battalions of the ADRI may be converted into Civic Mission Battalions; others will be rotated through a three to four monthly period of "Karya" duties and then returned to normal military duties. The organisation of a typical Civic Mission Battalion is:

- a. Command and Control Group - Headquarters.
- b. Survey Company.
- c. General Works Company.
- d. Agricultural Company.
- e. Workshop Company.

26. To date Civic Mission has met with only limited success, principally in West Java. However, Civic Action can be expected to grow as a social force and to become an important factor in the struggle for economic and political power.

Equipment

27. Supplies of small arms and ammunition are adequate to equip the Army, although these are of various types and calibres. Equipment includes items from most European countries, USA, Japan and the Communist Bloc. There is no detailed planned programme of standardisation except by areas and Indonesian home production is quite small. The Bandung Arms and Munitions factory is capable of producing only a small proportion of the peace-time requirement of weapons and ammunition and this is limited to rifles, pistols and certain types of light anti-aircraft gun barrels. This factory can produce annually 50 million rounds of 9 mm ammunition and in addition quantities of mortar (50 mm to 120 mm) and anti-aircraft (20 mm to 76.2 mm) shells, but not in sufficient quantity to meet requirements.

28. Maintenance throughout the Indonesian Army is low by Western standards. There has been a marked shortage of spares. The condition of equipment thus deteriorates rapidly, especially in the case of the more complicated and delicate items such as radio sets and vehicles. A high unserviceability rate exists with equipment acquired prior to 1950 and because of this and the shortage of ammunition, the weapons obtained in this period are now considered to be suitable only for issue in an emergency.

29. Most of the items of equipment currently in use within the Indonesian Army and the Police Mobile Brigades are listed at Appendix 6.

/Police

Police Mobile Brigade

30. The Indonesian National Police Department has a para-military organisation, known as the Mobile Brigade (MOBRIG) headed by a Police High Commissioner. This is a highly mobile force responsible for:

- a. Internal Security.
- b. Border patrol.
- c. Body guards for the President, Cabinet members and senior Government officials.
- d. Augmenting and supporting the Army in specific operations (i.e. anti-rebel operations in Celebes).

31. The MOBRIG has eleven Regional Commands and a Reserve Command. The current strength is estimated at about 20,000 men organised into thirty-two infantry battalions and a number of supporting arms and services.

Personalities

32. a. Nasution, General Abdul Harris

(1) Appointment. Minister of Defence and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

(2) Brief Background. Born in Tapanul, North Sumatra in December, 1918. Graduated from the Royal Military Academy at Bandung as an Ensign in the Royal Netherland Army (KNIL) in 1941. In 1948 he became Chief of the Army Staff in Djogjakarta and later the same year became the Commander of the Army Forces in Java. In 1949 he became Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army. Following the "October 17 Affair" in 1952 he was relieved of his appointment. In 1959 he became concurrently Minister of Defence and he was promoted to the rank of full General in February, 1960. He accompanied President Sukarno to the United Nations General Assembly in the same year. In July, 1962 he was appointed First Minister for Defence and Security/Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Services. His role in this capacity is that of co-ordinator rather than a commander.

b. Jani, Lieutenant General Achmad


(1) Appointment. Minister of the Army and Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

(2) Brief Background. Trained by the Dutch, under whom he was a platoon commander. In 1943 he joined the Japanese-sponsored home guard (PEFA) and from 1945-48 he commanded a battalion in the Indonesian Revolutionary Army. In 1955 he attended the Command and Staff College in the United States and in 1958 commanded the force which captured Padang and West Sumatra from the PRRI rebels. He became a deputy to the Chief of Staff of the Army in September, 1958. In 1958 he led an arms purchasing mission to the USSR and in 1959 led a similar mission to Europe.

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HIGH COMMAND ORGANISATION




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ADRI CHAIN OF COMMAND

Army Headquarters Djakarta




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INFANTRY BATTALION ORGANISATION




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ADRI - STAFF TABLE



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DISPOSITIONS OF MAJOR HEADQUARTERS AND TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS

<u>Formation/Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
Army HQ	Djakarta
HQ Army Strategic Command	Djakarta
HQ Sumatra Inter-Regional Command	Medan
HQ Borneo Inter-Regional Command	Bandjermasin
HQ East Indonesian Inter-Regional Command	Makassar
HQ Kodam I (Iskandar Muda)	Banda Atjeh
HQ Kodam II (Bukit Barisan)	Medan
HQ Kodam III (17 August)	Padang
HQ Kodam IV (Sriwidjaja)	Palembang
HQ Kodam V (Djakarta)	Djakarta
HQ Kodam VI (Siliwangi)	Bandung
HQ Kodam VII (Diponegoro)	Semarang
HQ Kodam VIII (Brawidjaja)	Malang
HQ Kodam IX (Mulawarman)	Balikpapan
HQ Kodam X (Lambung Mangkurat)	Bandjermasin
HQ Kodam XI (Tambun Bungai)	Sampit
HQ Kodam XII (Tandjong Pura)	Pontianak
HQ Kodam XIII (Merdeka)	Menado
HQ Kodam XIV (Udayana)	Makassar
HQ Kodam XV (Pattimura)	Ambon
HQ Kodam XVI (Hasanuddin)	Deupassar/Bali
HQ Kodam XVII (Tjenderawasih)	Kota Baru
Cavalry Centre	Bandung
Artillery Centre	Bandung (Tjimahi)
Infantry Centre	Bandung
Command and Staff College	Bandung
National Military Academy	Magelang
Para/Commando School	Bandung
Intelligence School	Bandung

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PREDOMINANT TYPES OF EQFT

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Country of Origin</u>
<u>Infantry Wpns</u>	
<u>Pistols</u>	
.38 Revolver	UK
9mm FN Automatic	BELGIUM/CANADA
9mm BERETTA Automatic	ITALY
7.65mm Automatic	ITALY
<u>Rifles</u>	
.303 SMLE	UK
7.62 SIMONOV	USSR
.30 MI GARRAND	USA
.30 CARBINE	USA
7.62 FN semi-automatic	BELGIUM
.30 BROWNING Automatic	USA
9mm Carbine	BELGIUM
6.5mm MANNLICHER	GERMANY
7.62 CETME Automatic	GERMANY
7.62 ARMALITE AR-10	HOLLAND/USA
<u>Machine Carbines</u>	
9mm MADSEN	DENMARK
9mm	SWEDEN
9mm OWEN	AUSTRALIA
9mm STEN	UK
.45 THOMPSON	USA
7.62mm	CZECH
9mm SHMEISSER	GERMANY
9mm BERETTA	ITALY
7.62mm KALASHNIKOV	USSR
.45 M3	USA

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/Light

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Light Machine Guns

.303 BREN	UK
7.62mm M52 (BREN Type)	CZECH
7.62 RPD	USSR
.30 BROWNING	USA
7.62 RN	BELGIUM
6.5mm and 8mm MADSEN	DENMARK

Medium Machine Guns

.303 VICKERS	UK
.30 BROWNING	USA
.50 BROWNING	USA

Heavy Machine Guns

12.7 DSHK	USSR (Field and AA)
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Flame Throwers

LFO	USSR
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Inf Anti-Tank Wpns

77mm/83mm BLINDICIDE RL	BELGIUM
GARAND EMERGA Grenade	BELGIUM
M7 Rifle Gde Launcher	USA
3.5 in M20 RL	USA/UK
M57 RL	YUGOSLAVIA
COBRA IV SSGW	SWISS
57mm Recoilless	USA
82mm Recoilless	USSR
107mm Recoilless	USSR
80mm A Tk Rifle	YUGOSLAVIA

/Mortars

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Mortars

2 in	UK
3 in	UK
4.2 in	UK/USA (Chemical Mortar)
51mm MADSEN	DENMARK
60mm	ITALY
60mm	USA
80mm	ITALY
81mm	USA
81mm	YUGOSLAVIA
120 M52	YUGOSLAVIA

Mines

Pressure Mine

Artillery Eqp

Field

25 pdr	UK
76.2mm	USSR
105mm How	YUGOSLAVIA
75mm BOFORS Pack How	SWEDEN
76.2mm Pack Mtn Gun	YUGOSLAVIA

Medium

122mm How	USSR
152mm Gun	USSR

Rockets/Guided Wpns

130mm KATYUSHA RL 32 Tube	USSR
SA2 GUIDELINE SAGW	USSR
140mm BM 14 RL	USSR

/Anti-Aircraft

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Anti-Aircraft

12.7mm DSHK Hvy MG	USSR (See HMGs)
20mm BOFORS	SWEDEN
20mm OERLIKON	SWISS
20mm HISPANO-SUIZA	SWISS
37mm LAA	POLAND
57mm AA	USSR
76mm AA	YUGOSLAVIA
85mm AA	YUGOSLAVIA
40mm BOFORS	USA
30mm HISPANO-SUIZA	SWISS

Armoured Fighting Vehicles

HUMBER Scout Car	UK
PANHARD Scout Car	FRANCE
WHITE Scout Car	CANADA
FERRRET II Scout Car	UK
SARACEN Armd Car	UK
SALADIN Armd Car	UK
BTR 40 APC	USSR
BTR 50 P APC (Amph)	USSR
BTR 152 APC	USSR
PT 76 Amph Tk	USSR
M3A3 Lt Tk (STUART)	USA
AMX 13 Lt Tk	FRANCE
AMX 13 ARV	FRANCE
BRDM Scout Car (Amph)	USSR
K61 Amph Tpt Veh (Tracked/Unarmoured)	USSR
Bren Gun Carrier	UK

/Soft-Skinned

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Soft-Skinned Vehs

MC	CZECH
PUTZ Jeeps	USSR
YAZ 450d $\frac{3}{4}$ ton	USSR
GAZ 69 Maint Veh 4 x 4	USSR
ABTOZABEL Dump Truck	USSR
ZIL 157	USSR
ZIL 164	USSR
ZIL 585	USSR
MERCEDES Wksp Veh	GERMANY
UNIMOG Jeep	GERMANY
Ford Trucks	USA
LANDROVER	UK
YAZ 67B	USSR
TATRA Trucks/Ambulances	CZECH

Wireless Eqpt

SR 156	UK
R 401 Radio Relay Eqpt	USSR
AN/PRC-10	USA
AN/VRC-34	USA
AN/GRC-87	USA
W18	UK
W38	UK
R116	USSR
R105, 108, 109	USSR

Radar

P-20	USSR
SON-9 FIRE CAN AAFC	USSR
RANGER AAFC	USSR
P-15 FLAT FACE	

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ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES

SECTION 3 - THE INDONESIAN NAVY (ALRI)

Organisation

33. Naval Headquarters are at Djakarta and, differing from Admiralty, there is no Board nor do the civilian employees there play anything but a very minor role. The structure of the Headquarters is based on the USN system with some minor differences. ALRI is administered directly by the Chief of the Naval Staff who is also the Minister of the Navy.

34. The Indonesian Archipelago is divided into seven naval areas. Each Naval Area Commander (Kodamar) is responsible in his area for:

- a. Naval administration.
- b. Supreme war administration.
- c. Local and other defences.
- d. Logistical support of the Fleet.
- e. Local operational command of ships allocated for internal security and anti-smuggling duties.
- f. Port administration of those harbours under Naval control.
- g. Liaison with Ministry of Sea Communications, Police, Customs and Water Police in the execution of anti-smuggling operations.

35. Area Commands are established as follows:

<u>Number and Area</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Naval Stations</u>
Kodamar I (North & Central Sumatra)	Belawan	Sabang Padang (Teluk Nadjar)
Kodamar II (Rhiau)	Tandjung Pinang	
Kodamar III (West Kalimantan, South Sumatra, West Java)	Djakarta	Pontianak Palembang Tjirebon Tandjung Priok
Kodamar IV (Central & East Java)	Surabaya	Semerang Surabaya Bali Kupang
Kodamar V (East Kalimantan, Celebes)	Makassar	Bandjermasin Belikpapan Bitung Tarakan Menado

/Kodamar VI

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<u>Number and Area</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Naval Stations</u>
Kodamar VI (Moluccas)	Ambon	Ambon Ternate
Kodamar VII (West Irian)	Biak	Biak Sukarnapura (Hollandia)

Bases and Dockyards

36. The main Naval base and dockyard is Surabaya which was extensively developed by the Dutch before World War II to handle ships up to cruiser size. Other naval bases also exist at Tandjung Priok, Makassar, Halang, Tandjung Uban, Pulau Sembu, Belawan, Sabang, Tarakan, Pontianak, Bitung, Biak; small naval detachments operate at Palembang, Balikpapan, Tjirebon, Semarang and some other ports. The ALRI has some 15 floating docks ranging in size down from 20,000 tons mainly dispersed between Surabaya and Tandjung Priok.

Dispositions

37. Strength. The strength of the Indonesian Navy is approximately 25,000 including about 15,000 marines. The present force available by main types is as follows:

a. Cruisers	1
b. Destroyer/Frigate/Esrot	17
c. Submarines	12
d. Sub-chasers	30
e. KOMAR Class FPBs	7
f. Motor Torpedo Boats	21
g. Motor Gun Boats	18
h. Fleet Minesweepers	6
j. Inshore Minesweepers	10
k. LSTs	7
l. Misc Aux AG	5
m. Oilers (including one Gasoline Tanker)	9
n. Attack Transports.	2
o. Submarine Depot Ships	2
p. Headquarters Supply Ships	1
q. Light Cargo Ships AKL	11
r. Gannet A/S Aircraft	13

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38. Deployment. Nearly all Indonesian warships are based at Surabaya at various stages of readiness or under repair or maintenance at the naval dockyard there. A few smaller craft are based at the civil port of Tandjung Priok. Some smaller vessels ranging from HDMLs to KRONSTADT Class subchasers are based in other areas, notably Rhiau, Belawan, Tarakan, Makassar and Palembang. In the past these craft were never dispersed in anything but small numbers and were employed almost exclusively on anti-smuggling duties. However, since the declaration of Indonesia's policy of "confrontation" and the revival of anti-rebel activities in Sulewesi there has been a marked increase in naval activity in the Malacca Straits and off the South Coasts of Sulewesi. Destroyers and submarines have been frequently reported in these areas. The Indonesian Navy is developing the ports of Sabang on the northern tip of Sumatra and also Ambon and it would thus appear that they may be aiming at a greater dispersal of their forces or greater strategic flexibility.

Order of Battle

39. This is listed at Appendix 1 to this Section.

Equipment

40. This is listed at Appendix 2 to this Section.

Shipbuilding

41. Indonesian shipyards at Surabaya and Djakarta are only capable of building patrol craft and landing craft. Until this very small shipbuilding capacity improves any future expansion of the Navy (except for small craft) must continue to be by purchase from other countries.

Naval Aviation

42. In 1957 a Naval Air Arm was formed with the joint roles of reconnaissance, anti-smuggling and anti-submarine operations. Sixteen Gannet AS Mk 4 aircraft and two Mk 5 trainers were delivered between 1960 and 1962. In addition 2 Albatross (UF-2) amphibious aircraft were purchased from USA in 1960 and 15 Mk 3 helicopters with Soviet trained Indonesian ground crews and some aircrew arrived later in 1963. The Air Arm is based at Waru which is a maritime airfield built on a French contract some 10 miles south of Surabaya.

43. The Air Arm has yet to stand on its own feet. It suffers chiefly from a chronic shortage of maintenance personnel at all levels and the attempts made to improve the position have met with little success. With Indonesia's other manpower needs there are insufficient men available with the basic education required for learning a technical trade. In spite of these troubles the Air Arm is to be expanded still further with the purchase of 12 IL 28's and 7 Hound a/s helicopters from the Soviet Union. Delivery is expected in late 1964.

The Korps Komando (KKO)

44. This, the Marine Corps, was originally founded from the naval troops in central Java in 1950. The initial guerilla struggle against the Dutch and the nation's island configuration naturally suggested the value of regular commandos once the nation's independence was assured. Although within the naval structure the KKO is a completely separate formation,

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having its own training establishments and barracks. It is a force modelled on USMC lines, many of the officers and NCOs having received training in the US or Guam. Many of the senior officers including the commanding General, are keener and hold more realistic and serious views about their profession than do the senior officers of the ALRI. However, leadership at junior officer level does not match those qualities. It was intended originally that supporting arms required to transform a battalion into a landing team would kept separate at least until 1965. However, the West Irian build-up provided the boost required to allow of the increase of the Korps to its present level and standards.

45. The strength is currently assessed at 14,000-15,000 personnel, including all recruits, the striking element being:

5 infantry battalions (a sixth is scheduled to be trained for 1964).

plus one battalion each of the following:

Tank, Artillery (this battalion is possibly nearly double the normal USMC size), MT, Amphibious (all Soviet and Czech equipped).

The current plan seems to be to expand to the equivalent of two composite brigades by 1967 with a skeleton for rapid increase to two divisions should this be required.

46. The main bases are in Surabaya and Djakarta. The present disposition of battalions is thought to be:

1st Surabaya (elements in Tarakan, Nunukan and Sebatik Islands).

IIrd Tjilandak (Djakarta) (elements in the Rhio Islands).

IIIrd Surabaya

IVth Djakarta (Presidential Guard detachment at all Palaces).

Vth West Irian.

VIth Projected for 1964.

Training

47. The Naval Academy at Morekembangan is being expanded to provide facilities for 800 - 850 cadets. Cadets enter from high school at the age of 18 for a four year course. Ratings training is mainly carried out at the Ratings Training Establishment alongside the Naval Academy. After a year's training ashore, new entries carry out further on-the-job training at sea.

48. Soviet Technical Assistance. Much on-the-job training has been conducted by Soviet Bloc personnel at sea and ashore. At its peak it is estimated that there were about 500 Soviet technicians in Indonesia providing assistance to ALRI. At present it is believed there are approx 100 Soviet technicians in Indonesia, none of which are seagoing. It is likely that this figure will be reduced even further soon.

49. Specialist Training Abroad. This has been greatly expanded since the acquisition of the ships from the Soviet Bloc. Prior to 1958 many ALRI personnel received their training in Western Europe and the USA. Since then there has been a move towards Bloc training and a certain amount to India. It is estimated that over 3,000 Indonesian Naval personnel have undergone or are currently undergoing training in the Soviet Union. The Indian Naval Training programme is believed to have been virtually completed.

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50. General. ALRI are experiencing some very complicated problems in the training of the expanding Navy, the following being the main sources of trouble:

- a. The general lack of qualified and experienced instructors throughout Indonesia resulting in large classes and a poor standard of instruction.
- b. Lack of text books, particularly in the Indonesian language.
- c. Training aids are scarce and poorly maintained.
- d. Foreign training has been spread through many countries by many students do not return to jobs where their training will be advantageous.
- e. Much of the training in the Soviet Bloc is in the Russian language, which the Indonesian finds strange and difficult.
- f. There appears to be a general lack of original higher staff thinking and planning such as one would expect to find in a growing navy.

Morale

51. Morale in the Navy is reasonably good considering the lack of professional skill, experience and leadership. Rudimentary operations against the rebels in 1958/9 were accomplished successfully but these were not any test of fighting qualities as there was little opposition. Success, according to ALRI, of the build up of the West Irian operation also helped to raise morale, but the recent inflation and economic difficulties may well offset this. Both officers and men appear to have a patriotic pride in their Service and individually would fight well in any cause which they believed. Morale may well suffer when the serviceability of the many new ships and weapons drops, as it almost certainly will because of the lack of skilled technical knowledge and tradition.

Operational Capability

52. General. In theory the operations of the Fleet will probably be organized around the cruiser IRIAN if only because this ship is the nation's pride. In the first seven months after her arrival IRIAN spent only fifteen days at sea and her work-up programme, even with Soviet assistance, has progressed very slowly and haphazardly. Maintenance and the docking have also presented problems. No adequate facilities are available in Indonesia for docking down IRIAN and recently she spent 8 months in Vladivostok for routine docking and repairs.

53. Surface. The effectiveness of ALRI in surface gun and torpedo attack has never been put to the test as the dissidents were without effective naval forces. ALRI has had, however, a good deal of bombardment experience against shore targets. It is probable that the bombardment was direct and there was no evidence of air or ground spotting. With the acquisition of 7 Komar type PGMC's, and the successful firings of missiles their surface capability is improved.

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54. Anti-Submarine. On paper ALRI has a considerable A/S capability. However the Gannets have carried out only a few elementary A/S exercises with the Fleet, the submarines are only just beginning to exercise with the Fleet, and poor maintenance and the lack of spares reduces the activities of the surface vessels. Thus the A/S capability must be considered to be very low and improvement is unlikely to be rapid.
55. Submarines. Due to ALRI's inability to maintain them, the original 'W' Class submarines delivered in 1959 spent little time at sea. However, with the aid of Bloc technicians, big efforts were made to put right all major defects and the crews of the next four 'W' Class submarines delivered in 1962 probably received better training than their predecessors. Many of the submarine officers seem to be above the ALRI average and have no illusions that their expansion in 1962 was too rapid and that it may be up to two years before their fleet is reasonably efficient. Nevertheless it is believed that about half the twelve submarines are capable of carrying out simple patrols.
56. Minelaying. Current stocks of mines are believed to be in excess of 15,000. These are mainly Soviet mines of World War II vintage and about 8,000 of them are believed to be moored contact mines while the remainder may be simple influence mines. In her ships ALRI has a considerable offensive minelaying capacity and defensive minelaying could be carried out by many of the older ships. Gannet aircraft are capable of minelaying.
57. Minesweeping. There is a minesweeping capability in six ex-T43 Fleet minesweepers, the ten Pulau Class inshore minesweepers and four old coastal minesweepers. Wire sweeping is known to have been carried out and the Pulau Class are fitted for magnetic and acoustic sweeping. However there are few indications of frequent sweeping exercises.
58. Air Defence. This was demonstrably poor during the rebellion and although the acquisition of many new ships with an AA armament has theoretically improved this deficiency, lack of practice and poor maintenance will not have resulted in a great improvement in air defence capability. There is also little evidence of ship control of fighters or even of target towing aircraft.
59. Amphibious Capability. This, an essential requirement for a West Irian operation, showed the most significant development in 1962. A good liaison was developed with the KKO and provided the necessary air support and air cover and fire support could have been guaranteed, the amphibious force could have achieved a landing. Since then, however, the Amphibious Task Group seems to have been rapidly dispersed, first to rest and recoup, then to shore training and routine duties by the KKO and some desultory transportation tasks by the LSTs. Thus it would probably require quite an effort to set up a similar task group in the near future.
60. Aviation. Up to 1962 the basic efficiency and spirit of the Fleet Air Arm was probably higher than in much of the rest of the Navy. However, there has been little advance in the last 18 months. Current problems exist in the training and maintenance fields. Greater emphasis is required on operational training but this has been held up for lack of weapon stores. So far there have been few major maintenance troubles, because British technicians have been available. ALRI technicians are not capable of carrying out major overhauls and due to continual transfers of technical personnel, maintenance training is proving ineffective. Nevertheless, despite delays and set-backs, the morale of aircrews and some ground crews is high.

/61.

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61. Frogmen. Some ALRI frogmen were training in Poland in 1959/60. A team of 26 was available for the West Irian operation and is alleged to have carried out beach reconnaissance. Training schools for frogmen have been opened and this type of warfare undoubtedly appeals to the Indonesians whose thinking is geared to guerilla activities and who could train and operate under generally ideal conditions. It is probable that there are sufficient frogmen available to carry out simple demolition and mining operations such as would pose quite a problem in the Malaya/Singapore/Borneo area.

Efficiency

62. From all the available evidence, and despite a considerable effort and improvement during 1962, ALRI efficiency is still low. This stems not only from lack of material skill and experience but also lack of practical training and sea experience. Although during the West Irian operation build-up and training ALRI put in more sea-time and training, it is clear that the task forces were inadequately trained and their shortcomings could have shown up disastrously in the face of determined opposition.

63. After the West Irian agreement, ALRI suffered a period of anti-climax - the forces dispersed and many of the lessons were forgotten because they never had to be tried in action and the forces were not training and exercising together for long enough to gain solid experience. However, since confrontation with Malaysia, ALRI has been very active and is conscious of the need for intensive training. Accordingly comparatively large scale training operations have been carried out with a reasonable degree of success.

64. Probably one of the few lessons learned was the need for joint Service co-operation and higher staff training. ALRI found themselves very short of suitable officers for higher staff jobs and operational responsibilities. In 1962 they showed that they were capable of planning a moderate sized combined operation in slow time and the present accent on higher staff training suggests that this capability will improve. However, the standard of execution will remain low for some years.

65. It is certain that the sea-time of the fully commissioned ships is again limited, whilst many ships apparently in commission have only skeleton crews or are immobilised for want of spares or repairs. Any startling improvement will be limited to certain classes of task forces upon which ALRI may decide to concentrate. There will not be any marked overall improvement, until ALRI have digested all the new and variegated material, and have channeled to advantage the many ideas coming back with foreign trained personnel.

66. Nevertheless, ALRI represents quite a threat if only because of the large number of units which it is potentially capable of manning and getting to sea.

Personalities

<u>Appointment</u>	<u>Name</u>
Minister/Chief of Naval Staff	Rear Admiral R.E. Martadinata
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff	Rear Admiral Muljadi

/Chief

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<u>Appointment</u>	<u>Name</u>
Chief Assistant to CNS	Brig Gen A. Sadikin
Fleet Commander	Commodore Sudorno
Head of General Planning Directorate	Colonel Subono
Head of Naval Intelligence Directorate	Colonel Sardjeono
Head of Operations Directorate	Colonel Nimpeono
Head of Logistics and Administration Directorate	Colonel Marwidji
Head of Personnel Bureau	Colonel Sumanti
Head of Air Operations (Naval Aviation)	Lt Col Purbonegaro
Commandant, Marines (KKO)	Maj Gen Hartono
Chief of Staff KKO	Colonel Budojo
Commander Amphibious Forces	Colonel Suwadji
Kodamar I	Lt Col Sukardjo
Kodamar II	Lt Col Suparman
Kodamar III	Lt Col Susatyo Mardhi
Kodamar IV	Colonel Hamzah
Kodamar V	Lt Col Panggabean
Kodamar VI	Lt Col Suwarjo
Kodamar VII	Lt Col Wibowo
Governor, Naval Academy	Col Subijakto

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ALRI ORDER OF BATTLE

(JUNE, 1964)

PENDANT NO.	NAME
<u>CRUISER - (CL) = 1No.</u>	
201	IRIAN
<u>DESTROYER - DD = 7No.</u>	
301	SILIWANGI
302	SINGAMANGARADJA
303	SULTAN ISKANDER MUDA
304	SAWUNGGALING
305	SANDJAJA
306	BRAWIDJAJA
307	DIPONEGORO
<u>DESTROYER/ESCORT - DE = 8No.</u>	
351	JOS SUDARSO
352	SLAMET RIJADI
353	NGURAH RAI
354	MONGONSIDI
355	IMAM BONDJOL
356	SURAPATI
357	LAMBUNG MANGKURAT
358	HANG TUAH
<u>ESCORT - PCE = 2No.</u>	
801	PATIMURA
802	HASANUDIN
<u>SUBMARINE - SS = 12No.</u>	
401	TJAKRA
402	TRISULA
403	NAGA BANDA
404	NAGA RANGSANG
405	HENDRAJAJA
406	ALUGORO
407	NANGGALA
408	TJANDRASA
409	WIDJAJA DANU
410	PASOPATI
411	TJUDAMANI
412	BRAMASTRA

/SUBMARINE

SECRET

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SUBMARINE DEPOT SHIP - AS = 2No.

4101	RATULANGI
4102	THAMRIN

LARGE SUBMARINE CHASER - PC = 22No.

KRONSTADT CLASS:

809	KIA
810	TJUTJUT
811	KATULA
812	LADJURU
813	MADIDIHANG
814	PANDRONG
815	SURA
816	KAKAP
817	BARAKUDA
818	PALU
825	MOMARE
826	LUMBA LUMBA
827	TONGKOL
828	LAPAI
829	TOHOK
830	SEMBILANG

KRALJEVICA CLASS:

819	LAJANG
820	LEMADANG
821	KRAPU
822	DORANG
823	TODAK
824	BUBARA

LARGE SUBMARINE CHASER (old) - OPC = 4No.

U.S. 173 CLASS:

805	HTU
806	TORANI
807	TJAKALANG
808	TENGGLERI

PATROL ESCORT (old) - OPF = 2No.

BATHURST CLASS:

804	RADJAWALI
803	PATIUNUS

/LARGE

SECRET

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SUBMARINE CHASER - SC = 4No.

MAMAR CLASS:

8119

KELABANG

U.S. 'B' CLASS:

571

BENTENG SILUNGKANG

572

BENTENG WAITATIRI

573

BENTENG KALUKUANG

SMALL GUIDED MISSILE MOTOR BOAT - FTG = 7No.

KOMAR CLASS:

601

KELAP LINTAH

602

KALAMISANI

603

SARPAWASESA

604

SARPAMINA

605

PULANG GENTI

606

607

MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT - PT = 21No.

JAGUAR CLASS:

651

SERIGALA

652

BERUANG

653

MATJAN KUMBANG

654

ANOA

655

PARIMAU

656

ADJAK

657

SINGA

P.6 CLASS:

658

BOHOROK

659

BADAI

660

TAOFAN

661

FRANARA

662

ANGIN KUMBANG

663

ANGIN GENDING

664

ANGIN RIBUT

665

ANGIN PUJUH

666

ANGIN WAMBRAU

667

ANGIN PRUBU

668

ANGIN TONGI

669

ANGIN GRENGGONG

670

ANGIN WAMANDAIS

671

ANGIN PASAT

/FLEET

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FLEET MINESWEEPER - MSF = 6No.

T.43 CLASS:

701	PULAU RANI
702	PULAU RATEWO
703	PULAU ROON
704	PULAU RURBAS
715	PULAU RADJA
716	PULAU RONDO

INSHORE MINESWEEPER - MSI = 10No.

705	PULAU ROMA
706	PULAU RAAS
708	PULAU RUPAT
710	PULAU RANGSANG
711	PULAU REMPAANG
712	PULAU RENGAT
713	PULAU RUSA
709	PULAU RAU
707	PULAU ROTI
714	PULAU RINDJAT

MOTOR GUNBOAT - PGM = 18No.

MODIFIED BKI CLASS:

8101	BATU PASIR
8102	BATU TRAS
8103	BATU GRANIT
8104	MEGA SAKTI
8105	MEGA MENDUNG
8106	MEGA GUNTUR
8107	MEGA KABUT
8108	MEGA GANTANG
8109	ULAR SENDOK
8110	ULAR NAGA
8111	ULAR PUSPA KADJANG
8112	ULAR BOA
8113	ULAR LAUT
8114	BATU KARANG
8115	BATU PADAS
8116	BATU HITAM
8117	BATU SANDEJA
8118	MEGA MUKTI

PATROL CRAFT - YP = 6No.

'A' CLASS:

AROKWES
ANTANG
AMPIS
ANDIS
ARYAT
ALKAT

/PAT CLASS = 6No.

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PAT CLASS = 6No.

PAT 01
PAT 02
PAT 03
PAT 04
PAT 05
PAT 06

ATTACK TRANSPORT - APA = 2No.

531
532

MOROTAI
HALMAHERA

SUPPLY/HEADQUARTERS SHIP - ACC = 1No.

561

MULTATULI

TANK LANDING SHIP - LST = 7No.

1
501
502
503
504
505
506

TANDJUNG NUSANIVE
TELUK LANGSA
TELUK BAJUR
TELUK AMBOINA
TELUK KAU
TELUK MANADO
TELUK MADJO

TANK LANDING CRAFT - LCT = 3No.

861
862
863

TELUK MORI
TELUK WEDA
TELUK KATUREI

LIGHT CARGO SHIP - AKL = 11No.

....
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961

TANIMBAR
NUSA TELU
NATUNA
BANGGAI
TALAUD
ARU
MISCOL

/OILER

S3 - 1 - 5

SECRET

SECRET

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OILER - AO = 8No.

901	SAMBU
902	TARAKAN
903	SUNGAI PAKNING
904	BUNJU
906	SUNGAI GERONG
907	PLADJU
908	BULA
910	BALIKPAPAN

GASOLINE TANKER - AOG = 1No.

909	PAKAN BARU
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MISCELLANEOUS AUXILIARY - AG = 5No.

	MARICK
	NAMLEA
	PIRU
	AMAHAI
923	NANUSA

MISCELLANEOUS (UNCLASSIFIED) - IX = 2No.

....	DEWARUTJI
....	BANTENG

SALVAGE VESSEL - ARS = 4No.

9101	RAKATA
9102	LOKON
9105	RADJA BASA
9201	RAUNG

TUG - AT = 8No.

926	TRITON
...	BADAK
9104	TAMRAU
934	LOMPOBATANG
935	TAMPORA
936	BROMO
1509	MUTIS
1508	DEMPO

TORPEDO RECOVERY VESSEL - YPT = 3No.

4151	BUAJA
4152	BINJAWAK
4153	RANTE KOMBOLA

/FIRE

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FIRE FIGHTING VESSEL - FF = 2No.

1506 BANAT TOBA
1507 RAWA PENING

DEGAUSSING VESSEL - ADG = 1No.

9103 KILAT

SURVEYING SHIP - AGS = 5No.

1001 DEWA KEMBAR
1002 BURDJAMHAL
1003 ARIES
1004 MAJANG
1005 JALANIDHI

IN RESERVE OF NON-EFFECTIVE

COASTAL MINESWEEPER (old) - MSC(O)

ENGGAHO
DJOMBANG
DJAMPEA
FLORES

S3 - 1 - 7

SECRET

SECRET

 APPENDIX 2 TO
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Equipment

Type & Class	Displacement (tons)	Max: Speed	Endurance	Armament (guns)	Armament (others)	Radar	(a) Sonar (b) IFF	Remarks
<u>Cruiser</u>								
IRIAN Class	20,000	34	8,400	12-6" (4 trip atg) 12-4.1" (6 twin) 32x37mm (16 twin)	2 DC traps 140 mines (est.)	Seagull High Sieve Neptune Egg Club Sun Visor Top Bow	(a) Probably fitted (b) Square Head High Pole	
<u>Destroyer</u>								
SKOPY Class	2,875 (full load)	36	3,200 @ 20 kts	4x5.1" (twin) 2x3.35" (DF) 8x37mm	10x21" TT 2 DC thro'rs 2 DC traps	Low Sieve Cross Bird Post Lamp Fire Iron	(a) Tamir 5M (b) Ski Pole Yard Rake	
ALMIRANTE CLEMENTE Class	1,290 (full load)	32	3,000 @ 18 kts	4x4" (twin) 6x30mm (twin) 6x20mm (twin)	3x21" TT 1 split- hedgehog 4 DC thro'rs 1 DC trap	1 SG 6-b 3 MLT/1 a-type 1 MLT/1 a-type	(a) 1 British 128 DVQ	
<u>Escort Vessel</u>								
Modified AIRONE Class	1,176 (full load)	22	2,400 @ 18 kts	2x3" 4x30mm (twin)	2 hedgehog 4 DC thro'rs 1 DC trap	1 SG 6-b 1 MLT/1 a-type Marconi- MF/RDF	(a) 1 British 128 DVQ	
Australian BATHURST Class	1,025 (full load)	12	4,300 @ 10 kts	1x4" 1x40mm 4x20mm	-	US RCA Commercial		
RIGA Class	1,300	29	3,250 @ 14 kts	3x4" 2xtwin 37mm	3x21" TT 1 hedgehog 4 DC thro'rs 2 DC traps 40 mines	Ball Gun Cross Bird Sun Visor	(a) Fitted but type unknown (b) Square Head High Pole	
<u>Submarine</u>								
"H" Class	1,030 (full load)	see remarks	-	2x25mm (twin) 2x21"	4x21" bow torps 2x21" stern torps (12 tor- pedoes or 24 mines)	Scoop Plate	(a) Tamir 5L	Surfaced max. 18 kts - 2,860mm Snort max. 5.5 kts - 5,500mm cruise 5 kts - 6-7,500 mm Submerged max. 13.5 kts - 13.5 mm cruise 3 kts - 150 mm.

/A/S Vessels

SECRET

Type & Class	Displacement (tons)	Max: Speed	Endurance	Armament (guns)	Armament (others)	Radar	(a) Sonar (b) IFF	Remarks
<u>A/S Vessels</u>								
KRONSTADT Class	380 (full load)	24	-	1x2.35" 2x37mm 6x12.7mm (twin)	2 ahead throwing weapons 'mouse- trap type' 2 DC traps	Ball End	(a) Tamir 10 (b) Ski Pole Yard Rake	
US 173	450 (full load)	20	5,000nm @ 10 kts	1x3"	4 DCT	1 SO-8 1 VS Sperry	(a) 1 QOU 1 MJ-3 echo sounder	
KRALJEVICA Class	225 (standard)	20	1,200 nm @ 12 Kts	1x3" 1x40mm 6x20mm	2 DCT 2 DC traps	1 similar to Rodifon 974 1 British Decca	(a) 1 British QOU-2	
<u>PGMC</u>								
KOMAR Class	73	38.75	570 nm @ 20 kts	2.25 mm	2 subsonic cruiser type surface to surface missiles		Square Tie High Pole Dead Duck	
<u>MTBs</u>								
JAGUAR Class	160 (full load)	42	700nm @ 22 kts	2x40mm 2x20mm?	4x21"	1 Beacon 978	(a) 134F	3 of this class are of wooden construction and slightly lighter. Only 4 boats have so far been fitted out with full out- rit of torpedo tubes.
<u>P.6 Class</u>	60 (full load)	45	1,400nm @ 22 kts	4x25mm	2x21" 12 DC	Skin Head	(b) Ski Pole	
<u>Patrol Craft</u>								
'A' Class	247 (full load)	12	-	1x37mm 4 MGs	-	-	-	11 vessels in this class but some are on loan to Shipping Department and Customs.
<u>Minesweepers</u>								
Inshore PULAU Class	160 (full load)	24	-	1x40mm 2x20mm	-	1 RCA-CR-103	-	Single Wire Sweep Acoustic Sweep Magnetic Sweep
Coastal - FLORES Class	175 (full load)	10	-	1 light gun (20mm)	-	none	-	Capable of sweeping moored contact mines.

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCESSECTION 4 - THE INDONESIAN AIR FORCE (AURI)Command and Organisation

68. AURI is an autonomous organisation under the direction of a Minister/Commander-in-Chief/Chief of Staff, responsible only to the Supreme Commander, President Sukarno. The present incumbent of this post, Air Vice Marshal Omar Dani, and many other senior staff officers have received their staff training at the RAF Staff College, and in effect, there is now a team of Western Trained staff officers running an air force largely equipped with Soviet Bloc aircraft in operational units.

69. The Minister/C-in-C is assisted by four assistants and ten bureau chiefs, all of whom are politically appointed, whose functions are believed to be the formulation of higher policy. The Headquarters organisation is based on the three-pronged system of air, administration and technical arms. A functional command system has been introduced and at present there are four Commands - Operations, Training, Maintenance/Material, and National Air Defence. The last of these was formed in 1962 to co-ordinate the setting up of a complete Air Defence of Indonesia, under the operational control of AURI, but administered by the three Services. So far little is known of its activities.

70. Area Operations Officers have been appointed to control the six Air Regional Commands throughout the archipelago and progress has been made with the formation of Operational and Training Wings. With increased delegation of authority to the Air Regional Commanders a notable improvement has been made towards more efficient control. Air Vice Marshal Omar Dani is considered to be pro-Western, although a nationalist, and has built up a reputation for efficiency and incorruptibility. Since he was appointed Minister/C-in-C early in 1962, there has been some improvement in the general organisation of the Air Force. However, it is still plagued by shortage of men and material and much remains to be done before it can be regarded as an efficient force.

Policy and Deployment

71. The roles of the AURI are laid down as follows:

- a. Air Defence.
- b. Air Search and Rescue.
- c. Photographic Reconnaissance for the Army and Civil Authorities.
- d. Logistic Support of its own bases.
- e. Support for the Army and Navy.

72. The acquisition of a jet medium bomber force has given the AURI an increased offensive capability in pursuance of the role of supporting the Army and Navy. Part of this force is equipped with Kennel Air to Ground missiles (ASM) and in the comparatively near future this will have formidable potentialities in the anti-shipping role.

73. AURI maintains its own paratroop force and its own security troops for the protection of its bases. It also provides air transport within Indonesia for the President of the Republic.

Personnel

74. The present strength of the Indonesian Air Force (AURI) is believed to be 17,000, with an additional 9,000 civilians employed on administrative duties. Military personnel include about 4,500 officers, 7,000 NCOs and 8,500 airmen.

Aircrew are thought to number between 400 and 450, the majority being relatively inexperienced junior officers. The extreme shortage of aircrews is illustrated by the fact that AURI has as many aircraft as it has aircrews. There is also a shortage of trained staff officers, ground crews and technicians, particularly in the radar and electronics fields. Despite official recognition of these shortages very little has been done as yet to remedy them.

Operational Units and Dispositions

75. The AURI is organised into 13 Operational Squadrons, the majority of which are normally based in Java, but there are main detachments at Hasanuddin in the Southern Celebes and Biak in West Irian. Details of these with their present locations are shown in Appendix 1.

76. Airfields. At present the AURI does not possess sufficient airfields suitable for the operation and deployment of all of its jet aircraft. This applies particularly to areas outside Java. An airfield development programme is in hand. Details of airfields considered suitable for jet operations are given at Appendix 2 to this Section. There are many more airfields and landing strips scattered throughout the archipelago than those shown, but these lack maintenance facilities, radio aids, lighting, fuel installations and communications.

Strength and Effectiveness

77. AURI has some 520 aircraft composed of 30 different types. (These figures include non-operational aircraft - details are given in Appendix 3.) Shortages of aircrews, technical personnel and facilities, and the absence of an effective logistic system is limiting the numbers which can be placed in squadron service. Of those aircraft which are in squadron service, the percentage which AURI are capable of putting into the air depends largely on the availability of air and ground crews, which varies with units. An approximate serviceability figure for the force as a whole is 35%, but in, for instance, No. 31 Squadron (C-130 Hercules) and Nos. 41 and 42 Squadrons (Badgers A and B respectively), the serviceability figure is generally higher - up to 50%. The operational force is backed by an adequate force of jet and piston engined training aircraft. It is likely that the overall numbers of aircraft in use will increase progressively as experience is gained and more trained personnel become available.

Training

78. Personnel have been trained in a number of countries and under instructors of diverse nationalities in Indonesia. This has led to a confusing mixture of doctrines, methods and techniques. The receipt of Soviet Bloc equipment necessitated a major training programme and numbers of personnel, both aircrew and technicians, were sent to Egypt, Czechoslovakia and Poland for experience on the new equipments. At the end of 1958 an agreement was signed with Czechoslovakia for training 250 aircrew over a period of four years. The first graduates under this scheme (including 32 pilots), returned to Indonesia in 1960. Some dissatisfaction with the standard of training received has been reported, and arrangements are believed to have been made for future courses to carry out advanced training in Russia before returning to Indonesia. (This training project was expected to be completed early in 1963.) A number of Soviet Bloc personnel have been observed working in Indonesia, and Soviet instructors and technicians have assisted AURI with the handling of its modern aircraft and equipment. Towards the end of 1962 AURI appeared anxious to become less dependent upon Bloc assistance and, as a result, a number of Soviet technicians were returned to their homeland.

79. For a number of years India has maintained a small training mission in Indonesia which has been engaged mainly on organising and running a staff course. In addition to this mission a steady stream of AURI personnel has been sent to India each year on a variety of training courses. Most AURI navigators are trained in India. A three-year training agreement, signed with

India in 1959 for the training of 1,280 technicians, is proceeding, and will shortly be completed. The Indian Air Force Advisory Group in Indonesia has recently been withdrawn.

80. AURI is thus relying heavily on overseas assistance for training its personnel during the period of expansion. Some improvement in manning can be expected by the end of 1963 with the completion of the current training projects, but if the force is to become fully effective when its expansion is completed a large recruiting and training programme will be necessary throughout the foreseeable future.

Other Resources

81. Airborne Forces. As mentioned in paragraph 73 above, the AURI has its own parachute unit with an estimated strength of 1,000 men fully equipped with light infantry weapons. (These are additional to the 2 or 3 battalions in the Indonesian Army.) The role of this unit is laid down as the defence and recapture of airfields, and for this it is maintained at a reasonable level of training. Parachutist training was, until recently, carried out with C.130B Hercules from No.31 Squadron. However, the increased demands placed on this squadron by 'Confrontation', coupled with increasing unserviceability, has compelled the use of C.47 aircraft, on loan from Garuda, in the para-training role. With normal aircraft capacities this squadron is capable of airlifting 640 paratroops, but AURI have been known to lift 100 men in one C-130B. The squadron could therefore lift up to 1,000 men providing all aircraft were serviceable.

82. Radar. There is a C & R system in process of construction. The cancellation of the Decca contract has brought to a halt the installation of a modern EW/GC1 system in Java and the outer Islands. Only one EW Station has been completed, on Bintan Island south of Singapore, and is now operational. Further progress is unlikely until a new foreign contractor can be persuaded to take on the contract and, in that event, it is estimated that at least a further 12 months will be required to complete the two large EW/GC1 stations in Java. A number of low cover early warning stations have been installed around the coast of Java but are on care and maintenance through lack of trained technicians, operators and communications.

83. In addition, the Indonesians possess fifteen NYSA B and C EW/GC1 mobile radars of Polish origin, some of which are sited outside Java. These radars are of poor quality and difficulties have been experienced in operating them in tropical conditions. Meantime, the Indonesians have attempted the installation of an ad hoc C & R system using some Russian mobile equipment, in conjunction with the Polish NYSA radars. However, because of the extreme shortage of trained technicians and operators, and the lack of a sophisticated communications system to link-up the sites, it is unlikely that in the foreseeable future the C & R system can be operated at more than 50% efficiency.

84. Navigation Aids and Electronics. Navigation aids throughout Indonesia are very limited but plans are in hand to improve them. Until they are improved the present shortage will continue to limit the all-weather capability of the jet fighter force when operating outside GC1 cover, but the Beagles and Badgers should be able to use their radar as navigation aids. As yet the Indonesians have shown no interest in developing an ECM capability.

85. Guided Missiles. AURI has shown increasing interest in guided weapons and as a result of the 1961 arms agreement with the USSR these weapons were introduced during 1962. They include semi-mobile surface-to-air missiles (Guideline), air to surface missiles (Kennel), and air-to-air missiles (type not known). Although the acquisition of these weapons will considerably increase AURI's operational effectiveness, the difficulties associated with their storage and maintenance under tropical conditions, not to mention the high cost of firing missiles for training purposes, will add to AURI's problems.

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86. Maintenance and Supply. AURI is still entirely dependent on spares from overseas and this continues to affect aircraft serviceability seriously. The present shortage of foreign currency has not improved the situation, and there is a high degree of cannibalisation. Maintenance problems are complicated because of the variety of aircraft held, the lack of adequate supervision and the shortage of trained technicians. The shortage of trained technicians is particularly acute in the radar and electronics trades.

Morale

87. The appointment of AVM Omar Dani as Minister/C-in-C of the AURI, and the advancement of some of the more professionally qualified younger aircrew officers at the beginning of 1962 produced some improvement in morale. However, AURI's failure to improve living conditions and pay (the latter in the face of increasing inflation) is beginning to cause a deterioration. There is no doubt that AURI is loyal to the President but there have been indications that many officers are dissatisfied with the efforts made so far to improve the Indonesian economy. There has recently been some penetration of AURI by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), but generally AURI may be regarded as anti-Communist.

Operational Capabilities

88. Air Defence. The present force is adequate for internal security operations but its present air defence capability is negligible. Within two years, with a reasonably effective control and reporting system, supersonic jet fighters, some equipped with radar and air-to-air missiles, AURI should have a moderate air defence capability over Java and portions of Sumatra during day and night in good weather. "Guideline" SAM missiles now supplement the air defences in the Djakarta area and will probably be deployed to two other main centres in Java by the end of 1964 or early 1965.

89. Air Offence. Within two years the AURI bomber force should be capable of dropping conventional weapons by day and night in good weather out to ranges of 690 nautical miles for IL-25 (Beagle) and 1,800 nautical miles for TU-16 (Badger) aircraft, from the major Indonesian bases.

90. Ground Attack. AURI has a limited ground attack capability but the emphasis of training is with obsolete piston-engined F-51s (Mustang) and B-25s (Mitchell). It is doubtful whether the force would be effective in close support of the Army for a major campaign. A few pilots have received limited training in the ground attack role on MIG-17 fighters but, in general, there is a lack of experience in this type of flying in jet fighter units.

91. Maritime Operations. Until recently AURI had neither the equipment nor the experience needed for maritime operations. However, as previously mentioned, the acquisition of TU-16 (Badger B) aircraft, equipped with "Kennel" ASM, has greatly increased AURI's capability against surface ships. This bomber force probably has a limited reconnaissance capability against surface shipping. However, AURI's effectiveness against submarines is considered negligible.

92. Air Transport Support. AURI relies heavily on its transport squadrons for logistic support to its outlying bases throughout the archipelago. Its total airlift capacity (100% serviceability) is 2,300 troops or 325 tons of freight. However the initial serviceability rate would be unlikely to exceed 65% and this would drop rapidly after the first few days of any operations.

/Personalities

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ANNEX A TO
JIC(FE) 111/64 (FINAL)

Personalities

93. A list of AURI personalities with their present appointments is given below:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Appointment</u>
Air Chief Marshal R.S. Suryadarma	Air Advisor to the President (Ex-Minister/CAS)
Air Marshal Omar Dani	Minister/Chief of Staff, AURI
Air Vice Marshal Sudjano	Commander, National Air Defence Committee
Air Cdre Srimuljono Horlambang	Deputy Minister/Commander AURI Operations
Air Cdre Sumarnoko Harbani	Deputy Minister/Commander AURI Administration
Air Cdre Dudiardjo	Deputy Minister/Commander AURI Logistics
Air Cdre Leo Wattimena	Commander of AURI Operations Command
Col Wiriadinata	Head of Air Force Paratroops
Col Dewanta	Director of Intelligence
Col Rusmin Nurjadin	Director of Operations

Conclusions

94. The present operational capability of the Indonesian Air Force is severely limited by:

- a. Shortage of experienced aircrew.
- b. Shortage of technicians and instructors.
- c. Lack of suitable airfields with facilities and logistics.
- d. Inadequate communications.
- e. Shortage of spares.

95. While these limitations exist AURI will only be capable of carrying out small-scale operations. Before major operations can be undertaken a determined effort must be made to improve the aircraft serviceability rate, to overcome the aircrew shortage, to intensify operational training and to improve considerably the airfield facilities throughout the archipelago.

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APPENDIX 1 TO
SECTION 4 OF
ANNEX A TO
JIC(FE)111/64(FINAL);

AURI AIR ORDER OF BATTLE
AS AT JULY, 1964

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Role</u>	<u>Airfield</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>A/C Type</u>	<u>Strength</u>
<u>No. 1 Wing</u>					
No. 2 Sqn	Transport	Halim Perdanakasuma	Djakarta	Dakota Crate	23 12
No. 17 Sqn	VIP tpt	"	"	Jetstar Cessna Piper Cub Otter Dakota Crate	1 5 4 3 4 1
No. 6 Sqn	Communications (Helicopter)	Semplak	Bogor	Hiller Bell H13G Bell H13J Hound M14 Iroquois UH 1B	2 3 2 8 2
No. 31 Sqn	Transport	Halim Perdanakasuma	Djakarta	Hercules	8
<u>No. 2 Wing</u>					
No. 1 Sqn	Lt Bomber	Abdulrachman Saleh	Malang	Mitchell	15
No. 3 Sqn	Fighter/Ground Attack	"	"	Mustang	16
No. 5 Sqn	Maritime Recce/ SAR	"	"	Catalina Albatross Goose E21C	1 4 2
<u>No. 3 Wing</u>					
No. 11 Sqn	Jet Ftr	Iswahjudi	Madiun	Fresco Midget	12 10
No. 12 Sqn	"	"	"	Farmer	5
No. 14 Sqn	"	"	"	Fishbed	16
No. 21 Sqn	Jet Lt Bmr	"	"	Beagle/Mascot	12
No. 41 Sqn	Jet Med Bmr	"	"	Badger A	10
No. 42 Sqn	"	"	"	Badger B	8
					<u>191</u>

Note: The figures quoted above represent the average number of serviceable aircraft believed to be available to each squadron under normal conditions at any given time, including aircraft under maintenance and those unserviceable.

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APPENDIX 2 TO
SECTION 4 OF
ANNEX A TO
JIC(FE)111/64(FINAL)

DETAILS OF INDONESIAN AIRFIELDS
SUITABLE FOR OPERATING JET AIRCRAFT

<u>Serial No.</u>	<u>Airfield</u> (a)	<u>R/W Length</u> (b)	<u>Surface</u> (c)	<u>Capable</u> <u>of Use By</u> (d)
1	<u>Java</u> Adisutjipto	6,070	Asphalt	IL-28, MIG-17, MIG-19, MIG-21
2	Djakarta/Mekajoran	8,120	"	} IL-28, MIG-17, MIG-19, TU-16 & MIG-21
		6,235	"	
3	Halim Perdanakusuma	7,500	"	IL-28, MIG-17, MIG-19 TU-16 & MIG-21
4	Hussein Sastranegara	6,560	"	IL-28, MIG-17, MIG-19 MIG-21
5	Maospati/Iswahjudi	8,000	"	IL-28, MIG-17, TU-16 MIG-19 & MIG-21
6	Abdulrachman Saleh	6,560	"	IL-28, MIG-17 MIG-19 & MIG-21
7	Surabaya/Tandungperak	4,900	"	MIG-17 (Restricted use by MIG-19 & MIG-21)
8	<u>Sumatra</u> Medan	8,000	"	IL-28, MIG-17, TU-16 MIG-19 & MIG-21
9	Padang	4,920	Concrete	MIG-17 (Restricted use by MIG-19 & MIG-21)
10	Palembang	5,085	Asphalt	MIG-17(Restricted use by MIG-19 & MIG-21)
11	<u>Moluccas</u> Fitu-Morotai	8,000	" Coral	TU-16, IL-28, MIG-17, MIG-19 & MIG-21
12	Pattimura/Amboina	5,500	Concret & Asphalt	MIG-17 (Restricted use by IL-28, MIG-19 & MIG-21)
13	<u>Celebes</u> Kendari/Walter Mongonsidi	5,400	Asphalt	MIG-17, IL-28, MIG-21 MIG-19
14	Hasanuddin	6,650	"	IL-28, MIG-17, MIG-19 & MIG-21
15	<u>Borneo</u> Bandjermasin	5,700	Asphalt on Rock Base	MIG-17, MIG-19, IL-28 & MIG-21

/Bali

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APPENDIX 2 TO
SECTION 4 OF
ANNEX A TO
JIC(FE)111/64(FINAL)

<u>Serial No.</u>	<u>Airfield</u> (a)	<u>R/W Length</u> (b)	<u>Surface</u> (c)	<u>Capable</u> <u>of Use by</u> (d)
16	<u>Bali</u> Denpasar	5,660	Asphalt on Coral	MIG-17(Restricted use by IL-28, MIG-19 & MIG-21)
17	<u>West Irian</u> Biak/Mokmea	11,715	Asphalt on Coral	TU-16, IL-28, MIG-17 MIG-19 & MIG-21

SECRET

J10 Secretary
of Defence

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE,
DOWNING STREET, LONDON, S.W.1.

14. 7. 64

*With the Compliments
of*

C.F. X. Burns.

SECRET

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION
CANBERRA

95

COL 91/2



142/8

✓

Dear Sir,

I think you may be interested to know that the R.A.A.F. is having trouble with its twelve Lockheed Hercules long-range transport aircraft. A proportion of them are grounded, pending modification of metal fatigue trouble in the main wing span. Help from America will be necessary and repairs may take some months. The Lockheed Company issued a technical bulletin showing that cracks had appeared in certain of these aircrafts which had flown for a specified time. Inspection of the R.A.A.F. aircraft revealed some of the defects set out in the technical bulletin. The R.A.A.F. hope to maintain their current schedules by increasing the utilisation of the remaining aircraft.


2. The object of this letter however, apart from telling you of the above, is to draw attention to the fact that Indonesia has 10 Hercules, which must also be affected by the defect and grounded. The longer they are in, grounded the better for all concerned. It would be optimistic to hope that the Indonesian Hercules could be given the lowest form of priority but perhaps it might be possible to consider at your end whether Lockheeds could be given a suitable hint.

Yours sincerely,

P. A. GRIER

P. A. GRIER.

J. S. Champion Esq. O.B.E.,
Defence Department,
Commonwealth Relations Office,
LONDON. S.W.1.



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SECRET

UNITED KINGDOM SECURITY WARNINGS

1. Category AC telegram. Paraphrase NOT required.
2. A telegram which contains a reference to any classified telegram or correspondence must itself be classified.
3. The Ministry of Defence Cypher Office must be consulted if it is desired to distribute or release this telegram, or any part of it, to a person or nation who would not normally be authorised to receive it.

FROM : CINC FAREAST
TO : CABINET OFFICE LONDON

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IZ 16570
TOO 020330Z
TOR 020507Z

FCK/JICFE 89

2nd July, 1964.

To Secretary JIC from Secretary JIC(FE).

1. JIC Anzam Meeting concluded.
2. The following are the conclusions of the paper on "The military threat to the Malaysian area up to the end of December 1964".

Begins:- "We assess that major Indonesian acts of overt aggression against British or Malaysian armed forces are unlikely but the possibility cannot be entirely ruled out. Indonesia could undertake lesser forms of activity with military implications either as a continuation of confrontation or in retaliation for what she considers to be hostile acts by Malaysian security forces. Indonesian and Indonesian inspired infiltration will continue. More specifically we conclude that:-

A. Indonesian and Indonesian inspired sabotage will increase in Malaya and Singapore throughout the period; it may be more effective than hitherto on account of Chinese Communist participation.

B. Indonesia will continue her attempts to use local dissident groups to promote insurrection in Malaya.

C. Indonesia will continue to engage in covert operations against the Borneo States, using a mixed force of volunteers and regulars numbering at present some 2300-2500. An increasing proportion of regulars can be expected. Greater emphasis will be placed on the recruitment and training of dissident elements from within the Borneo States.

D. It is not expected that during the next three months there will be any substantial or sustained increase of Indonesian military activity across the border into Borneo. However, if the Indonesians decide to strengthen their forces along, or close to, the Border, it is possible that there would be an increase in the scale of activity in the last three months of the period under review.

E. The numbers of troops which could be effectively employed in infiltration could only be significantly increased if the problems of Command, Communications and Supply were solved. They have made some progress in this field in the past few months, and may be expected to make further progress in the future.

SECRET

S E C R E T

-2-

F. In Sarawak, the Indonesians will continue to supply arms and training to the CCOS militant potential of approximately 4000, and attempt to use it to create major internal unrest. The CCO is at present not ready to embark on insurgency and is anxious to avoid any precipitate action. However, it could at any time initiate a campaign of terrorism, assassination and sabotage in areas now under predominant CCO influence.

G. In Sabah, especially in the Tawau residency attempts will continue to be made to organise elements of the Indonesian community for sabotage and terrorism, although it is unlikely that these actions will achieve much success.

H. It is unlikely that a serious insurgency threat will develop in Brunei in the period under review".

Ends.

3. The paper is being sent in today's bag. The other two papers taken on:-

A. Relations between the CCO and the Indonesians.

B. Soviet Bloc aid to Indonesia in a limited war situation, will follow by next bag.

CIRCULATION

020330Z

JIC Normal

S E C R E T

TOP SECRET

93

142/8

UNITED KINGDOM SECURITY WARNINGS

1. Category AC telegram. Paraphrase NOT required.
2. A telegram which contains a reference to any classified telegram or correspondence must itself be classified.
3. The Ministry of Defence Cypher Office must be consulted if it is desired to distribute or release this telegram, or any part of it, to a person or nation who would not normally be authorised to receive it.

FROM : MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, UNITED KINGDOM
TO : CINC FAR EAST

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

OZ 8241
TOO 291805Z

INFO : BHC KUALA LUMPUR

TLL COSSEA 141 29th June, 1964

From Chief of the Defence Staff.

- References:
- A. SEACOS 143
 - B. COSSEA 92
 - C. Kuala Lumpur to Commonwealth Relations Office No 1129.
 - D. SEACOS 142.

1. We appreciate your concern with the interim period. Authority to execute operations against lateral communications agreed in principle in reference B was withheld pending outcome of summit meeting in Tokyo, and is also regarded as subject to submission of Malaysian case to United Nations. Ministerial clearance will therefore be necessary, and Ministers are likely to be reluctant to give it in the absence of a Malaysian approach to United Nations.

2. Commonwealth Relations Office have signalled political guidance in reply to reference C and have asked BHC Kuala Lumpur to inform them urgently whether Malaysians are now prepared to send letter to the President of the Security Council.

3. We will be discussing whole question in the light of Lord Head's reply and reference D at our meeting tomorrow. At NDC you may give your military view in accordance with references A and D but as far as final authorisation of further measures is concerned you should simply say at this stage that the atmosphere in London would be much more favourable to deniable or undeniable offensive action if Malaysians would despatch immediate letter to President of Security Council.

CIRCULATION

TOO 291805Z

COS (Normal)

Subject: Operations in Borneo.

Originator: COSSEC 6285.

TOP SECRET

On the instructions of the
Chief of the Defence Staff,
the attached report has been
referred for examination and
report to the Joint
Intelligence Committee.

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of *Secretary JIC*

TOP SECRET

Copy No. *131*

COPIES OF THIS DOCUMENT MUST NOT BE MADE WITHOUT THE
AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY, CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

COS 129/64

Ministry of Defence

Revised Cover Sheet

12th June, 1964.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

RECEIVED

15 JUN 1964

J. I. C.

INDONESIAN CAPABILITIES FOR INCREASING GUERRILLA WARFARE
IN THE BORNEO STATES WITHIN THE NEXT THREE MONTHS

Note by the Secretary

1. At their meeting on Thursday 11th June, 1964, the Chiefs of Staff took note (1) of the Report (2) at Annex, assessing the maximum force of regulars and volunteers which the Indonesians could deploy and maintain in the Border area of Kalimantan up to 30th June 1964, and the extent to which this force could be launched against the Borneo Territories in covert operations.
2. The Report does not consider the effect of counter action by Security Forces, although this could have a substantial (but not necessarily decisive) effect on the size of the force which the Indonesians could deploy against Malaysian Borneo.
3. When considering the Report, the Chiefs of Staff noted that the figures contained in it have substantially altered since it was written and no longer reflect the current assessment.

J.H. Lapsley
Air Vice-Marshal
Secretary
Chiefs of Staff Committee

Notes:

1. COS 41st Meeting/64, Minute 125.
2. JIC(FE) 42/64.

TOP SECRET

Annex to
CCS. 129/64

INDONESIAN CAPABILITIES FOR INCREASING
 GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE BORNEO STATES
 WITHIN THE NEXT THREE MONTHS

BACKGROUND

1. President Sukarno and the Indonesian Government are under pressure as a result of economic and other difficulties. Moreover, the Indonesian Army have not been as successful in Borneo as had been hoped. It is possible that the Indonesians will now work for a temporary easing up of confrontation, but it is equally possible that if political negotiations fail, President Sukarno may decide to step up confrontation to the fullest extent possible.

AIM

2. The aim of this paper is to assess a theoretical maximum force of regulars and volunteers which the Indonesians could deploy and maintain in the border areas of Kalimantan within three months and to assess the extent to which this force could be launched against the Borneo Territories in covert operations.

FORCES AVAILABLE

Forces Already Earmarked for Guerilla Warfare

3. We estimate that in Borneo the Indonesians have at present 1,200 volunteers and 600 regulars engaged in guerilla operations. Their recent plan was to reinforce these with regulars from Java at a rate of 1,000 a quarter.

4. In a recent paper+ we concluded that in a period up to June, 1964:-

- (a) Indonesia will step up the scale and size of covert operations against the Borneo Territories. The overall number of troops both regular and volunteer earmarked for these operations is expected to reach 2,500 by June, 1964.
- (b) The proportion of Regular troops and MOBRIK involved in the covert operations will steadily increase and it is now believed to total some 600 - 700. They could be used in groups of up to company size for deep penetrations.

Additional Forces Immediately Available in Kalimantan

5. Regular. 2,100 regular troops could be made available for deployment in the Border areas of Kalimantan without affecting the internal security deployment of the seven garrison battalions or the 1,600 police (MOBRIK).

6. Volunteer. Allowing for volunteers at present under training and COO elements which have not yet been re-infiltrated into Sarawak, the Indonesians could find about 800 additional volunteers for 'A' Operations.

+ ANZAM JIC Report No. 2/64

Annex to
C.S. 123/64
(Continued)

Additional Forces Available from the Other Indonesian Islands

7. It is assessed that up to eight battalions at present stationed in the other Indonesian Islands could be made available for guerilla warfare against the Borneo States. Of this total two battalions of the RPKAD deployed in Java would appear to be readily available within a month, and not in need of a long guerilla warfare training period. These troops, numbering some 2,000 could be quickly deployed to Kalimantan by air and sea transport or parachuted direct from Java at a number of places along the border.

SUMMARY OF FORCES AVAILABLE

8.	(a)	At present earmarked for guerilla warfare			
		in the Borneo States -	Volunteers	-	1200
			Regulars	-	600
	(b)	Readily available in			
		Kalimantan -	Volunteers	-	800
			Regulars	-	2100
	(c)	Available in Java for reinforcement within one month -	Regulars	-	2000
	(d)	Available outside Kalimantan within three months -	Regulars	-	4400
			TOTAL	-	<u>7100</u>

Additional Sources of Support

9. Indonesian Volunteers. An additional source of volunteers could be provided by the Peoples Defence Organisation (OPR). Their strength could be as high as 10,000 but it is highly unlikely that this number could be taken away from their duties without reducing their IS/Local Defence Capabilities. However, they have undergone rudimentary military training and might be useful to fill the volunteer ranks. It is not known whether the Indonesians intend to draw from this source in the immediate future but OPR members have been used in incursions into the Borneo Territories.

10. Assistance from Subversive Elements in the Borneo States. Whilst Indonesian infiltrating parties could expect considerable assistance in the form of supplying food, shelter and information from members of the Indonesian communities in Sabah and from Malay dissidents in Sarawak, neither of these groups is likely to be able to assist Indonesian guerilla activities by militant action on any significant scale. CCO current policy with regard to their military potential remaining in Sarawak, assessed at approximately 3000 strong, appears to be to take action only in concert with an Indonesian invasion. In the event of a massive crossing of the Border some CCO elements would assume that the expected Indonesian invasion was taking place and that the time for revolt had arrived. Owing to lack of adequate training and arms supplies however, they would not be able to mount a full-scale insurgency within the time-scale of this paper. On the other hand they would be able to initiate a campaign of sabotage, assassination and terrorism on a fairly wide scale, particularly in the CCO dominated rear areas.

Annex to
OS 127/4
(Continued)

FACTORS LIKELY TO AFFECT THE SCALE OF
 FORCES AVAILABLE FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE

11. The following factors are considered likely to affect the scale of forces available for guerilla warfare assessed as numbering 11,100:-

- (a) Limitations of existing logistic organisation to supply additional force before and during infiltrations.
- (b) Capability of existing command and control facilities to accept additional forces.
- (c) Difficulties of terrain (see paragraph 12)
- (d) Financial limit to cost of reinforcing Kalimantan with troops from other islands.
- (e) Fear of the effect on world opinion of a massive increase in the use of regular units.
- (f) Fear of British retaliation in the shape of limited offensive action and the need to increase defensive capabilities to meet it.

Logistic Limitations on Size of Forces Employed in Guerilla Warfare

12. Present Capability. Except to a limited extent in Western Kalimantan, the terrain in the border areas is very difficult and roads are non-existent. There are numerous inland waterways of limited navigability, but supply by this means is slow and unreliable. In current operations the Indonesian logistic organisation is supplying some 2,000 troops, either by making available supply points for units deployed in reserve or by air dropping supplies direct to units deployed in the border regions. This demand is being met by two or three C-130 sorties each week.

13. Theoretical Capability. We have previously assessed that the Indonesians have a capability to supply five battalions at war rates in overt war in Kalimantan. The setting envisaged was a limited theatre of operations and did not assess the effort required to supply units deployed along the whole length of the frontier. However, logistic requirements for guerilla operations are considerably less than war scales and it should be possible to maintain a force of 7,000 regulars and volunteers deployed in a number of localities along the border region. In practice some of their supplies would probably be delivered by surface means, but it would be theoretically possible for the Indonesians to deliver all their needs (some 30 tons per five days) by air.

14. Logistic Supply of Units Inside the Borneo Territories. It is most unlikely that the Indonesians would make air dropping supplies to their forces, once these were inside Malaysian territory. We therefore consider that all supply dropping would be carried out in Kalimantan and the supplies then moved forward by surface means. Additional supplies are planned to be made available from local sympathisers, by seizure or by the efforts of special teams sent in to set up dumps in or en-route to the pockets. Plans could easily be upset by the skilful use of Security Forces to capture the dumps or to exhaust their 'transit supplies' by harassing the groups during infiltration. In view of these difficulties we would guess that only some 3,500 could be maintained at any one time inside Malaysian territory.

Annex to
CJG, 129/64
(Continued)

Command and Control

15. It would appear that the Army can adequately command all the regular and volunteer forces currently engaged in guerilla warfare in Kalimantan. However the problems of control, co-ordination and movement are likely to cause difficulties in the timing of simultaneous operations as the size of forces increases.

Financial Limit to the Cost of Reinforcing Kalimantan with Troops from other Islands

16. There have been indications that financial considerations are a limiting factor as to the number of troops which can be made available for reinforcement to Kalimantan. We are unable to quantify this factor.

Need to Strengthen the Defences of Kalimantan

17. The Indonesians will appreciate that any marked stepping up of guerilla activities will carry with it a risk of retaliation by British forces. We expect therefore that they will want to increase the forces available for the defence of Kalimantan at the same time as they increase the forces earmarked for offensive operations. The Indonesians can readily find enough troops for both purposes but logistic factors will, as we have pointed out earlier, limit the numbers they can deploy in the forward areas of Kalimantan to approximately 7,000 men. Within this total, defensive requirement need not reduce to any great extent the numbers available for offensive operations since broadly the same troops could be used for shallow penetration into the Borneo Territories and for defensive purposes in Kalimantan.

Fear of Alienating World Opinion

18. The Indonesians have made great efforts to maintain the fiction that the guerillas in Borneo are natives of Borneo aided by Indonesian volunteers. Regular troops have so far been used in a proportion not more than a quarter of the number of volunteers in any given operation. They have also been ordered to remove all their identifying marks. The Indonesians must realise, however, that if they were greatly to increase the number of Regulars employed in Borneo, this must become apparent to some extent and risk alienating world opinion. They could, however, reduce this risk by using the bulk of their Regular forces in shallow penetrations thereby lessening the risk of prisoners or casualties falling into our hands.

Fear of British Retaliation

19. While trying to generate the maximum pressure on the Malaysians and ourselves, the Indonesians have shown themselves most anxious not to take any action which might lead to escalation to overt war. They may reckon that if they step up their guerilla effort in Borneo, the pressure of world opinion will prevent us from retaliating by all-out offensive action against Indonesia. At the same time they probably appreciate that if they try to swamp British forces in Borneo there is risk that we would decide that we would not indefinitely remain on the defensive. They may therefore hesitate before launching into all-out guerilla operations in Borneo.

Annex to
C.S. 129/64
(Concluded)

CONCLUSIONS

- 20.
- (a) The Indonesians are likely to continue to exert their main military pressure in Borneo. Their subversive efforts against Malaya and Singapore is being stepped up but will remain a diversionary effort. We estimate that in Borneo, the Indonesians have at present 1,200 volunteers and 600 regulars engaged in guerilla operations. Their recent plan was to reinforce these forces with Regulars from Java at a rate of 1,000 a quarter.
 - (b) We believe if an all-out effort was ordered the Indonesians could concentrate for guerilla operations within one month a further 800 volunteers and 2,100 Regulars from the forces at present in Borneo. This would still leave them seven battalions and 1,600 Internal Security Police (MOBRIG) for internal security in Kalimantan.
 - (c) The Indonesians could in addition make two parachute battalions available within one month from outside Kalimantan.
 - (d) The Indonesians have a theoretical airborne logistic capability to supply in forward positions in Kalimantan the forces at (a), (b) and (c) above, totalling 6,700.
 - (e) Two limiting factors may be:-
 - (i) The Indonesians inability to control and maintain across the border a guerilla force of this size.
 - (ii) Their inability to use to the full their theoretical airborne logistic capability. We are unable to quantify either of these limitations.
 - (f) In addition, the following factors are likely to act as a brake on the extent to which the Indonesians use the forces at (a), (b) and (c) above in offensive guerilla operations:-
 - (i) Fear of the effect on world opinion of too massive a use of Indonesian Regulars.
 - (ii) The need to strengthen the defensive forces in Kalimantan with an eye to the possibility of British counter-action.
 - (iii) The fear that a massive build-up may drive the British forces to offensive operations.
 - (g) In view of logistic considerations and in order not to damage their public position the Indonesians may use the bulk of their Regular forces in shallow penetrations.
 - (h) Taking the foregoing into account we believe that the Indonesians can in an all out effort deploy and maintain close to 7,000 regulars and volunteers on their side of the border. We find it difficult to estimate how many of these could be launched and maintained in covert operations across the border at any one time but think that this total is unlikely to exceed 3,500 men.

EXTRACT from C.O.S. 41st MEETING/64 held on 11 June 64

91

125. INDONESIAN CAPABILITIES FOR GUERILLA 142/8 RESTRICTED
WARFARE IN THE BORNEO STATES

The Secretary was informed by telephone of the approval of the Chiefs of Staff to a Secretary's minute (1) subject to amendment by the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (2).

Notes:

1. COS 2147/26/5/64.
2. VCDS 1.

J.I.C.

27 MAY 1964

Please initial and pass quickly

1. Secretary *JS*

2. D/Secretary *JS*

~~A/Secretary 1~~ *JS*

A/ - do - 2 *JS*

A/ - do - 3 *JS*

A/ - do - 4 *JS*

3. P.C.

4. Subject *142/8*

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COS 2147/26/5/64

Copy No.....

Ministry of Defence

26th May 1964

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Copy to: Chief of the Defence Staff
Major-General C.R. Price, Commonwealth
Relations Office

INDONESIAN CAPABILITIES FOR INCREASING GUERRILLA
WARFARE IN THE BORNEO STATES WITHIN
THE NEXT THREE MONTHS

1. Attached, at Annex, are comments (1) by the Joint Intelligence Committee on a report (2) prepared by the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, on Indonesian capabilities for increasing guerilla warfare in the Borneo States within the next three months.
2. In accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the Defence Staff, you are asked to forward by 8th June 1964, approval or comments to the report (2) as amended in accordance with the comments of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

J.H. Lapsley
Air Vice-Marshal
Secretary
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Notes:

1. JIC 343.
2. COS 129/64.

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ANNEX TO COS 2147/26/5/64

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE COMMENTS ON COS 129/64

1. In general the figures estimated in this report are agreed. It must be emphasised, however, that definitions used such as troops 'engaged', 'earmarked' as "immediately available" are very broad.
2. The following comments of detail are made:
 - a. Paragraph 3. Of the 1200 IBT and 600 regulars estimated as 'engaged', it is assessed that 300-400 are already established within East Malaysia, a further 400-500 are involved in indirectly supporting the operations or forming an immediate reserve for re-infiltration, whilst about 1000 are not yet committed but available, not far from the border. It is estimated that in addition some 200 Indonesian-trained members of the CCO have so far been re-infiltrated independently.
 - b. Paragraph 14, line 10. The figure of 3500 is mentioned as being the ceiling force which could be maintained across the border. A fair proportion of this force would be absorbed in portage and escort work on the L of C.
 - c. Although prior to the "ceasefire" the proportion of regulars referred to was one quarter, it has increased since then as a result of a recent change in Indonesian tactics, including the introduction of a real military direction and co-ordination of operations.

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